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OR nearly half a century, our national laws dealing with the em-

ployment relationship have either granted directly certain benefits-such as a minimum wage, a safe place to work, retirement
benefits, and protection against discrimination on the basis of race or sexor have left these benefits to be secured through the play of economic
forces known as collective bargaining. There have been efforts over roughly the same period of time to grant, by action of Congress, compensation to
performers whose performances have been captured on film or tape or
phonograph record and then re-played by others for commercial profit.
All such efforts have thus far failed. The Copyright Act of 1976' has no
provisions for "performers' rights" in recorded music or recorded speech,
as distinguished from copyright in the musical composition or literary
work being rendered. Labor organizations representing performers-instrumental musicians, singers and actors-have therefore attempted to secure such performers' rights through the private mechanism of collective
bargaining.
So long as no mechanical means existed for recording and recreating
such performances, there was no concern about such performers' rights or
attendant royalties. Once, however, the inventive genius of such persons
as Thomas Edison had produced the motion picture and the phonograph
record, a person's performance could be played far away, and played
often. One obvious consequence was the very serious threat to that performer's employment opportunities, as well as to the employment of other
performers for whose services the recording could be substituted. Another
consequence was the belief that, whether or not the performer's employment was threatened, the performer should receive compensation when the
performance was rendered from the recording, particularly when others
reaped commercial benefits from the performer's talents.
One group of performers for whom these problems have been acute are
the instrumental musicians, who perform not only live but also on phonograph records and tapes, on filmed television programs and on motion picture soundtracks. These musicians are represented by the American
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981).
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Federation of Musicians, which periodically negotiates labor agreements
with employers in the various entertainment industries. There are, for example, separate contracts covering wages and working conditions for instrumental musicians working for the manufacturers of phonograph
records, for the producers of television films, and for the producers of socalled theatrical motion pictures. The re-use of the "fixed" performances
of musicians, generically referred to here as "recordings," has generated a
conflict of interests between two constituencies within the union. One
group consists of those who perform on these recordings. These persons
hear the recordings replayed for commercial profit--on radio broadcasts,
jukeboxes, wired-music services, or television broadcasts-and naturally
wish to share in that profit, since their talents have contributed to it. The
other group of affected musicians is that which has been ousted by the use
of recorded music. These musicians would otherwise be asked to perform
live-on radio and television programs, in theatres and nightclubs, in
dancehalls, restaurants and hotels. This latter group reasonably feels that
the recording musicians are responsible for their displacement, and that
some of the profits from the commercial exploitation of recorded music
should inure to the benefit of those whom that music has displaced.
There have been insistent pressures within the American Federation of
Musicians to bargain not so much for performers' rights and performance
royalties, but rather for the protection of the predominant segment of the
membership that does not record for the phonograph record, motion picture, or television industries. These pressures retarded Federation endorsement of performers' rights in their collective bargaining agreements.
It took what has been characterized as a "revolt" within the membership of
the AFM, occurring in the late 1950s, to move the Federation leaders to a
bargaining policy more protective of the interests of the recording musicians. This evolution (or revolution) in the philosophy and bargaining
policy of the American Federation of Musicians is the subject of this
Article.
I.

2

THE RISE OF RECORDED Music AND OF JAMES C. PETRILLO

The phonograph, invented in 1877 by Thomas A. Edison, became a
practicable device for home enjoyment between 1896 and 1900. Through
technological improvements leading to greater fidelity of sound, orchestral
recording became a reality in 1913, supplementing the emphasis in the preceding decade upon vocal performances, most notably those of Enrico
Caruso. At first the phonograph record created more employment opportunities for instrumental musicians than it displaced. It was not until the
2. Most of the factual material recounted in this section and the two following sections
is based upon two very thorough and useful works: R.

LEITER, THE MUSICIANS AND
PETRILLO (1953); and Countryman, The Organized Musicians (pts. I & 2), 16 U. CHI. L.
REV. 56 (1948), 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1949). A less detailed, but still helpful, treatment of
these facts and also of the origin and operations of the Music Performance Trust Funds, is to
be found in ch. III of T. KENNEDY, AUTOMATION FUNDS AND DISPLACED WORKERS (1962).
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1930s that the competition of records with live musicians became serious,
as radio broadcasters came to rely extensively upon the playing of such
records over the air.
Beginning in 1910, silent motion pictures-previously used as a novel
adjunct in vaudeville theatres-became a commercial success in their own
right, with the appearance of the multi-reel picture. This development
brought a most substantial need for instrumental musicians. Some motion
picture studios hired small musical groups to perform in the studios during
filming, as a way of relieving some of the tedium of the actors' day. But
far greater was the use of instrumental musicians in the theatres in which
silent movies were exhibited. Theatre employment for live musicians increased tenfold. Many theatres hired a single musician, typically a pianist
or organist, to provide mood music to accompany the silent film, while
other theatres hired orchestras, some of substantial size, to accompany the
vaudeville and film attractions shown under the same roof. By 1926 some
22,000 musicians were playing in American motion picture theatres. Contracts between theatre owners and the American Federation of Musicians
served as some guarantee of continued employment.
Additional employment opportunities for musicians were generated by
the emergence in 1920 of radio as a device for transmitting voice and music. A dearth of program material led to extensive reliance on phonograph
records, but federal government regulations designed to achieve diversity
of programming resulted in a limitation upon recorded music and the use
of live musicians. At first, these musicians played for the radio stations
without pay, a a means of publicizing their wares, but soon they became
subject to wage scales negotiated between the local stations and the locals
of the AFM. The duty to pay for live music induced radio stations to
resort more frequently to phonograph records, which were often introduced in a manner that gave the radio audience the impression that the
music was being performed live in the radio studios. Local employment
opportunities were more seriously undermined in 1926 and 1927 when the
NBC and CBS radio networks were formed, allowing transmittal of a single program through local stations to the entire nation.
Perhaps the most dramatic blow to the employment of live musicians
was the advent of the talking motion picture. Warner Brothers released
"The Jazz Singer" in 1927. Within two years, 2,000 theatres had installed
sound equipment, the cost of which was substantially less than the cost of
retaining a staff of musicians on a full-time basis. In 1929, the number of
musicians performing for vaudeville and motion pictures fell from 22,000
to 19,000, and by 1930 it had fallen to 14,000. During that year the
number declined precipitously to some 5,000 performing musicians in
American motion picture theatres. This decline was accompanied by an
all but total destruction of the power of the AFM in the theatres; a strike
needs workers to call upon, and the refusal of live musicians to work could
not close a theatre exhibiting sound motion pictures.
Many of the displaced musicians packed their instruments and moved to
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the land of promise, Hollywood; but the motion picture studios provided
employment for only some 200 or 300 of them, and they had to be of outstanding ability. Those who were hired by the motion picture producers
were assured of some stability of employment through labor agreements
negotiated by the AFM, which provided for the hiring of a minimum
number of musicians in the studio's "staff orchestra," or the expenditure of
a minimum amount of money annually for staff musicians. This chain of
events caused many persons within the AFM to call for a ban on recording
for motion picture soundtracks. Such a recording ban would probably
have been unsuccessful, however, since musicians who were willing to play
could have been wooed from the union by lucrative employment contracts.
Moreover, such a ban would probably have been illegal, because a work
stoppage directed against the producers as a means of procuring employment from theatre owners would likely have been treated as a secondary
boycott, unlawful under both state tort law and the Sherman Antitrust
Act.3 Joseph N. Weber, President of the AFM since 1900, decided instead
to launch in 1929 and 1930 a public-relations campaign directed at inducing a public boycott of sound motion pictures, claiming that they were a
debasement of music, but 'that met with little success. The decision of
some locals to exert pressure directly on movie houses in 1936 and 1937,
including the use in some cases of picket lines and sit-ins, met with a similar fate.
President Weber was, however, sensitive to the fact that motion picture
soundtrack, like the phonograph record, could be re-used to the detriment
of live employment opportunities, and he succeeded in securing restrictions on such use. The 1938 labor agreement between the AFM and the
major studios provided that a motion picture soundtrack was to be used
only "to accompany the picture for which the music was performed" and
was not to be used for any other picture or purpose "except to accompany
4
a revival of the picture for which recordings were originally made."
At the same time as sound motion pictures were drastically reducing the
need for live musicians in theatres, other events were limiting their employment opportunities elsewhere. There were, however, some
countercurrents that retarded the decline. During the period from 1929 to
1932, phonograph record manufacturing dropped. Apparently, in a time
of depression, the public was getting its principal pleasure from the musical and comedic material broadcast over the radio rather than from the
purchase and playing of phonograph records. But in 1932, there was an
upswing in the manufacture of records and the resulting employment of
musicians in that industry. The major contributing factors were the lowerpriced record, the rise of "swing" music and the proliferation of the juke3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
4. That restriction on the use of soundtrack remains in the AFM contracts to this day,
almost verbatim, and is qualified by only a limited number of exceptions, such as the "dubbing" of the soundtrack onto phonograph records; in such cases, the original motion picture
recording musicians are paid at scale wages as if they had performed on the phonograph
record.
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box. From 1920 to 1933, live musical performances in hotels, restaurants
and nightclubs were adversely affected by the lack of liquor to which the
music could serve as accompaniment. The demise of Prohibition at the
end of 1933 generated an increase in such "club dates" for musicians. But
the major and most insistent threat to live performers in the 1930s came
from the use of recorded music on radio programs.
The year 1930 witnessed the development of the so-called electrical transcription, which made it possible to record fifteen minutes of a radio program on a single sixteen-inch disc, and then to use that disc for delayed
rebroadcast, either on the West Coast the same day or anywhere in the
nation months or years later. Soon after, the Muzak Corporation became
the major force in "wired music," which involved a private hook-up to a
central station playing musical transcriptions, which were transmitted to
hotels and restaurants. In radio broadcasting itself, the Federal Radio
Commission loosened its limitations upon the use of phonograph records
on the air, and this policy was continued by its successor agency, the Federal Communications Commission, created in 1934. (Those agencies did,
however, take steps to assure that the broadcaster announced that the music was being played from phonograph records and not by a live orchestra.) Radio broadcasters responded to the public's increasing taste for
popular music by playing more records. In the late 1930s, more than half
of the music played on American radio stations was transcribed or was
from phonograph records. Local radio stations throughout the country
were making less use of full-time "staff orchestras" and of "casual" musicians both because of the availability of recordings and because of the
spread of the radio network systems.
During this time, a young man of influence within the American Federation of Musicians was gravely concerned about the threat that recorded
music posed to the economic wellbeing of musicians. He was James Caesar Petrillo, who became president of Local 10 in Chicago in 1922, when
he was thirty years old. Petrillo, earlier than any other leader within the
labor movement, emphasized that technological unemployment within the
field of instrumental music was different from other trades or crafts. In
other trades workers were displaced by the inventions of entrepreneurs,
while it was the musicians themselves who were responsible for making the
recordings that displaced their fellow artists. From this fundamental
premise, Petrillo early concluded that one way to avoid technological unemployment was for musicians simply to cease forging the instruments of
their own destruction, that is, to cease recording. Petrillo also concluded
somewhat later that to the extent musicians did make recordings, they
were obliged to mitigate the harmful economic impact upon their fellow
musicians.
While president of the Chicago local, Petrillo organized the first AFM
strike against broadcasters to combat their use of recordings. In 1931, Local 10 called a strike by Chicago radio musicians, in part to prevent the use
of records on commercial broadcasts. The strike was settled through the
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broadcasters' concessions on other matters. The Chicago local then announced in early 1937 that it would not permit its members to make recordings or transcriptions unless the local officers could assure that there
would be an end to "the menacing threat of canned music competition."
Petrillo, and the policies he effected in Local 10, carried weight at the annual convention of the Federation in 1937, which gave its mandate to President Weber to begin an economic battle against the encroachments of
mechanical music.
Weber entered negotiations in 1937 with representatives of the radio
broadcasting industry and of the transcription and phonograph record
companies. He declared that he was prepared to order his musicians to
cease performing on radio and to cease recording, if that was necessary to
assure increased employment of musicians by the radio stations. The twoyear agreements negotiated with the radio broadcasters provided for a very
substantial increase in the size of radio staff orchestras. The networks and
their affiliates, which previously had been spending $3,500,000 yearly in
musicians' wages, agreed to spend an additional $2,000,000 per year. The
1938 agreements with the recording companies required those companies
to place on each record label a restrictive legend similar to "only for noncommercial use on phonographs in homes." The objective was to impose
an "equitable servitude" on the recordings, so that the musicians could
enjoin their use on radio broadcasts. Both the "quota" contracts with the
broadcasters and the record-label strategy were soon subjected to legal
challenge.
As the radio "quota" contracts were about to be renegotiated in 1939,
Assistant United States Attorney General Thurman Arnold published a
list of union practices that he asserted to be clear violations of the Sherman
Act and that the Antitrust Division would prosecute with vigor. The list
included "unreasonable restraints designed to compel the hiring of useless
and unnecessary labor." In an attempt to avoid this peril, the AFM relegated its labor negotiations to the local level, between local stations and
individual union locals. But, although wage scales of radio musicians
moved up in the period 1940 to 1947, the number of staff musicians employed by the radio networks and local stations fell from 2,237 to 1,939.
By the end of that period the average local radio station employed less
than one-third of a full-time musician.
The more widely known legal attack upon the collective bargaining
strategy of President Weber was directed at the record-labeling requirement contained in the labor agreements between the AFM and the recording industry. Phonograph records commonly bore such labels as "for
home use only" or "not licensed for radio broadcast," in the hope that
remote purchasers-such as radio stations-would be bound thereby. Several "name performers" who had organized themselves as the National
Association of Performing Artists instituted a number of test suits in the
late 1930s against radio broadcasters that refused to abide by the warning
on the label. Several of these suits were successful, the most important
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being the 1937 decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Waring v.
WDAS BroadcastingStation, Inc.5 In that case, Fred Waring, who had
been hired to perform on radio under the sponsorship of the Ford Motor
Company, sued radio station WDAS, which had purchased a Waring recording bearing a conspicuous warning legend and played it over the air;
Waring objected to the competition this gave his own live performances.
The Pennsylvania courts enjoined the unauthorized use of the phonograph
record. 6 This victory was, however, short-lived. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a contrary result in 1940 in the
famous case of RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman.7 There, the court
held that the sale of the recordings of the Paul Whiteman orchestra resulted in the loss of state copyright protection because it was a "general
publication,"' 8 and that the restrictive legend neither saved the copyright
nor imposed an enforceable equitable servitude upon purchasers of the
recordings. 9 The Whiteman court further held that state doctrines of unfair competition could not overcome the preemptive implications of the
federal copyright scheme, which dictated free use of creative works not
protected under federal law.' 0 The impact of this decision was great, both
because it was expressed in a most thoughtful opinion by the most highly
regarded jurist of his day, Learned Hand, and because the Second Circuit
encompassed New York, a center for record production and sales and for
radio broadcasting.
The Whiteman decision is uniformly regarded even today by representatives of recording artists as one of the most grievous blows that American
law has inflicted upon these artists. I The effect of Whiteman was that
radio broadcasters were legally entitled, upon payment of the price of a
phonograph record, to exploit and re-exploit for their own commercial advantage the public's desire to hear the major recording artists of the day.
The decision forced the American Federation of Musicians to look elsewhere for ways to pressure the broadcasters to refrain from so utilizing
recorded music as to destroy the employment opportunities of live musicians. The Federation soon realized that direct economic pressure could
be such a device, and that the obvious targets of such economic pressure
were the record manufacturers and the broadcasters. The more forwardlooking labor leaders appreciated that the broadcasters could weather a
work stoppage fairly well because they could rely on the very source of the
musicians' distress, the phonograph record.
After the broadcasting and record negotiations of 1937 and 1938, President Weber came under sharp verbal attack from local president Petrillo,
5. 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).

6. 194 A. at 642.
7.

114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).

8. 114 F.2d at 88-89.
9. Id. at 89.
10. Id. at 90.

11. As discussed later in the Article, the other unwelcome legal actions were a product
not of the courts but of Congress.
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who was gaining increasing notoriety within the AFM. Petrillo was known
in part for his tough stance within Local 10 on the question of mechanical
recordings and in part for the fact that the Chicago musicians were the
highest paid in the union. By 1940, Weber-at the age of 75-had served
as the AFM President for 40 years. That year, he announced his retirement, and James Caesar Petrillo at the age of 48 was elected President of
the Federation.
II.

THE

1942

RECORDING BAN AND THE CREATION OF THE

RECORDING AND TRANSCRIPTION FUND

Petrillo's experiences in Chicago in 1937 and 1938, when he had ordered
his musicians not to record, suggested to him that a nationwide ban could
be fully effective in preventing the use of recordings on radio. To consolidate the position of the AFM as a prelude to any such recording ban, Petrillo took two major steps shortly after his election as Federation
President.' 2 Many solo instrumentalists, accompanists and symphony
orchestra conductors were members of the American Guild of Musical
Artists, and not of the AFM; a recording ban could be undermined if the
AGMA musicians would not cooperate. Petrillo threatened in August
1940 to withhold from AGMA artists the services of musicians who were
members of the AFM. Although the AGMA leaders resisted this campaign and filed suit to stop it, they finally capitulated, and by February
1942, ninety-nine percent of the solo concert instrumentalists had become
members of the AFM. Another two-year campaign was successfully
waged by Petrillo to organize the last holdout in American symphonic
orchestras, the Boston Symphony Orchestra. The AFM Annual Conventions of 1941 and 1942 authorized Petrillo to ban the making of records
and transcriptions.
In June 1942, Petrillo notified the recording and transcription companies
that AFM members would not record after August 1. The nationwide recording ban went into effect as threatened, and all recording ceased. Petrillo's target was not so much the recording industry, which he made clear
he would happily support if their recordings could be limited to home use,
but rather the broadcasting industry. The recording ban generated a public uproar, with seventy-three percent of the American public favoring legal action against Petrillo; a Senate committee investigation; expressions of
concern about the impact of the recording ban, and the resulting decrease
in the flow of new records to radio stations, upon the morale of our fighting men and women; and a public-relations war between the AFM and
organized labor here and abroad on one side, and the recording companies
and broadcasters, who often controlled newspapers as well, on the other.
In 1942, Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold filed an antitrust
action in federal court in Chicago seeking an injunction to prevent the
Federation, its officers and directors, from continuing the recording ban.
12. See R. LEITER, supra note 2, ch. 7.
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The government claimed that the Federation was in violation of the Sherman Act, by attempting to restrain commerce in phonograph records and
electrical transcriptions and to eliminate competition between recorded
music and live music. The complaint pointed to the elimination of records
for home use, for radio use and for use in jukeboxes. The government also
leveled other charges against the defendants. In July 1942, Petrillo had
ordered an end to twelve years of Saturday afternoon radio broadcasts of
performances by high school orchestras from the National Music Camp at
Interlochen, Michigan; the defendants were charged with seeking to eliminate all live radio performances of music by persons not members of the
union. Petrillo had since 1940 required radio networks to boycott affiliated
stations that failed to hire a standby orchestra when network musical programs were transmitted through the local stations; the antitrust complaint
alleged that the defendants illegally sought to require radio stations to hire
standby musicians whose services were "neither necessary nor desired."
This lawsuit was a part of Assistant Attorney General Arnold's campaign
to use the Sherman Act to prevent featherbedding and the interference by
labor with the adoption of improved mechanical methods reducing the demand for labor. The National Association of Broadcasters filed a brief
amicus curiae in support of the Government's contentions. The district
court granted the Federation's motion to dismiss.' 3 The court held that the
defendants' acts were not enjoinable and did not violate the Sherman
Act.14 The pertinent federal statutes-the Clayton Act' 5 and the NorrisLaGuardia Act' 6-declared lawful the use of a work stoppage or the threat
of a work stoppage in pursuit of the union's objectives in a "labor dispute."
The case was held to involve such a "labor dispute," because the Federation was in effect seeking a "union shop" in the broadcasting industry,
directed both against nonunion live performers such as the Interlochen7
orchestra and against phonograph records and electrical transcriptions.'
8
The United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed the dismissal.'
At the same time, in February 1943, the Federation proposed that recording companies should pay to the union a fee in the nature of a royalty
for each phonograph record and transcription made by union members.
The union would disburse these moneys so as to reduce unemployment
caused largely by these mechanical reproductions. The union fund would
provide work through live concert performances, free to the public, which
would foster musical talent and music appreciation. This "trust fund" proposal was the imaginative creation of President Petrillo, whose philosophy
it was to have an industry, thriving upon the services of recording musicians, contribute to the economic well-being of those musicians ousted
13. United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304, 309 (N.D. I11.1942),
aftd, 318 U.S. 741 (1943).
14. 47 F. Supp. at 309.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
16. Id. § 101.
17. United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304, 308 (N.D. I11.1942).
18. 318 U.S. 741 (1943).
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from work by such recordings. His memories of the grievous loss of theatre employment for union members, resulting from motion picture soundtrack, were still vivid in Petrillo's mind. The record and transcription
companies, however, rejected his proposal. They objected to placing these
moneys within the union's uncontrolled discretion and they in principle
resisted the claim that they had any obligation to persons, identified
merely by their membership in the union, who had never been their employees. Negotiations foundered, and the strike continued on into the
summer of 1943, a year after it had begun.
The recording companies managed fairly well to weather the cessation
of the musicians' services. They had built up a backlog of new recordings
just before the strike, and they were able to make new pressings of records
made earlier. They made new recordings without using instrumental musicians, relying heavily on unaccompanied vocalists or on vocalists who
were accompanied by instruments not then covered by AFM rules or contracts, such as harmonicas, ocarinas, ukeleles and one-man bands. There
were some, but limited, sale of "bootleg" records and of records made in
Mexico and Cuba. Because of the war, raw materials used in record manufacture, particularly shellac, were in short supply, so that the production
of new records would have been limited even apart from the recording
ban. Nonetheless, the recording companies attempted to exert some pressure for a settlement-after conciliation efforts had failed regarding the
union's proposal for a trust fund-by taking their case to the National War
Labor Board. The NWLB was empowered to investigate disputes over
contract negotiations, direct the parties to adopt specific settlement terms,
bring those terms to the attention of the public, and ultimately to have
them enforced by governmental seizure of the business in the event the
Economic Stabilization Director found "that the war effort will be unduly
impeded or delayed" by continuance of the dispute. The NWLB asserted
jurisdiction. While a panel of the Board was holding hearings, however,
the strike took a dramatic turn.
In September 1943, Decca Records-which along with Columbia and
RCA Victor produced almost all of the phonograph records in the United
States, and which itself produced one-quarter of the total-signed a contract with the Federation. Within a month, several large transcription
companies and twenty-two small record and transcription manufacturers
signed the Decca contract. The companies agreed to pay royalties on each
phonograph record sold, ranging from one-fourth cent on a thirty-five cent
record to two and one-half percent of the sale price of records selling for
more than $2.00. The royalty on electrical transcriptions was three percent
of the company's gross revenue from their sale, lease, or license.' 9 The
royalties were to be kept by the Federation in a separate fund, called the
Recording and Transcription Fund, and were to be used "only for purposes of fostering and propagating musical culture and the employment of
live musicians, members of the Federation." By March 1944, almost
19. Transcriptions used only once by any one radio station were royalty-free.
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eighty small recording and transcription companies had signed the Decca
agreement. RCA Victor and Columbia, however, along with the NBC
transcription division, stood firm. In part, they were fearful that the
union's royalty demands, if successfully imposed upon them, would inevitably be presented to their parent broadcasting companies, the National
Broadcasting Company and the Columbia Broadcasting System.
The hold-out recording and transcription companies continued to press
their case before the National War Labor Board. In March 1944, a threemember panel of the Board recommended that the musicians should be
ordered to return to work and that no royalty plan should be approved. In
June 1944, the full Board, while agreeing that the record ban should end
immediately, approved the concept of a union welfare fund and ordered
arbitration of the amount and disposition of the royalty payments. Petrillo
refused to accede, since he had already secured favorable terms from other
companies that might be jeopardized by less favorable terms in an arbitration proceeding (since the existing agreements contained a so-called "most
favored nation" clause). The NWLB order was not made the subject of a
seizure order by the Economic Stabilization Director, since the continuation of the recording ban only at RCA Victor and Columbia could hardly
be said to impede the war effort unduly. The public outcry continued,
however, as did informal governmental pressures. In October 1944, more
than two years after the recording ban had begun, President Roosevelt sent
a telegram to Petrillo, appealing to his patriotism and citizenship, and urging him to end the ban and to abide voluntarily by the order of the National War Labor Board. Petrillo refused. Among other things, he pointed
out that agreements had already been reached with 105 recording and
transcription companies, and that he was in no position to give RCA and
Columbia more favorable terms.
The companies that had signed the agreement returned to full production. Shellac imports increased. Decca began to record a larger share of
the new popular songs, and recording artists began to switch to Decca
from RCA Victor and Columbia, the most celebrated example being Jascha Heifitz, who left RCA to sign a nonexclusive agreement with Decca in
October 1944. The competitive pressures on the two major hold-out companies became too great. In November 1944, almost twenty-seven months
after the recording ban began, RCA Victor and Columbia agreed to terms,
and full production was restored in the recording industry.
The contract that was signed by the major recording companies, by
smaller record companies totalling roughly 600, and by electrical transcription companies had a termination date of December 31, 1947. The
wage provisions were, however, renegotiated in October 1946, and the
Federation was able to secure substantial wage increases, resulting in scale
payments of $41.25 for three hours of regular recording or $38.50 for two
hours of recording by symphony orchestras. These wage figures will play
an important part in this, story of the union, because no further wage increase was negotiated by the AFM for recording musicians until the end of
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1958, while payments into the fund newly created under the 1943 and 1944
contracts mounted significantly. Royalty payments to the union for the
Recording and Transcription Fund accumulated from 1943 to 1947. The
union administered these payments separately from general union moneys;
no part was used to pay the salary of any union official. Union disbursements from the fund began in early 1947, and were designed to provide
employment for musicians through the offering of live concerts, without
admission charge, in such places as parks, ballrooms, concert halls, schools
and hospitals. The fund was divided among the approximately 700 locals
of the union, with each local (except for the three largest, in New York,
Los Angeles and Chicago) receiving $10.43 for each member in good
standing; the three largest locals were entitled to this sum for each of their
first 5,000 members and to only $2.00 for each additional member. Because almost all of the phonograph recording took place in these three
cities, this "discrimination" rankled many of the recording musicians, who
felt that their share of disbursements from the fund was not commensurate
with the fund income that had been generated by their recording services.
Local union officers disbursed these allocations to unemployed members
of the local for their services at public concerts. 20 Every program planned
by any local required advance approval by the national union.
The amount collected by the Federation and placed in the Recording
and Transcription Fund through the end of 1947 totalled approximately
$4,500,000, substantially all of which was expended between 1947 and
1949. Contributions from the locals and from civic organizations and local
governments frequently supplemented this expenditure. Nearly 19,000
performances were given, generating more than 45,000 paychecks. The
types of performances in order of decreasing frequency included teen-age
dances, entertaining units, band concerts, orchestra concerts, regular
dances, jazz concerts, parades, and symphony concerts. The success of the
fund was principally attributable to the boom in the production of phonograph records at the end of the war. In 1945, 165,000,000 records were
sold; in 1946, the figure rose to 275,000,000; and in 1947, to 350,000,000
sales. The three-percent royalties from the licensing of radio transcriptions
generated only a relatively small part of the fund.
III.

UNION ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE RADIO EMPLOYMENT, AND THE
LEA ACT

The AFM did not devote its energies during World War II exclusively to
the elimination of phonograph records as a threat to live musical performance by union members on radio. Other union policies were designed directly to promote employment on network and local radio stations. As
noted above, Federation locals in the late 1930s succeeded in negotiating
"quota" agreements requiring minimum dollar expenditures on staff musi20. Accusations were frequently made that the local officials were allocating fund payments to reward their friends, regardless of their unemployment status.
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cians by local stations. Although the availability of phonograph records to
the radio stations, and the manpower shortages of World War II, generated substantial pressure to reduce the number and size of staff orchestras,
Petrillo continually worked to maintain and indeed to increase the number
of musicians employed in radio broadcasting. The Federation's policy
called for the locals to negotiate for the hiring by the radio stations of a
specified minimum number of musicians; these individualized quotas were
based upon the station's financial status and to some degree upon its previous employment figures. The Federation was in a better position to extract
such quota agreement from local stations that were network-affiliated, as
distinguished from independents; the networks, which were more dependent upon the services of live musicians and thus upon the good graces of
the union, often exerted gentle pressure upon the recalcitrant affiliated station to capitulate to the union's demands. The Federation used several
techniques for eliciting cooperation from the networks. A number of networks carried the music of name bands from live performances in hotels,
and those bands could be barred from playing for the networks. The
union could also call out the network staff musicians and thus cut off all
"sustaining" musical programs; commercial programs, in which the musicians were under contract to individual sponsors or their producers, could
still be broadcast. Finally, the Federation could threaten or effect a total
strike against the networks and the sponsors. Although the union rarely
used this device, NBC and CBS in 1945 lost the services of musicians on
two popular commercially sponsored programs.
The Federation's objective of increasing employment in the local stations was carried out through other methods as well. Stability of employment in those stations was threatened by the increasing use throughout the
1930s of so-called cooperative programs by the networks. These programs
originated at the network, and blank periods were provided into which
local commercials could be inserted by local stations to which the program
was fed. The Federation contended that these "co-op" programs were displacing many local bands, since local sponsors no longer had to place their
advertisements through local programs utilizing local musicians. Accordingly, in late 1940, Petrillo ordered members of the AFM not to perform
on such co-op programs, many of which were then forced to turn to vocal
2
rather than instrumental musical backgrounds. '
FM broadcasting, which began just before the war, gave promise of increased employment for musicians, except when AM broadcasters simultaneously transmitted on FM outlets. In October 1945, the AM notified
broadcasters that its members would not perform on simultaneous AMFM broadcasts unless a standby orchestra was employed. If, for example,
the network staff orchestra utilized ninety-five musicians for the simultane21. The Federation's ban, aimed immediately at the sponsors or producers employing
live musicians, could fairly be characterized as a secondary boycott, since its ultimate object
was to induce the local stations to hire more musicians. Congress did not explicitly declare
such secondary pressure illegal until the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-167, 171-187 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
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ous broadcast, ninety-five more would have to be hired-simply to "stand
by"-for the period of the broadcast. Alternatively, the broadcaster would
be expected to pay a "standby fee" to the union.
Standby musicians also had to be used by radio stations when their programs featured musical performances by amateurs, military bands, nonunion musicians, or traveling musicians from other jurisdictions. The AFM
often effected the outright banning of these kinds of performances. Its
most controversial action was Petrillo's order in July 1942 to remove from
the air a long-running program carrying student concerts from the National Music Camp at Interlochen. Petrillo aggravated matters by boasting
in early 1944, "Nor was there in the year 1943 any other school band or
orchestra on the networks and there never will be without the permission
of the American Federation of Musicians." The airtime thus preserved for
professional musicians was miniscule, but the public outcry was enormous.
Bills passed the Senate on two occasions prohibiting interference with the
broadcasting of noncommercial cultural or educational programs.
In the House of Representatives, however, the anti-Petrillo sentiment
was more deeply felt. Many Congressmen viewed the Interlochen decree
as part of a pattern of dictatorial behavior, manifested in a host of actions
contrary to the public interest, such as the recording ban of 1942-44, a
controversial eleven-month strike in 1944-45 directed against local station
KSTP in St. Paul, and the negotiation of employment quotas and standby
orchestras in radio broadcasting. In 1945, Congressman Clarence F. Lea
sponsored comprehensive legislation (H.R. 5117) directed at a number of
these practices.22 Technically, the Lea Bill was an amendment to the
Communications Act of 193423 dealing with radio broadcasting. As introduced, the bill outlawed "the use of force, violence, intimidation, or duress, or . . . the use or express or implied threat of the use of other means"
where the object was either to compel a broadcaster to employ "any person
or persons in excess of the number wanted by" the broadcaster; or to compel a broadcaster to take action designed to generate pay for live musicians
on radio whether or not their services were actually performed; or to compel a broadcaster or any other person (obviously including manufacturers
of phonograph records or electrical transcriptions) to pay an exaction for,
or to impose restrictions upon, the use or sale of recordings or transcriptions in connection with broadcasting. 24 In short, the targets were the Federation's attempts at featherbedding as a means of artificially maintaining
employment in radio broadcasting, and the union's attempts to prevent the
use of phonograph records and transcriptions in such broadcasting. The
recommended sanctions for violation were fine and imprisonment. The
bill made it clear that broadcasters and recording companies were free to
agree to such arrangements voluntarily, and that any such agreements
22. H.R. 5117, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
23. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)).
24. H.R. 5117, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
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could be enforced by the union. The bill outlawed only the compulsion of
such an agreement.
One need only skim the legislative debates on the floor of the House and
Senate to sense the deeply felt antipathy toward Mr. Petrillo. As one Congressman stated:
I agree that this bill is aimed at Petrillo. Let us not kid ourselves. He
is the man we are after. We are not after the fellow who blows the
horn or plays the violin or plays the piano.
We are after Petrillo, the
25
man who runs the union like a dictator.
The accompanying committee report systematically listed the kinds of demands made by Petrillo and the Federation upon the broadcasting industry in previous years.2 6 The report referred to millions of dollars extorted
from the broadcasting industry, and opined that "if demands now pending
were granted it would, by these racketeering and extortion methods, require the broadcasting industry to pay tribute probably much in excess ' of
27
$20,000,000 a year for peace against these boycotts, strikes, and threats.
25. 92 CONG. REC. 1556 (1946). There were constant references to Petrillo as a dictator,
with emphasis placed on his middle name and analogies made to Capone and Hitler. Id. at
1546, 1556. Almost every speaker made reference to some incident in his district in which a
military band or a school band was forbidden to play because of an edict from Petrillo. The
ban on the Interlochen broadcasts was especially condemned. See id. at 1544, 1547, 1550-51.
Petrillo was the focal point for attacks upon a wide range of abuses, although the Lea Bill
directly addressed only a few of these. References were made to Petrillo's authority under
the Federation bylaws to suspend the constitution and bylaws as well as other rules adopted
by the membership, id. at 1548, 1558; to the fact that the Federation's ban of amateur and
military bands on the air portended yet greater control over the content of radio programming, see id. at 1563; to the fact that Petrillo uniformly put his selfish interests over the
interests of patriotism and over the appeals of his President, id. at 1549; to the union's interference with the live performances (as opposed to performances on the radio) of amateur
and military groups, id. at 1548, 1550; and to the fear that Petrillo's actions, including the
demand for standby charges and royalties for transcription licensing, would serve as an
example for unions in other industries, see id. at 1550, 1556.
26. H.R. REP. No. 2508, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946) identified the following demands:
That broadcasters employ persons in excess of the number wanted; that in lieu
of failure to employ such persons the broadcaster should pay to the federation
sums of money equivalent to or greater than funds required for the employment of members of the federation; that payments for services already performed and fully paid for should be repeated; that payments should be made
for services not performed; that broadcasters should refrain from broadcasting
noncompensated, noncommercial educational or cultural programs; that
broadcasters should refrain from broadcasting musical programs of foreign
origin; that tributes should be paid for using recordings, transcriptions, and
other materials used for broadcasting; that restrictions should be placed on the
manufacture and use of recordings or transcriptions for the purpose of restricting or preventing the use of such materials for broadcasting; that tributes
should be paid for recordings previously paid for; that dual orchestras should
be employed for a single broadcast over two or more outlets; that over 400
small broadcast stations in the country having no live orchestras would be
compelled to employ such orchestras; that the use of voluntary noncompensated orchestras be barred from broadcasts unless an orchestra of the Federation of Musicians were also employed or that the union was paid an
equivalent or greater amount than the regular charge for a federation
orchestra.
Id., quoted in 92 CONG. REc. 1543 (1946).
27. H.R. REP. No. 2508, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946).
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Petrillo's activities had engendered such hostility among Congressmen
that it was a foregone conclusion that some version of the Lea Bill would
be enacted. Some voices, however, were raised against it. The Congress of
Industrial Organizations pointed out several of the more troubling features
of the bill. The ban upon "duress" or of "other means" could be understood to outlaw not merely intimidation, but also a speech, a pamphlet or
other publicity, or the "threat" of an individual to quit work. Such a ban,
particularly in view of the criminal penalties, was said to be unconstitutional for vagueness and an impairment of free speech and press. 28 The
ban on compelling the hiring of more employees than the broadcaster
"wanted" made it possible for the employer freely to overwork its employees to the point of threatening their health and safety, without any recourse
for the union to peaceful concerted measures in support of collective bargaining. 29 Congressman Marcantonio of New York expressed dismay that
the law would make it a crime to engage in a peaceful strike, and that
Congress was for the first time attempting to fix employment relations in
the broadcasting industry by limiting collective bargaining. He pointed
out the unfair advantage given to broadcasters when workers could be
jailed for giving speeches or issuing pamphlets in support of demands for
increased employment. 30 Congressman Celler, also of New York, suggested that while Petrillo's solution for unemployment in broadcast music
was unsound, so too was that of the Lea Bill. He suggested that Congress
should instead consider creating a system of royalty payments to recording
musicians when their recordings were utilized commercially. 3 1
For the most part, these appeals fell on deaf ears. Several motions were
made on the floor of the House to amend the bill, but they were voted
down. One amendment would have stricken from the bill the language
"or by the use or express or implied threat of the use of other means"; 32
this would have sheltered a peaceful strike designed to achieve the employment of more workers or to obtain payments when records are played.
Another amendment would have substituted for the bill's criminal penalties an action for an injunction and the loss by the union and individual
wrongdoers of the protection normally given concerted activity under the
National Labor Relations Act; in substance, the violators would be subject
to discharge. 33 Another amendment would have limited application of
criminal penalties to the officers of the union rather than to all of the
28. 92 CONG. REC. 1546 (1946).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1545-46:
It is a bill to increase the profits of broadcasting monopolies at the expense of
workers and not a bill to protect children's orchestras, as its proponents would
have us believe. This bill definitely provides for imprisonment for striking
and definitely increases the profits of licensees and broadcasting companies at
the expense of the American musicians and other workers in the broadcasting
industry.
31. Id. at 1547.
32. Id. at 1559.
33. Id. at 1559-60.
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union's members as their agents, 34 while yet another would have limited
liability to those who committed an overt act accompanied by a threat of
physical force or violence. 35 This concern on the part of some legislators
for the severity of the criminal sanctions proposed in the Lea Bill was not
shared by most members of the House. Their view was that the Federation's activities involved "moral turpitude akin to that of larceny, embezzlement, the acquisition of another's property by false pretenses,
racketeering, and extortion." 36 They also felt that a $1,000 fine was not
unfair given the $20,000,000 per year that the AFM was allegedly extorting
from the broadcasters.3 7 Another unsuccessful amendment-which properly understood would have substantially destroyed the principal objective
of the legislation-would have permitted the union to "strike for any objective which may be lawfully obtained through negotiations. ' 38 This
amendment would have sheltered strikes to secure standby orchestras or
standby payments, and strikes to secure royalty payments on recordings
and transcriptions, since such terms could under the statute be lawfully
negotiated and lawfully incorporated in a labor agreement.
Although these amendments failed, representatives of the Committee
did adopt one amendment while the issue was under discussion on the
floor of the House. Rather than making it unlawful to compel a broadcaster to employ more workers than were "wanted by such licensee," the
House inserted instead the phrase "needed by such licensee to perform
actual services."' 39 The change was an important and favorable one for the
musicians, for it rendered the test for featherbedding somewhat more objective. As thus amended, the Lea Bill passed the House on February 21,
40
1946, by a resounding vote of 222 to 43.
Because the House bill differed from the more confined bill passed by
the Senate, a conference committee was convened, and the bill that issued
was in all pertinent respects the same as the Lea Bill as passed by the
House. Perusal of the floor debates in both Houses shows that there was
substantial misunderstanding and disagreement as to certain central provisions of the bill. There was, for example, disagreement as to whether a
union could legally strike to secure a contract provision giving royalties to
musicians for repeated broadcasts of the recordings on the radio. 4' Moreover, in spite of the rather clear terms of the bill, which would sustain the
validity of such a contract provision if voluntarily agreed upon, and which
would validate "the enforcement or attempted enforcement, by means lawfully employed," of any such contract provision, controversy remained as
to whether a union could strike to enforce such a royalty provision already
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1562.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1564-65.
1543.
1562-64.
1564.
1566.
3244, 3251-54.
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in a labor agreement. 42 Some Congressmen regarded even efforts to negotiate such a provision as within the ban of the Lea Bill.4 3 Nor was there a
common understanding as to whether the number of employees "needed"
by the broadcaster was to be conclusively determined by the broadcaster
itself or by a court of law. 44 Finally, confusion remained as to whether the
payment of royalties for the use of phonograph records or transcriptions
was even an "exaction," coercion to secure which would be unlawful; some
Congressmen understood that term to embrace only unlawful payments
and not payments by way of royalties or
from the broadcasters
45
compensation.
Undaunted by the failure to secure understanding, let alone agreement,
on these fundamental issues, the House passed the conference bill on
March 29, 1946, by a vote of 186 to 16.46 The Senate followed suit on
April 6, 1946, by a vote of 47 to 3 (with 46 members of the Senate not
present and not voting). 4 7 On April 16, President Truman signed the Lea
Act into law. 48 The full text of the Act is set forth in an appendix to this
Article.
The Lea Act restricted the bargaining policies of the American Federation of Musicians in the broadcasting and recording industries, and carried
far-reaching implications for performing musicians after 1946. Section
506(a)(1) outlawed strike threats-surely a form of "duress" or "other
means"-to compel local stations or networks to hire a standby orchestra
on "co-operative" programs, or on simultaneous AM-FM transmissions, or
even to compel them to maintain or increase the size of their staff orchestras. 49 This section represented the beginning of the end for staff orchestras, at both the network and local levels. Staff musicians dwindled
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, and there is today no staff
orchestra on any radio network or station, or any television network or
station, in the nation. Section 506(a)(2) made the ban on the union's
"standby" strategy more complete, by outlawing pressure on networks or
stations to5 0 make payments to the union in lieu of hiring standby
musicians.
Section 506(a)(3), which outlawed union compulsion to pay more than
once for services "in connection with" the broadcaster's business, 5 ' was
42. Id. at 2821, 2823.

43. Id. at 2823, 3253-54.
44. Id. at 3245, 3256.
45. Id. at 3254.
46. Id. at 2823.

47. Id. at 3258.
48. Ch. 138, 60 Stat. 89 (1946) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1976), amending Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064), repealedby Act of Dec. 8, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-

507, 94 Stat. 2747.
49. 47 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (1976). If stations could demonstrate that they had no need
for staff musicians, for example because music was adequately available through recordings,
then union pressure to maintain any kind of staff orchestra, no matter how small, was illegal
and subject to criminal sanctions.

50. Id. § 506(a)(2).
51. 1d. § 506(a)(3).
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very broad indeed. Presumably, however, the legislators had in mind the
standby payments demanded of the networks for music played on co-operative programs and similar payments demanded of AM stations for simultaneous broadcasts on FM. Section 506(a)(4), which banned demands for
money for services not to be performed, condemned standby payments for
yet a third time. 52 The language of sections 506(a)(3) and 506(a)(4) could
also be read to outlaw demands upon a broadcaster to pay royalties to
recording musicians each time the broadcaster aired a phonograph record
or transcription. Such a reading was not necessary, however, since
this
53
conduct was more precisely outlawed in subsection (b) of the Act.
Subsection (a)(5) prohibited compulsion by the union to eliminate
broadcasts of music performed by school bands, military bands, and amateur groups-and possibly musical performances in the course of religious
services (a particularly offensive example conjured up by several Congressmen during the floor debates).5 4 The 1943 Petrillo ban on the Interlochen
broadcasts, and on the broadcasts of all school orchestras, was the principal target here. This statute did not, however, outlaw union pressure to
ban such groups from live performances at hometown events, so long as
these were not broadcast over the radio. Although Petrillo apparently had
attempted to ban very few foreign broadcasts of music as a form of unfair
competition
with his own musicians, section 506(a)(6) banned that conduct
55
too.

Section 506(a) having effectively outlawed all union pressure directly to
increase employment of musicians by radio broadcasters, section 506(b)
effectively outlawed union pressure to secure the same objective through
imposition of restrictions on or royalties from recordings. 56 While subsection (a) banned coercion of "a licensee," subsection (b) also banned coercion of "any other person." Had the Lea Act been in effect during the
1942-44 recording ban, it would thus apparently have made it unlawful.
One of the Federation's objectives had been to compel producers of electrical transcriptions to pay to the union moneys based upon a percentage of
profits derived from the use or licensing of those transcriptions for radio
broadcasts. Assuming that a payment unwillingly made is an "exaction,"
the union would have been coercing the transcription producer ("any other
person") to pay an "exaction for the privilege of, or on account of, . . .
manufacturing . . . recordings [or] transcriptions . . . used or intended to
be used in broadcasting. ' 57 The victims now to be protected were the
producers of transcriptions and not just the broadcasters; and they received
protection whether the payments were to go to the union itself or to a third
party, such as a separately administered special trust fund. Read broadly,
the quoted language might even have barred union pressure upon a manu52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. § 506(a)(4).
Id. § 506(b).
Id. § 506(a)(5).
Id. § 506(a)(6).
Id. § 506(b).
Id. § 506(b)(I).
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facturer of phonograph records for the payment of royalties on record
sales (to the public generally as opposed to sales to broadcasters) in the
event broadcasters played the same recorded song over the air.
Most clearly, section 506(b)(1) outlawed direct pressure upon the radio
broadcaster for the purpose of securing an agreement to pay "performance
royalties" to recording musicians when their records were played on the
air.58 Although Congressman Celler had suggested that Congress ought
legislatively to provide for such royalty payments, 59 the Lea Act forbade
the use of strikes and picketing to achieve that objective through collective
bargaining. 60 Since most would agree that effective collective bargaining
is premised upon the availability, if only in reserve, of peaceful concerted
activities, the Lea Act virtually removed from the bargaining agenda between the Federation and the broadcasting industry the question of socalled re-use payments or royalties for recorded music. Economic constraints soon reinforced this legal constraint. A strike threat is credible
only so long as Federation members are employed in the industry, and in
the decade after passage of the Lea Act more and more radio stations and
eventually the radio networks employed fewer and fewer staff musicians.
The language of section 506(b)(2), if broadly construed, prohibited
strikes against the manufacturers of phonograph records where the object
was to prevent the use of such records on radio broadcasts. 6' The section
bars use of duress or other means to force persons "to accede to or impose
any restriction upon [the] production [or] use" of recordings or transcriptions for "the purpose of preventing [their] use" in broadcasting. 62 The
more obvious target, however, was the union's campaign of the preceding
decade to have the recording companies place legends upon record labels
purporting to restrict the records to home use and to bar them from use on
radio broadcasts. Such legends had been declared in the Whiteman case to
be legally unenforceable, 63 so that the ban in the Lea Act was of limited
importance. But some states still treated those legends as creating enforceable servitudes on the records. Moreover, the Whiteman decision merely
declared the legends unenforceable, 64 while the Lea Act declared the attempt to secure them criminal, 65 wherever done throughout the United
States. Subsection (b)(2) also outlawed pressure by the union directly
upon the broadcaster, where the object was to compel the broadcaster not
to play phonograph records or electrical transcriptions on the air. 66 Section 506(b)(3) reinforced this congressional ban by effectively prohibiting
union compulsion of broadcasters or transcription producers to pay royal58. See id.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
(1940).
64.
65.

92 CONG. REC. 1574 (1946); see supra text accompanying note 31.
47 U.S.C. § 506 (1976).
Id. § 506(b)(2).
Id.
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712
114 F.2d at 90.
47 U.S.C. § 506 (1976).

66. Id. § 506(b)(2).

SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL

[Vol. 37

when the
ties for re-use of transcriptions containing musical performances
67
musicians had been paid for their original performance.
In short, section 506(b) forbade the union to strike or picket in support
of demands-certainly against broadcasters and in most instances against
recording companies-for royalty or re-use payments for the broadcasts
and the sales of phonograph records and transcriptions, and for restriction
or elimination of recorded music on radio programs.
The Lea Act deprived the Federation of the power to achieve through
collective bargaining not only some of its more objectionable goals but
also some objectives that were an acceptable if not indeed laudable part of
the campaign to protect the economic status of the professional musician
in the face of widespread radio use of recorded music. Many Congressmen were prepared to take such action not merely because of their hostility
toward Petrillo but also because of their beliefs about the economic status
of the recording musician and musicians generally. When, for example,
Congressman Marcantonio asked Congressman Brown, a member of the
Lea Committee, how he could justify making unlawful the demand of musicians for royalties when their recordings were played on the air, Brown
answered:
Let me say further, for the gentleman's edification and education,
that today, as he well knows, union musicians are receiving higher
compensation than ever before in history; that today there are more
musicians employed in the United States than at any time in our history; that these recordings and radio appearances have made the musicians of the United States, and their profession, the most prosperous
as well as in all the history of any nation on the
in all of our history,
68
face of the earth.
The activity outlawed by the Lea Act was not, however, as broad as
might first appear. Notwithstanding the prohibitions of sections 506(a)
and (b), subsection (c) expressly permitted the enforcement, by means lawfully employed, of any contract right that the union possessed against a
broadcaster or recording company, whether the contract was made before
or after the passage of the Lea Act. 69 Thus, although the Federation could
not stike to secure standby payments or the banning of amateur orchestras from the radio or payment for the use of phonograph records or transcriptions, a broadcaster could voluntarily agree to such conditions and if
it did, the Federation could enforce that agreement by lawsuit, arbitration
or strike. In short, the Lea Act permitted negotiating for such contract
provisions, but barred a strike to secure them. Although Congress could
explain this anomaly by stating that its purpose was not to outlaw broadcaster decisions but rather to outlaw resort to extortion and racketeering by
the AFM, the Lea Act reached beyond those union techniques and embraced the use of "duress" or "any other means."' 70 Under these provi67. Id. § 506(b)(3).
68. 92 CONG. REC. 2823 (1946).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1976).

70. Id. § 506(a).
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sions criminal sanctions turned upon whether the Federation was merely
urging the broadcaster or record company to comply, or was "constraining" that person to comply. The statute also invited subterfuge on
the part of the union at bargaining sessions; for example, if the union was
negotiating with regard to both wages and re-use payments or standby
orchestras, the union could designate any strike as a lawful strike over
wage rates although the real pressure was being exerted on the "residuals"
or "standby" issues. In any event, because section 506(c) permitted the
continued enforcement of existing contract obligations, the Recording and
Transcription Fund agreements of 1943 and 1944 between the Federation
and the recording industry remained lawful and enforceable. The question remained, however, whether Federation pressure to renew the fund
agreement after its termination on December 31, 1947, would be lawful
under the Lea Act.
One month after the Lea Act became law, Petrillo and the Justice Department put it to the test. For several years, radio station WAAF in Chicago had employed three musicians on its staff. In May 1946, the Chicago
local, with Petrillo as its President, in an effort to induce the station to hire
three more musicians, directed the three employees to cease working and
set up a picket line in front of the station's place of business. Petrillo was
charged with criminally violating section 506(a) of the Lea Act by using
duress or other means to coerce WAAF to employ persons "in excess of the
number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services."
Among other things, the Government pointed out that in the months subsequent to the strike call, the work of the three striking musicians was being performed by the switchboard operator and another woman in the
7
office of the radio station. 1
In December 1946, Judge La Buy of the Chicago federal district court
sustained Petrillo's claim that the Lea Act provisions were unconstitutional, and dismissed the criminal charges. 72 The judge held, first, that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment was violated by making a crime
of conduct so indefinite as coercing a broadcaster to employ persons in
excess of the number "needed," a term that was too vague to be understood by persons of common intelligence. 73 Judge La Buy also noted that
under the Lea Act the hiring of "unnecessary" employees-which would
be lawful if done by the broadcaster on its own or under an agreement
between the broadcaster and the union-would lead to a criminal conviction for officers and members of the union even when effected through
"free speech as manifested by peaceful picketing. ' 74 He held that the stat71. See R. LEITER, supra note 2, at 160.
72. United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. I11.), rev'd and remanded, 332 U.S. I
(1947), on remand, 75 F. Supp. 176 (N.D. 111.
1948).

73. 68 F. Supp. at 848-49: "Life and liberty may not be imperilled by or be subject to

such a frail and uncertain device as one man's opinion against another's. The will of an

individual [the broadcaster] to make an act a crime or not, depending upon his own judgment, is abhorrent to our form of government."
74. Id. at 849.
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ute violated the first amendment by outlawing picketing that was not violent but rather was designed to disseminate the views of Petrillo and the
AFM. As if the statute were not unconstitutional enough, Judge La Buy
further held that the Lea Act violated the thirteenth amendment ban upon
involuntary servitude by declaring criminal the quitting of work by the
three musicians to compel WAAF to hire three more. Finally, the judge
held that the fifth amendment was also violated by the Act's arbitrary classification in violation of due process of law. 75 He concluded that it was
arbitrary to single out broadcasting station employees and to deprive them
while workers
of the right to strike and picket in support of their demands,
76
in other American industries were accorded that right.
Through an expedited appeal pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, the
dismissal of the charges was directly reviewed in the United States
Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the case to the district
77
The Court held that, although the statements of an employer as to
court.
the number of employees "needed" was not conclusive,
We think that the language Congress used provides an adequate
warning as to what conduct falls under its ban, and marks boundaries
sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law in
accordance with the will of Congress. . . . It would strain the requirement for certainty in criminal law standards too near the breaking point to say that it was impossible judicially to determine whether
attempting to compel another to
a person knew when he was
78 wilfully
hire unneeded employees.
The Court also held that Congress could properly single out and prohibit
employee practices that injuriously affected commerce in the radio industry without banning all comparable practices in all other industries. 79 Finally, the Court concluded that under the appeals statute it was required to
pass upon the constitutionality of the statute only upon its face, and not as
charged under the facts of the complaint. 80 Accordingly, the Court held
that the claim that the Lea Act was applied in this case to punish peaceful
resumption of employment was not
picketing and to compel involuntary
8
ripe for the Court's scrutiny. '
On remand, Judge La Buy construed section 506(a)(1) so as to render it
all but ineffective. The judge held that the Act could be violated only if
the prosecution could prove that Petrillo had knowledge that the three additional musicians were unnecessary. Because sufficient proof82of knowledge was lacking, the prosecution had failed to prove its case.
75. Id. at 849-50.
76. Id. at 850.
77. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id. at 12.
81. Id. at 13. The three dissenting Justices were prepared to hold the Lea Act provisions in question unconstitutional for vagueness. Id. at 17 (Reed, J., dissenting).
82. United States v. Petrillo, 75 F. Supp. 176, 181 (N.D. 111.1948). The evidence at the
trial before him showed that the three members of the Federation employed by WAAF
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No criminal prosecutions under the Lea Act have been reported since
the 1948 Petrillo decision. Events after 1948 rendered it unnecessary in
any event to resort to the Lea Act. For one, the work stoppage against
broadcasters became increasingly ineffective as a union weapon as the
number of musicians employed by broadcasters dwindled. It is ironic that
in the Petrillo case itself, the "extortion" and "compulsion" feared by Congress caused no inconvenience to the operations of the radio station. At
least as significant, strike threats against radio networks (which for a
number of years still retained staff musicians) aimed at pressuring local
radio stations to retain their own staff musicians or to hire standby musicians now fell within the proscription of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.83
That Act banned the secondary boycott, upon charges in an administrative
proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board. In such a proceeding the Board could promptly secure a federal court injunction against
the continuance of the threat or the use of strikes or picketing.
Whatever the reasons may have been-the Lea Act of 1946, the TaftHartley Act of 1947, a new round of congressional hearings directed
against the AFM in 1948-the Federation in 1948 reversed a number of its
bargaining positions in the broadcasting industry. Petrillo lifted the ban
on radio broadcasting by school orchestras, although the Interlochen
Camp remained on the AFM unfair list and radio stations declined to
carry broadcasts of its concerts. New three-year contracts between the
union's locals and the network originating stations expressly authorized
simultaneous AM-FM transmissions without any extra pay for the musicians or for the union. The Federation announced that it would no longer
pressure the networks to compel affiliated local stations to hire additional
musicians.
worked as record librarians, and that the station consumed 90% of its broadcast time playing
records and electrical transcriptions. In May 1946, Petrillo had served notice on the station
that it should hire three more musicians. After an exchange of telegrams and letters the
station stated that it could hire only one more musician, while Petrillo stated that he would
order the three musicians to withdraw their services, which he did, and they withdrew. In
these dealings as well as in previous negotiations, Judge La Buy found the relationship between the station and Petrillo to be "cordial and cooperative." Id. at 180. Moreover, station

employees testified that neither they nor the station were even inconvenienced by the walkout. The court also noted that the Lea Act did not outlaw the use of the strike to enforce
existing contract provisions. 1d. At the time of the Petrillo demand and the walkout, the
three musicians had individual contracts of employment with the station and those contracts
explicitly incorporated the constitution and bylaws of the Chicago local, which in turn explicitly empowered the local president to withdraw the services of union members should he
determine this would protect the interests of the local or its members. Further, WAAF never
actually informed Petrillo that it had no need for the services of three additional musicians,
and Petrillo at all times understood that these additional musicians were to perform actual

services. The judge paid little attention to the fact that the station devoted 90% of its time to
recorded music and that Petrillo was purported to say shortly before his arrest that he was
purposely violating the Lea Act in order to test its constitutionality.

83. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
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AND

THE CREATION OF THE MUSIC PERFORMANCE TRUST FUNDS

Three provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 were of particular pertinence to the American Federation of Musicians. Section 8(b)(4) declares
it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to induce a secondary
boycott. 84 Although the contours of the secondary boycott have never been
altogether clear, it is fairly certain that several AFM tactics used in the
early 1940s would have been illegal after 1947. Those tactics included the
ban on performing for network programs in order to induce affiliated stations to hire more musicians and the ban on making electrical transcriptions when the object was to induce radio stations to hire musicians.
85
Section 8(b)(6) is the featherbedding provision of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The bill that Taft endorsed, and that was ultimately approved, forbade a
union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree
to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an
'86
exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed.
Even this more narrow proscription encountered some resistance from
those who argued that the section might improperly be read to bar the
87
pursuit of traditional labor objectives, such as job safety and rest periods.
Ironically, on the day Congress voted to override the veto of the TaftHaitley Act by President Truman, on June 23, 1947, the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in the Petrillo case upholding the constitutional88
ity of the Lea Act.
Perhaps the most serious threat to the Federation policies of the Petrillo
84. Id. § 158(b)(4).
85. Id. § 158(b)(6). An earlier version of this section in the House bill was patterned

upon the Lea Act, and outlawed the demand by a union to employ "persons in excess of the
number of employees reasonably required by such employer to perform actual services."
When this bill was considered by a conference committee, the Senate conferees rejected it as
unduly broad. In explaining their reasons on the floor of the Senate, Senator Taft spoke
while United States v. Petrillo was on appeal to the Supreme Court:
The Senate conferees, while not approving of featherbedding practices, felt
that it was impracticable to give to a board or a court the power to say that so
many men are all right, and so many men are too many. It would require a
practical application of the law by the courts in hundreds of different industries, and a determination of facts which it seemed to me would be almost
impossible. So we declined to adopt the provisions which are now in the Petrillo Act. After all, that statute applies to only one industry. Those provisions are now the subject of court procedure. Their constitutionality has been
questioned. We thought that probably we had better wait and see what happened, in any event, even though we are in favor of prohibiting all featherbedding practices. However, we did accept one provision which makes it an
unlawful-labor practice for a union to accept money for people who do not
work. That seemed to be a fairly clear case, easy to determine . ...
93 CONG. REC. 6441 (1947). Not surprisingly, the illustration given by Senator Taft of the
meaning of§ 8(b)(6) came from the music industry. He said that it would be an unfair labor
practice for a union to insist that a person hire 10 musicians even though he had physical
room for only six, and would therefore have to pay the other four for not working. Id.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) (1976).
87. 93 CONG. REC. 6441, 7561 (1946).
88. 332 U.S. 1 (1947). See generally American Newspaper Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100
(1953).
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years was section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 89 That section makes it
unlawful for an employer to pay or to agree to pay money to any union
representing its employees, and for any person to request or accept such
payment. 90 The obvious targets were union extortion and management
bribery of union officials. Section 302(c)(5) declares those provisions inapplicable, however, to money paid to a trust fund established by the union
"for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and
their families and dependents," provided the payments are for health care,
pensions, compensation for injuries or accidents, unemployment benefits,
or insurance for these contingencies, and provided "employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund." 9 1
While Congress was considering this legislation in 1947, it became evident
that the exemption provisions would not reach the AFM Recording and
Transcription Fund, disbursements from which were completely within the
control of the Federation. Although the ban of section 302 was not to
govern contracts already in existence, 92 the agreements with the recording
and transcription companies were to expire on December 31, 1947, and
any negotiations for contract renewal would be governed by section 302.
Petrillo was not anxious to share with management administration of
the fund. Even if the fund were jointly administered, the law appeared to
prohibit provision of benefits for persons who had never been employees
of the recording and transcription companies. Yet it was a cornerstone of
the Petrillo philosophy that recording royalties should be used to benefit
not the recording musicians but other musicians throughout the country
who had been displaced by the use of recorded music on radio broadcasts,
in jukeboxes, and through wired-music services such as Muzak. Such uses
had grown even more prevalent since the end of World War II.
Never one to shrink from the use of economic force in the face of inhospitable legislation, Petrillo announced in October 1947 that upon the expiration of the contracts with the phonograph record and electrical
transcription companies, all AFM musicians would cease recording. His
notice to the recording companies stated that it was "our declared intention, permanently and completely, to abandon that type of employment."
Petrillo acted pursuant to a resolution adopted at the 1947 AFM Convention, which authorized the Executive Board to order a recording ban at the
expiration of the current agreements. That summer authorization was an
invitation to the recording companies-which had been through a recording ban only three or four years before-to produce and stockpile master
records that could be used for pressings during the period when the musicians refused to record. The recording ban went into effect on January 1,
1948. Petrillo agreed in February to allow recording of transcriptions for
network shows if the disc was used only once and then discarded; this
89.
90.
91.
92.

29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
Id. § 186(a)-(b) (1976).
Id. § 186(c)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
Id. § 186(f) (1976).
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concession permitted delayed broadcasting of normally live network programs on the West Coast. With this one exception, no recordings were
made.
The companies did not initially rush to end the stoppage because record
stockpiles were high and transcriptions of many commercials and radio
programs could be done with vocalists only (aided on occasion by ocarinas
and ukeleles). As the months went by, however, the stockpiles diminished
and some foreign recordings and "bootleg" recordings by anonymous or
pseudonymous American musicians made their way onto the market. In
May 1948, the transcription companies filed charges of secondary boycott
with the National Labor Relations Board against the Federation and the
New York and Los Angeles locals. The transcription companies alleged
that the recording ban forced them to cease doing business with the radio
stations, which were the true "primary" targets of the union's strike. Surprisingly, there was no resort to criminal prosecution under section
506(b)(2) of the Lea Act. 93 Even the Taft-Hartley charges ultimately foundered, as in December 1948, the regional director of the New York office
of the NLRB refused to issue a complaint under section 8(b)(4) against the
Federation or its locals. Perhaps it was believed that the true purpose of
the 1948 recording ban, unlike the 1942 ban, was not to prevent the use of
recordings on radio broadcasts and thus to increase the use of live musicians, but rather to restore the payments to and benefits from the trust fund
in the interests of part-time and unemployed musicians. Such a union ob'94
jective was not so clearly "secondary.
Although some of the recording companies engaged in legal maneuvering, most were anxious as 1948 wore on to reach a settlement with the
Federation. A committee representing those companies met with union
representatives in an attempt to perpetuate the trust fund in a manner that
would be consistent with the Taft-Hartley Act. It was agreed that this
could probably be done if the fund were to be administered by an independent Trustee rather than by the union. The union and representatives of the four major recording companies (RCA Victor, Columbia,
Decca, and Capitol) and three smaller companies reached a tentative
agreement on October 28, but the companies conditioned their participation upon an assurance of legality from their attorney, from the Department of Justice, and from Senator Taft, co-sponsor of the Taft-Hartley
Act! After receiving assurances from their attorney, the record companies
submitted copies of both their proposed labor agreement and the proposed
trust agreement to the United States Attorney General, who in turn consulted with the Solicitor of Labor of the Department of Labor. Both of
93. 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1976). Since the apparent purpose of the recording ban was to end
the playing of records and transcriptions on the radio, one would think that a violation of

the Lea Act could readily be made out.
94. There was considerable evidence, however, that the Federation's purpose was indeed to remove recorded music from radio. Petrillo had commented that the strike was
directed not at the 80% of phonograph records used in the home, but rather at the 20% used
on radio broadcasts.

1983]

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS

these officials concluded that the proposed trust fund was lawful, because
the Trustee-who was to be selected by the recording companies and not
by the union-was not a "representative" of the AFM. Any payments
from the companies to the Trustee were thus not within the ban of section
302 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Senator Taft had by then rendered a similar
advisory opinion. The parties executed the 1948 Phonograph Record
Trust Agreement and the 1948 Labor Agreement on December 14, 1948,
and the 1948 Electrical Transcription Agreement on December 20, 1948.
Recording promptly resumed, almost one full year after the strike had
begun.
The trust agreements in the recording industry were to run for five years.
Royalties from phonograph record sales and transcription licensing, at
substantially the same rates as obtained under the earlier Recording and
Transcription Fund Agreement, were to be paid to a Trustee nominated by
the record companies collectively and appointed by the Secretary of Labor. The 1948 agreements specifically provided that the Trustee was not to
act as a representative of the union or of any person receiving payments
from the trust fund. The Trustee was directed to perform his functions "on
the sole basis of the public interest." He was to distribute money so as to
provide employment for instrumental musicians throughout the country,
whether or not they were union members, in concerts free to the public "in
connection with patriotic, charitable, educational, and similar programs."
The Trustee was to engage musicians at the prevailing local union wage
scale and arrange performances upon the advice not only of the AFM but
also of business, civic and charitable groups and organizations. The
Trustee was to distribute moneys among localities throughout the United
States and Canada, in areas bounded by the jurisdiction of the various
union locals, and in amounts based upon a per capita count of the local
union members. All local expenditures were to be supervised by the
trustee and were not to be used to reward union supporters or otherwise to
enrich the local union or any private commercial enterprise. The first
Trustee named by the record companies, with the concurrence of the
AFM, was Samuel R. Rosenbaum. 9 5
95. Mr. Rosenbaum was an attorney, a member of the Pennsylvania Bar and engaged
in private practice in Philadelphia. In his capacity as chairman of the Labor Committee of
the National Association of Broadcasters and of a group of independently owned radio stations, Rosenbaum had conducted negotiations in 1937 on the opposite side of the table from
the AFM. There was nothing in his background to suggest that he would act as a representative of the union in the administration of the trust funds. Upon assuming his duties in
December 1948, Rosenbaum considered various methods by which the funds could be most
efficiently administered. His efforts have been described as follows:
He determined that it would not be practical to set up branch offices in each of
the areas he was required to serve. In accordance with the terms of the Trust
Agreements, he, therefore, sought the assistance of the National Recreation
Association, Community Chest, American Red Cross, Kiwanis Clubs, Rotary
Clubs, and other business, musical, welfare and educational organizations, but
none of these was prepared to assume the burdensome responsibilities attend-

ant upon producing recommendations of worthwhile projects in the hundreds
of areas to be served. As provided in the Trust Agreements, he also sought the

assistance of the AFM. Mr. Petrillo and the International Executive Board of
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Having created trust funds in the recording industry, the American Federation of Musicians turned its attention to other industries in which recorded music was seen as displacing the services of live musicians. One
such industry was television, which burst upon the American scene after
the war. Petrillo, initially uncertain about the implications of television for
professional musicians, had in 1945 ordered union members not to render
services on television programs. This ban was removed in 1948, in contracts between the major networks and the major Federation locals. Most
of the television shows in the late 1940s were performed live, but the
Hollywood studios soon began to produce a substantial number of filmed
programs exclusively for television use, as distinguished from theatrical
exhibition. In its first collective bargaining negotiations with Hollywood
producers of television films, the Federation negotiated not only a labor
agreement covering wages and working conditions for musicians recording
on those films but also a trust agreement, which generated payments from
the producers to a newly created trust fund similar to that established in
the phonograph recording and transcription industry. The labor agreement required the signatory companies to execute the trust agreement simultaneously and authorized the union to terminate the labor agreement
in the event the signatories failed to perform their obligations under the
trust agreement. In effect, producers of television films could not secure
the services of musicians unless they first agreed to contribute to the trust
fund.
The signatories of the 1951 Television Film Trust Agreement were Samuel R. Rosenbaum as Trustee and the producers and distributors of films
or soundtracks for television. The agreement covered the use on television, at any time in the future, of films produced during the term of the
agreement and embodying performances of Federation musicians, or pictures of such performances. When these films were shown on television
for the first time the signatory producers or distributors or their licensees
would make payments to the trust fund. In most instances the payment
amounted to five percent of the company's gross revenues from the use or
the AFM refused to have anything to do with the administration of the Trusts,

fearing that AFM participation would run afoul of the Taft-Hartley Act, but
they finally were persuaded by the Trustee to permit the AFM locals to make
recommendations as to projects which the Trustee might sponsor in their respective areas.
Shapiro v. Rosenbaum, 171 F. Supp. 875, 882-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (footnotes omitted). The
locals thus assumed the principal responsibility for making recommendations for free public
performances, all such recommendations to be approved by the Trustee. A local representative also was expected to attest that each performance had actually been rendered, as a
condition to the Trustee's mailing a separate paycheck to each of the participating musicians.
The Trust Funds and Mr. Rosenbaum were to become central characters in a future conflict of major dimensions within the American Federation of Musicians. Another significant
element in that conflict was the fact that the 1948 labor agreement for the recording musicians provided for a wage scale of $41.25 for a three-hour recording session. This was the
same scale figure as had obtained under the 1946 agreements in that industry, and under the
terms of the 1948 agreement that scale was to continue to prevail for five more years through
December 31, 1953.
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exhibition of the film on television, for as long as the film was so used or
exhibited. Even films exhibited by network producers on so-called sustaining programs, which contained no commercials and for which the producers received no revenue, generated for the trust fund two and one-half
percent of the production cost of the film whenever the film was shown on
the network.
Soon after the negotiation of the television film labor and trust agreements, the Federation negotiated labor and trust agreements covering the
production of commercials for television-the so-called "jingles and spot
announcements" agreements. The trust fund agreement was between
Trustee Rosenbaum and the producers and distributors of the film or
soundtrack for television commercials. The companies agreed to pay the
Trustee $100 for any jingle or spot that used the services of musicians,
when first exhibited on television. Unlike the royalty for television films,
this was a one-time payment.
The fourth trust fund, also administered by Samuel Rosenbaum, was
based upon the revenues derived from the release to and exhibition on
television of films initially made for exhibition in motion picture theatres.
The labor agreements between the Federation and the motion picture studios had provided since 1939 that the music on the soundtrack of a theatrical motion picture could be used only with that film or with a revival of it.
These agreements attempted to bar the development of "library" soundtracks from older films for re-use in films subsequently produced. Later,
the Federation agreed to permit "dubbing" of film soundtrack onto phonograph records, provided the film musicians were paid therefor at the rate
they would have received had they made the record themselves. The Federation required similar re-use payments when portions of a film soundtrack were used in "radio transcriptions to exploit the picture." The
Federation was, however, less certain about the wisdom of permitting theatrical motion pictures containing the services of musicians to be used on
the emerging medium of television. Section 11(I) of the labor agreement
negotiated in September 1946 between the Federation and the major motion picture producers-including MGM, Paramount, Twentieth Century
Fox, RKO, Warner Brothers, Columbia, Universal, Republic-and representatives of the larger independent producers provided that the producers
were not to transfer, use, or authorize the use on or in connection with
television of soundtracks or films containing performances by musicians,
except after negotiations with and upon written consent of the Federation.
The 1946 agreement also provided that the producers would incorporate
this provision in any agreement they might make regarding the licensing
or utilization of soundtrack and in all employment contracts with motion
picture musicians.
The Federation modified this ban on the television exhibition of theatrical motion pictures in their May 1951 agreements with the film producers.
The labor agreement of that year provided that theatrical motion pictures
produced either before or after 1946 could be released for television exhi-
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bition, provided the soundtrack containing musical performances was
completely re-recorded by a new orchestra, with the musicians being paid
at the current scale for film recording. At the same time, the motion picture producers agreed to make payments into a trust fund for theatrical
films released to television, such payments to continue so long as the motion picture was used on television. The producers were to pay Trustee
Rosenbaum five percent of the gross revenues derived from the "use, exhi96
bition, exploitation, rental, or other dealing with any film" on television.
Thus, by 1952, the four Music Performance Trust Funds were receiving
payments from four sources: the phonograph record and transcription
companies, paying roughly one percent of the sales of records and three
percent of the revenues from the use of transcriptions; the producers of
theatrical motion pictures, paying five percent of the gross revenues from
the release and continuing exhibition of such films on television; the producers of films for television, paying five percent of the gross revenues
from the exhibition of Such films; and the producers of television jingles
and spot announcements, paying $100 upon the first showing. By far the
greatest proportion of the trust funds came from phonograph records.
Throughout the 1950s the total payments to and allocations from the Trust
Funds increased each year. 97 In spite of the health of the Music Performance Trust Funds, however, the health of the profession itself was by no
means on the upswing in the post-war period.
V.

THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES,

1945-1955

The history of the entertainment industries in the decade between 1945
and 1955 was dominated by the rise of television broadcasting. Commercial programs first began to appear on television as early as 1941, and in
1943 Petrillo set the wage scale for musicians performing on television. As
World War II was drawing to a close, however, Petrillo and the International Executive Board (IEB) of the Federation became uncertain of the
direction that television would take and whether it would generate more
employment for musicians or would instead generate filming or recording
techniques that permitted the re-use of television programs and the possible displacement of musicians. Accordingly, in February 1945, Petrillo
and the IEB reversed their policy of cooperation with the new medium and
forbade musicians to play on either live or filmed television.
This same uncertainty about the implications of television motivated Petrillo in the 1946 negotiations with the motion picture producers. Petrillo
96. "Gross revenues" was defined as the "genuine selling, leasing, or licensing price for
each broadcast of the film on television" as fixed in a bona fide arm's length transaction. By
an addendum to the agreement with the producers, they later agreed to make a one-time
payment to the Trust Fund for each documentary film shown on television.
97. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950, after the first full year of the funds' operation, exclusively in the phonograph record and transcription industry, $900,000 was disbursed; $1,400,000 in fiscal 1951; $1,700,000 in 1952; $1,950,000 in 1953; $2,200,000 in 1954;
$2,300,000 in 1955; $2,800,000 in 1956; $3,900,000 in 1957; $4,850,000 in 1958; and
$6,325,000 in 1959. In one decade the fund had increased sevenfold.
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demanded that the producers refrain from releasing to television any motion pictures originally made for theatre exhibition. Discussing these negotiations more than a decade later, Petrillo claimed that he had no fixed
idea of protecting any particular group of musicians; his object was simply
to "tie up" the motion picture so that it could not be freely utilized in
another medium. He did, however, suggest that the principal beneficiaries
of the restrictive provision were the musicians employed by the radio
broadcasting industry: if old theatrical motion pictures were to preempt
television time, there would be fewer opportunities for radio musicians to
work for the television broadcasters. There was surely no conception in
1946 that the restrictive clause could be used as leverage to secure re-use
payments for the film musicians when their films were released to and exhibited on television. Petrillo believed that the film musicians were extremely well paid, and that it was more important to preserve work for
other less affluent members of the union. 98 Ultimately the motion picture
producers reluctantly acceded to the ban upon the release to television of
theatrical films. The motion picture industry was riding the crest of a
financial wave in 1946 and was dependent upon the hundreds of musicians
working in staff orchestras at major studios; Petrillo's warnings of a possible strike induced the studios to submit to the television ban.
This hostility on the part of the Federation to the television use of musical performances was soon relaxed. In early 1948-shortly after Petrillo
had declared an end to the recording of phonograph records and electrical
transcriptions-Petrillo lifted the ban on performing for television, and the
union negotiated network contracts governing wages and other working
conditions in the television studios. 99 In the next network negotiations, in
1951, agreements were reached covering radio broadcasting, which made
provision for the continuation although not the expansion of staff orchestras; television broadcasting, which made no provision for staff orchestras
and which contemplated the making of kinescopes of live programs for
one-time delayed showing within sixty days for any affiliated stations; and
television films, which provided for the payment by the network-producers
to the Music Performance Trust Funds of five percent of their gross revenues from the exhibition of those films.
The Hollywood motion picture bubble began to burst in 1947, and several studios soon realized that one relatively painless way to turn a quick
profit was to sell old theatrical motion pictures to television. By 1950, several of the smaller motion picture studios had been joined by Republic
Studios in seeking a relaxation of the Federation's ban upon the television
98. Deposition of James C. Petrillo in Atkinson v. American Fed'n of Musicians. No.

670,348 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County), at 62, 64-72, 100, 113-18, 131-35, 141 (Apr. 29-30,
1958) [hereinafter cited as Deposition of James C. Petrillo].
99. These 1948 contracts with the networks, which ran for three years, devoted principal
attention to the work of radio musicians. The contracts abandoned earlier restrictive AFM
policies that required the hiring of standby orchestras or payment of standby wages when a

musical performance was broadcast simultaneously on AM and FM stations or when cooperative programs were fed to local affiliates by the networks.
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use of theatrical films. In the motion picture industry negotiations of 1951,
the AFM agreed to permit the producer to release their films to television,
provided several conditions were satisfied. First, the producer was required to score an entirely new soundtrack for each picture, using the same
number of musicians as had been used in making the original soundtrack.
Second, the producer was to pay the musicians the prevailing scale rates
for the recording of television film, which were at the time $50 per musician, $100 for the leader, $100 for the orchestra manager, $150 for the
arranger, and $50 for the copyist. Third, the producer was to pay to the
Music Performance Trust Fund five percent of its gross revenues derived
from the television exhibition of the motion picture.1°° Some producers
quickly learned that it was not feasible to score and use an entirely new
soundtrack, either because of the overlay of music with the spoken words
of the actors or because the track could not physically be separated from
the motion picture film. This led to a situation in which many producers
would hire a new orchestra simply to make a "dummy" soundtrack that
was never used. Soon musicians were hired to assemble, play a few notes,
and collect a paycheck; one studio held a dummy scoring session in which
thirty-seven films were scored in one hour and the musicians were each
paid $1,850.
The producers and Petrillo realized that the situation was intolerable,
and a new agreement was reached in September 1952. The agreement
abolished dummy recording sessions and permitted producers to use the
original soundtrack upon making a one-time payment to the original film
musicians of one-half of the 1952 scale. The producers were to continue to
contribute five percent of their gross revenues to the Trust Fund. The
Trust Fund would also receive the payments due any film musician in the
event he or his widow could not be located. Under the 1951 agreement
requiring re-scoring, some $477,300 was paid to Hollywood musicians; and
under the 1952 agreement payments (until June 1955) totalled $279,400. 10t
While television was emerging in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a preeminent medium for American popular entertainment, radio was not faring well. Not surprisingly, neither were the musicians in radio staff orchestras. Staff orchestras on local radio stations were dwindling to the point of
disappearance. The need for local musicians was slim indeed, given the all
but total reliance of most stations either on network programming or on
recorded music. This trend toward the playing of phonograph records or
transcriptions on radio accelerated greatly as the public turned to television for the kind of dramatic and comedy shows that had formerly been
more common fare on radio. Even the network staff orchestras based in
New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, which had each provided full-time
employment for between forty and sixty-five musicians, began to shrink, as
100. HearingsBefore a Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Educationand Labor on
Investigation with Respect to the Operations of the Contributionsto Musicians Performance
Trust Funds, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 135 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Trust Fund Hearings] (tes-

timony of Phil Fischer).
101. Id. at 135-36.
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did the orchestras hired by sponsors for network radio programs. As television became the principal medium for advertising commercial wares to
the public, more and more radio shows were cancelled and the networks
gradually became unable to afford staff orchestras of any size. Musicians
made transcriptions of the theme music or cue music for popular radio
shows, and these were re-used for two or three years. Although this process generated contributions to the Music Performance Trust Fund, it
eliminated employment opportunities for the radio musicians. Today,
none of the radio (or television) networks or local radio (or television) stations employs staff orchestras.
There was some slight trade-off in television work for musicians, however, once the three-year ban on performing on television was lifted by
Petrillo in early 1948. Musicians were widely utilized on television variety
shows and provided background music for dramatic programs and situation comedies. But the television networks had learned during the threeyear ban on live music that in many instances they could rely instead on
"canned music," including phonograph records and particularly the
02
soundtrack of foreign motion pictures.
This resort to canned music for television programs again came to the
fore after 1951, when the Federation permitted musicians to play for films
made especially for television but required the producers to pay five percent of their revenues to the Music Performance Trust Fund. In such cases
the musicians making the film might be paid a total of $1,200, while the
producers paid $2,000 upon the first exhibition of the film on television
and more for later showings. The recording musicians received no re-use
payments for such later showings. Since the producers could score that
same program with canned music for not much more than $100, they often
avoided the use of live musicians. It became quite an art to cut and paste
the soundtrack of old foreign films and "compose" with them to provide
musical background for television film. More punctilious producers of
television films had original music written and then took it abroad for recording, where labor costs were lower and the obligation to contribute to
the Trust Fund could be escaped altogether. Between 1952 and 1955, only
some twenty percent of the music for television films was scored by live
American musicians, while the balance was scored with foreign or canned
music, or had no music at all.' 0 3 The problem was compounded by the
Federation's policy at that time not to supply live musicians to producers
who used any canned soundtrack on any of their television films. In 1954,
the Federation modified this policy in the hope that employment opportunities in television films for American musicians would increase.' 04 No
significant increase resulted. The musicians hardest hit by this use of
canned or foreign music were the members of Local 47 in Los Angeles,
102. The AFM contracts with American producers restricted use of a soundtrack apart

from the film for which it was made.
103. Trust Fund Hearings, supra note 100, at 45 (charts of major findings).

104. Id. at 83.
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since it was they who in the early 1950s performed on more than ninetyfive percent of the television film using live American musicians. The
Hollywood musicians believed that their plight was in considerable measure attributable to the Trust Fund policies of the Federation.
Musicians in the phonograph record industry were at the same time witnessing a diminution of their income, but this was produced not by any
suppression of the sale of records, but rather by an increase in the cost of
living. Between 1945 and 1955, retail sales of phonograph records were
relatively constant, 10 5 and the emergence of new recording companies provided some new employment opportunities for recording musicians. But
the wage scale for such musicians was exactly the same in 1953 as it had
been in 1946, while in this period the cost of living rose more than thirtyfive percent and the earnings of performing artists represented by other
unions (such as the American Federation of Television Artists and the
Screen Actors Guild) rose from ten to nearly sixty percent.1°6
The health of the theatrical motion picture industry in the decade after
1945 was perhaps the most depressing of all.'0 7 Although there was a modest upturn in 1955 and 1956, this was attributable not to the production
and distribution of theatrical motion pictures, but rather in substantial part
to the increase in the production of films especially for television and in
revenues from the sale of old theatrical motion pictures to television.' 0 8
Indeed, the increasing number of releases of old films to television in the
early 1950s was a mark of the depressed state of the motion picture industry. The major producers had previously been able to heed the requests of
the distributors and exhibitors not to release these films to television in
view of the serious competitive impact the releases would have on
moviegoing. Such self-restraint in the release of old films paralleled the
reluctance of the AFM to have such films released to television, given the
possible effects upon the employment of live musicians. Ironically, the release of theatrical films to television no doubt further reinforced the flight
of the American consumer from the motion picture theatre to the living
room television set.1°9
105. Id. at 57.

106. Id. at 52.
107. Id. at 57. The corporate income of motion picture producers before taxes had risen
steadily from $33 million in 1937 to a peak of $309 million in 1946. In the same period the
amount of money spent on motion picture attendance rose from $676 million to
$1,692,000,000. A drastic reversal took place between 1946 and 1947. Corporate income fell

steadily from $309 million in 1946 to $80 million in 1952, while money expended at the box
office dropped to $1,284,000,000; this, at a time when the cost of living, per capita income,
and population of the United States were significantly mounting. Gross revenues of the 10
leading production companies fell from $968 million in 1946 to $682 million in 1954, 30%
under the 1946 figure.
108. I. BERNSTEIN, HOLLYWOOD AT THE CROSSROADS 12 (Hollywood AFL Film Council Study 1957).
109. Between 1946 and 1956, when the American population was sharply rising from 141
million to 167 million, the total movie-going audience fell by one-half, from an average
weekly attendance of 90 million persons in 1946 to 46.5 million persons in 1956. Of that
latter figure, fewer than 12 million persons attended conventional four-wall theatres, while
the balance went to drive-in theatres and on the average paid less per person. Id. at 2.
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Not only was the moviegoing audience shrinking. So, too, was the production of American films. 10 A 1957 study painted a bleak picture of the
industry, and detailed the damage to its business structure in the decade
following World War II, caused by adverse antitrust decrees; by the emergence of the independent producer; the breakdown of term contracts between the major studios and their actors, producers, directors and writers;
the shrinking number of movie stars and the higher prices that had to be
paid for them; the business diversification that characterized many of the
major producers (investment, ownership of foreign theatres, oil and gas,
real estate); the production of high-cost films; and the cost of new techniques of exhibiting motion pictures such as three-dimensional effects,
wide screen, and improved sound.II
Not surprisingly, the drop in theatre attendance and motion picture production was mirrored in a worsening of the economic status of persons
employed in the studios. Studio employment fell from 22,000 in 1946 to
13,000 in the mid-1950s, with the major studios being the hardest hit. The
increasing activity at the motion picture studios in the production of films
for television provided only slight stability. 1 2 The earnings of motion picture employees rose only sixty-six percent between 1946 and 1956, while
Los Angeles workers in manufacturing, for example, saw their wages rise
seventy-six percent, and those in retail trade enjoyed an increase of eightytwo percent. 1 3 While the payroll of all employers across the nation was
increasing 103 percent in that decade, the total Hollywood payroll was
shrinking by twenty percent. A major factor in this downslide was the
substantial increase in the number of American films produced abroad. 114
Behind all of these grim Hollywood statistics lay television. More
Americans spent leisure time at home, where live entertainment and films
were available for "free." Americans spent thirty-five percent more for
recreation in 1955 than in 1946. In that period, spending for motion picture theatres dropped roughly thirty percent; spending for live entertainment such as legitimate theatre and opera rose roughly ten percent; and
receivers, recordings and musical instruspending for radios, television
15
ments nearly doubled."
All of these developments in the entertainment industries can perhaps
best be summarized by considering their impact upon the income of professional musicians working in Los Angeles. 1 6 In the five years under
I10. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 19-29.
112. Id. at 36 ("Even with this booster, however, the motion picture companies needed
fewer than three workers for each five they employed in 1946. By contrast, the whole U.S.
economy now employs six workers for each five needed.").
113. Id. at 42.
114. Id. at 65-70. Film production abroad offered lower wages, lower taxes, and readier
availability of money and subsidies. Id.
115. Facts Consolidated, Trends in Imports of Sound Recordings (Aug. 1958) (prepared
for Cecil F. Read).
116. Trust Fund Hearings, supra note 100, at 53-54 (tables of earnings). In spite of the
competition from television, jukeboxes and wired-music services, their income from live per-
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discussion, these members of Local 47 witnessed a substantial percentage
increase in their total earnings from live face-to-face performances in
nightclubs and the like, and from live television and television films; a
modest increase in their total earnings from phonograph records and theatrical motion pictures; and a precipitous decline in their earnings from
live and transcribed radio performances. Overall, these musicians were
increasingly concerned about their economic situation. Scale wages for
phonograph records were the same in 1954 as in 1946; Hollywood production of theatrical motion pictures was sharply declining; serious doubt existed as to the future of the musician in all forms of radio work; and,
although television work, both live and on film, was on the upswing, there
was concern that an undue number of work opportunities were being sacrificed by the use of canned and foreign music on television film. Certain
actions taken by President Petrillo and the International Executive Board
of the AFM in 1954 and 1955 brought matters to a head, and triggered a
revolt within the membership of Local 47.
VI.

THE TRUST FUNDS IN

1954-1955,

AND THE APPEAL OF LOCAL

47

Although the Hollywood musicians perceived their economic situation
to be gradually worsening throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, their
overt resistance to the Trust Fund policies was triggered by two decisions
made by President Petrillo and the International Executive Board in 1954
and 1955. One decision, made in negotiations with the phonograph record
industry, resulted in the perceived diversion of a long-overdue wage scale
increase from the recording musicians to the Music Performance Trust
Fund. The second decision, made in June 1955 during the term of the
agreement with the motion picture industry, resulted in the diversion of
rescoring fees, which were payable upon the release of theatrical motion
pictures of television, from the film musicians to the Music Performance
Trust Fund.
The wage scale for a three-hour recording session for phonograph recformances in nightclubs, ballrooms and the like rose from a total of $4.9 million in 1950 to
$7.7 million in 1954. Their income from work in television films also rose in that period,
from $455,000 in 1951 to $1,129,000 in 1954. Interestingly, in 1952, the "re-scoring fees" to
Local 47 members from the release of theatrical motion pictures to television was $200,000,
while their income from recording for one-half hour filmed television programs was not
much more, $284,000. The gap widened substantially in the years immediately following.
The income of the Los Angeles musicians from live television between 1951 and 1954 rose
from $547,000 to $1,873,000; their income as staff musicians on local television stations
dwindled to almost nothing, while casual employment on local television remained relatively stable, and their income more than doubled from work on commercial programs
broadcast on the networks. Earnings from work in radio were seriously diminished, falling
from some $3,210,000 in 1950 to some $1,200,000 in 1954. while their earnings from employment by radio stations fell only some 15%, their earnings from commercial employment
by sponsors or advertising agencies for radio network broadcasts fell by a factor of three,
from $2.6 million in 1951 to $860,000 in 1954. Somewhat surprisingly, in light of the
shrinkage of production of theatrical motion pictures in Hollywood, the earnings of Local 47
members in motion pictures increased slightly between 1950 and 1954, from $4.4 million to
$5 million.
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ord musicians were set at $41.25 by the labor agreement of 1946 between
the AFM and the record manufacturers. At the end of the yearlong strike
of 1948, a new agreement was reached in which the Recording and Transcription Fund was transmuted into the Music Performance Trust Fund, in
order to comply with the Taft-Hartley Act. That agreement made no provision for an increase in scale wages for the recording musicians over its
five-year duration. During the negotiations for a new agreement, in December 1953, Petrillo sought both a substantial pay increase for the recording musicians and an increase in the contributions to be paid to the Trust
Fund upon the sale of phonograph records (then at an average level of one
percent of the retail sales price). The recording companies adamantly resisted an increase in their royalty obligations to the Trust Fund. The companies were already paying some $1.5 million per year into the Fund, and
they believed that any increased payments by the record companies should
be paid to the recording musicians, as an incentive and reward to boost
morale. The companies appreciated that for every dollar diverted into the
Trust Fund, there would be one dollar less to pay the musicians who made
the records.
A tentative agreement was reached in early January 1954, by which the
Trust Fund payments were to be increased by seven and one-half percent
for 1954 and 1955, and by another seven and one-half percent of the original royalty figures for 1956 through 1958. In addition, the agreement increased scale pay for the recording musicians by ten percent for the first
two years of the contract and another ten percent over the next three years,
resulting in a pay scale for 1956 through 1958 twenty-one percent higher
than the pre-contract scale.
After the recording companies had thus expressed a willingness to pay
these percentage increases to the recording musicians, Petrillo in January
declared to the companies that they should have no interest in whether
those increases were paid to the musicians or were instead paid to the
Trust Fund, over and above the percentage increases in the sales royalties
already payable to the Fund. Although the companies initially demurred,
the course of negotiations was such that they did not care to press the issue;
the memories of the 1948 strike, and no doubt also of the two-year strike
five years before that, were still fresh. The Labor Agreement that was
finally executed in January 1954 provided for the continuation throughout
its five-year term of the $41.25 wage scale for a three-hour recording session. The agreement also provided for the payment of ten percent of the
musicians' scale earnings during the first two years, and twenty-one percent of scale earnings during the next three years, to the Music Performance Trust Fund. The separate 1954 Trust Fund Agreement provided in
addition for two increases of seven and one-half percent over the prior
prevailing royalty rate calculated on the number of records sold.
This version of the 1953-54 record negotiations was related some three
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years after the event by James B. Conkling, in a court deposition." 7 At
the time of the negotiations, Mr. Conkling was President of Columbia
Records and represented that company in negotiating the 1954 Labor
Trust Agreements. His account was sharply contradicted by President Petrillo and by the International Executive Board. They consistently asserted
that the ten and twenty-one percent payments were never intended as
wage-increase payments for the recording musicians. Interestingly, the individual contracts of employment between the recording companies and
their recording artists, which generally provided for certain payments to
the artists as an advance against any future royalties they might receive on
record sales, treated the ten and twenty-one percent payments as payments
to the recording musicians themselves but the seven and one-half percent
increase in royalties payable to the Trust was not so treated.
In any event, word of the negotiations for the 1954 phonograph record
agreements reached the recording musicians of Local 47, who were angered not only by the union's failure to secure any scale increase-making
their scale earnings throughout 1958 the same as in 1946-but also by the
perceived diversion to the Trust Fund of wage increases already conceded
by the recording companies. Initially, royalty payments to the Trust Fund
had been rationalized as a tax upon the record producers to ease unemployment generated by the recording business. Now the recording musicians could fairly characterize the Trust Fund payments as a diversion of
long overdue pay increases from them, the creative and working artists, to
musicians the bulk of whom were not working in the industry, or were not
union members, or were relying on Trust Fund payments merely as a
modest supplement to a principal source of income from some other trade.
The Los Angeles musicians performed on roughly one-third of the phonograph records made in America, while nearly all of the theatrical motion
pictures made in the 1940s and before utilized the services of Local 47
members. When the AFM in 1951 relaxed the five-year ban upon the release of theatrical motion pictures to television, Hollywood musicians were
the beneficiaries of the new re-scoring policy, which conditioned such release upon the making of a new soundtrack. When this proved impracticable, the Hollywood Film-Television Labor Agreements of 1952 and 1954
provided instead for the television use of theatrical films upon the payment
of re-scoring or re-use fees to the musicians who performed on the original
soundtrack of the films; the re-scoring fee was $25 for each instrumental
musician, or one-half the prevailing scale for recording on television film.
The separate Hollywood Film-Television Trust Agreements of 1952 and
1954 provided for the payment by the signatory motion picture companies
of five percent of the gross revenues they received, both when the film was
released to television and so long as the film continued to be used on television. Thousands of theatrical motion pictures were released to television
between 1951 and 1955 as an antidote for the sharp decline in box office
117. Deposition of James B. Conkling in Anderson v. American Fed'n of Musicians, No.
669,990 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. County),passim.
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receipts and corporate profits in the motion picture industry. These transactions generated nearly $800,000 in re-scoring fees, payable initially to
the musicians recording the "new" soundtrack (more accurately, "dummy
track") and thereafter to the musicians who worked on the original film.
In June 1955, in the middle of the term of the 1954 Labor Agreement
and Trust Agreement with the motion picture producers, Petrillo and the
International Executive Board declared that the producers were to cease
making re-scoring payments to the film musicians and to begin making
them instead to the Music Performance Trust Fund, in addition to the payment of five percent of their gross revenues. At its meeting in Cleveland,
in connection with the 1955 Annual Convention, the International Executive Board resolved:
In many cases the musicians who made the original pictures have
passed away or cannot be located. It is on motion made and passed
that any future such repayments be made to the Music Performance
Trust Fund instead of to the musicians originally employed. This is
effective immediately. In case this action requires a change in8 the
contract, the matter is to be left in the hands of the President."
Petrillo promptly took appropriate action by informing the motion picture
companies of this change; the Federation's constitution and bylaws empowered him to take such unilateral action without consultation with or
approval by the affected parties.
Petrillo asserted that, because of the death or unknown location of most
of the musicians employed in films in the 1930s and 1940s, by 1955 only
some one hundred musicians were receiving re-scoring fees under the 1954
Labor Agreement. Petrillo characterized this situation as a "racket"" 9
and stated that it was a "mistake" for the union ever to have entered into a
labor agreement20that provided for the payment of re-scoring fees to the
film musicians.'
The musicians of Local 47, however, viewed the June 1955 directive of
the President and the IEB as an unjustified diversion of moneys from older
film musicians, many of whom were now unemployed and in need of the
re-scoring payments, to other musicians across the country who had not
given of their creative endeavors to the motion picture industry and who
might not even be members of the union. They were particularly outraged
by the recapture of some checks that had already been made out to the
INT'L MUSICIAN, Aug. 1955, at 48-49.
119. Deposition of James C. Petrillo, supra note 98, at 74, 114. Petrillo felt that the film
musicians had very few equities in the matter.
Musicians who originally made the picture received the union scale. They
didn't make the picture without pay, and we thought if we took the money and
put it in a Trust Fund it will do more good for 260,000 musicians than a

118.

handful of musicians. .

.

.In the labor movement you deal with majority

membership; what is best for the majority, not the individual. . . .The group
that we are conducting the negotiations for is part of the American Federation
of Musicians. . . . Always we work for the interest of the majority of the
members of the Federation.
Id. at 114, 118.
120. Id. at 71-72.
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account of the film musicians and that were then re-issued to the Trust
Fund. Their distress mounted when they learned that within the first year
after the Federation's decision of June 1955 it was estimated that because
of the very large television deals made by a number of major motion picture producers, more than $2.5 million would be paid into the Trust Fund
rather than to the Hollywood musicians.' 2' Thus the diversion of wage
increase payments in the 1954 phonograph record industry agreements and
the diversion of re-scoring fees in June 1955 contributed to a growing conflict between the Trust Fund policies of the AFM and the interests of the
film and phonograph recording musicians. 122
The board of directors of Local 47 at its meeting in July 1955 authorized
the recording secretary of the local, Maury Paul, to draft a letter to the
International Executive Board protesting its action of the previous month.
The letter pointed out that many of the studio musicians receiving the
rescoring or reuse payments were in serious need and that many of the film
musicians had relied on the Federation's prevailing practice of securing
payments for musicians upon the transfer of their work from one medium
to another. Secretary Paul concluded with an endorsement of the trust
fund principle, but stated that industry payments, not payments by members of the Federation, should support the fund. He suggested that the
earnings of all musicians throughout the country could be taxed to ease the
problems of musicians displaced by recording technology. In response to
Paul's letter, the International Executive Board stated that it was prepared
to reconsider its action at its midwinter meeting in January 1956.
Local 47 did not wait for the IEB's January meeting. At the general
membership meeting of Local 47 in September 1955 the members, more
than 500 in number, voted unanimously to pursue a formal appeal to the
International Executive Board for relief and to appoint a member of the
local's board of directors, Cecil F. Read, to represent the local in its ap121. Warner Brothers alone had sold some 1,000 films for use in television. Trust Fund
Hearings,supra note 100, at 17.

122. Both of these decisions by the AFM officers were later to be explained in a deposition by President Petrillo, under sharp questioning by opposing counsel.
Q. Have you personally favored the establishment of performers' rights, .
either in the Federation or elsewhere?
A. Well, performance rights is all right if a performer can get his rights, but
my idea as a labor leader is always trying to get some employment for the
fellow that is out of work. . . . The guy that I want to help is the fellow
that is going out of business.
Q. You don't have any interest in securing additional benefits for the man
who is making the recording, who is doing the work?
A. Well, the fact is, I guess, his is the highest wage scale in the country. How
can you say we are not doing anything for them? The best conditions, the
best wage scale is the recording musician. What are we supposed to do,
get them some more money, some more conditions, residual rights? What
about the guy that is out of work here? Aren't you thinking about him at
all, this fellow that has been put out of work? . . . You are for the guy

that is making the dough, and I am for the guy that is out of work; that is
the difference between the two of us.
Deposition of James C. Petrillo, supra note 98, at 67-69.
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peal. 12 3 The resolution directed the officers and employees of the local to
furnish Read with all of the documents needed in preparation for the appeal. When the vice-president of the local, who was also an IEB representative, promptly resigned to avoid turning over documents, Read ran for
the position, against a member who was supported by the officers and employees of Local 47, and was elected in October 1955 by a vote of approximately 1,300 to 500. Petrillo had granted the request of Local 47 for a
hearing before the International Executive Board but withdrew his authorization when Read was elected vice-president of Local 47. The local reinstated its petition, however, and Petrillo relented. Nevertheless, Read's
requests for information and documents from Federation officers and from
the Trustee of the Music Performance Trust Funds were for the most part
denied.
In January 1956, Read presented the local's formal Appeal to the International Executive Board. 124 The basic argument of Local 47 was that the
Trust Fund policies of the Federation had resulted in a severe impairment
of the economic position of the recording musicians, and that the union
had thereby violated its fiduciary obligation as bargaining representative
of those musicians and had deprived them of their property rights. The
appeal began by pointing out the economic plight of the recording musicians. 125 The Appeal of Local 47 then proceeded to describe the Trust
Fund policies of the Federation and their harmful impact on the film and
recording musicians. Payments were made to the Trust Funds, rather than
123. Read had "worked in Chicago in theaters before there were sound movies, then in
radio stations before there was an NBC or CBS network, and in hotels and dance halls
before live musicians were displaced by juke boxes and wired musicial services." Hearings
on Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, Copyright Office (July 28, 1977), reprintedin
SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RE-

CORDINGS 969, 1000 (Comm. Print 1978). In 1947, he moved to Los Angeles, where he
worked on network radio programs, phonograph records, videotape and film television pro-

grams, and motion pictures. Read was vigorous, articulate, meticulous with facts and
figures, and passionate in his concern for the plight of the recording and film musicians.
124. The full text of the appeal is set forth in the Trust Fund Hearings,supra note 100, at
57-93.
125. Id. at 60-70. While per capital income in the United States had risen 229% from
1939 to 1955, and the cost of living had risen 91%, the wage rates for musicians in phonograph recording had increased only 37%, and the wage rates for musicians in theatrical films

increased only 61%. Id. at 61. In that same period, the hourly rates negotiated by the
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) for singers had increased
80%, the hourly rates for singers represented by the Screen Actors Guild (for vocal performances in motion pictures) had increased 250%, and the hourly rates negotiated by the Screen
writers guild had increased 133%. Id. at 68. This differential was compounded by the fact
that it was common practice among unions representing other creative artists involved in
film or recordings to negotiate for royalty payments to the performers upon re-use in the
same medium or upon transfer to a different medium. For example, actors represented by
the Screen Actors Guild were paid royalties when their theatrical films were exhibited on
television, when their television films were exhibited in theatres, and when their television
films were shown more than once on television. Performers represented by AFTRA were
paid for re-use of kinescope television shows and transcribed radio shows, and when motion
picture soundtrack was transferred onto phonograph records or phonograph records were
dubbed onto television film. id. at 67. In the musicians' case, most of these re-use payments
were made instead to the Musicians Performance Trust Fund. Id. at 66.
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the musicians, when phonograph recordings were sold, when electrical
transcriptions were replayed on radio, when theatrical motion pictures
were released to and exhibited on television, when television films were reused and when commercial announcements were re-broadcast. Wage increases negotiated for musicians performing on phonograph records were
paid instead to the MPTF. Trust Fund payments for the re-use of television films made it prohibitive to use live American musicians and induced
producers to use foreign or canned music instead. In the half year since
June 1955, the release to television of more than 1,000 theatrical motion
pictures was alleged to have resulted in the diversion of nearly $1.6 million
of re-scoring fees from the Los Angeles musicians to the Trust Fund, with
a correlative loss to Local 47 of nearly $24,000 in union dues.
The local's Appeal emphasized the fact that its membership was so small
in proportion to the total membership of the AFM that it was unable to
protect its interests within the governing organs of the Federation and argued that the burden of protection thus fell on the Federation leaders. Recording musicians, most of whom worked in Los Angeles or New York,
26
constituted no more than three percent of the Federation membership.
The Los Angeles musicians accounted for ninety-seven percent of all recording for motion pictures, ninety-four percent of television film recording done by American musicians, and thirty-three percent of all
phonograph recordings. Their services generated roughly half of the payments going into the Trust Funds, yet they received only some four percent
of the moneys paid out by the Trust Funds.
Because of its limited voting power within the Federation, Local 47
claimed in its Appeal that "an extremely high degree of responsibility and
trust rests with the governing body of the Federation to respect and safeguard the interests of this important but impotent minority in the conduct
of affairs affecting film and recordings."' 127 Local 47 claimed that because
the Federation was acting as a bargaining agent and fiduciary, all negotiated payments rightfully belonged to the performing musicians.' 28 The
Appeal also presented the theory that a performer has a basic property
right in his performance and in any reproduction thereof. This right was
126. Id. at 90-93. Of the national union's membership of 250,000 persons, roughly 50%
allegedly did no work at all, and only an estimated 20% were employed fulltime, earning
$3,000 or more per year from performing. Of the roughly 53,000 fulltime musicians, some
41,000 were engaged in live performances in clubs, bars, hotels, restaurants, and the like.
Only some 12,000 were employed in radio, television, movies and the recording industries.
Id. at 91.
127. Id. at 64.
128. Id. at 65, 69.
In the discharge of its responsibilities as agent, the union has a fiduciary relationship to those it represents akin to that of a trustee, and must govern itself
with respect to their interests accordingly.
By membership in the union, the musician does not relinquish his individual rights in his performance . . . ;nor does the federation acquire any authority to prejudice, diminish or transfer those rights, or the fruits thereof.
Id. at 69.
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also labelled a "performance right," justifying compensation for the musician (or any other creative performer, such as an actor or singer) whenever
his recorded work-on records, tape, soundtrack or film-is commercially
exploited. The right was viewed as fully comparable to the right of an
author upon the printing of copies of his book, or29to the right of a com1
poser upon the public performance of his music.
The Appeal closed with a detailed request for relief. It petitioned the
International Executive Board of the AFM to grant the following benefits:
(1) The payment of increases in the recording industry wage scale, now
twenty-one percent, to the recording musician instead of the Trust Fund;
(2) The payment of rescoring fees of $25 to musicians recording the soundtrack of a theatrical motion picture upon release of the motion picture to
television, and the recovery from the Trust Fund of all such fees paid since
June 1955; (3) The payment of re-use fees for transcribed radio shows to
the recording musician rather than to the Trust Fund; (4) The payment of
royalties for re-runs of films made for television not to the Trust Fund but
to the recording musicians; (5) The reduction in the total cost of recording
music for television films, in order to recoup losses from the use of imported or library soundtrack; (6) The explicit adoption by the Federation
of the principle of performance rights, and the making of a concerted effort
(with actors, singers, writers, directors and other performing artists) to
30
change the copyright law to recognize such performance rights.'
The International Executive Board denied the Appeal on February 16,
1956, stating that the ten and twenty-one percent scale payments under the
phonograph record industry agreement were not wage increases but rather
were contributions to the Trust Fund. 13 1 The Board claimed that the objective of Local 47 was the discontinuance of the Trust Funds, and that
"[t]his would mean that many musicians throughout the country would be
deprived of the little employment made possible by the Fund and for
which the recording industry acknowledges it owes an obligation. The
only ones to benefit would be the recording musicians who are among the
best paid members of the Federation and whose mechanical product is the
principal reason for the widespread unemployment among our other
members."
VII.

THE REVOLT WITHIN LOCAL

47

At the same time as Local 47 was on record as attacking the Federation's
Trust Fund policies, the president of the local was going on record to defend them. John te Groen had been president of Local 47 since 1950. In
that capacity he attended in late 1955 a meeting of delegates from California, Arizona and Nevada, at which a resolution was adopted that reflected
the "grass roots" support of union members for the Music Performance
Trust Funds. Te Groen joined in a unanimous resolution "[t]hat this con129. Id. at 69, 88.
130. Id. at 69-70, 89-90.
131. INT'L MUSICIAN, Mar. 1956, at 12.
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ference go on record as vigorously opposing any movement which has for
its purpose the weakening or destruction of these funds, and further, that it
affirms its support of President Petrillo in his efforts to protect the interests
' 32
of the great membership of our federation."'
After the International Executive Board rejected the Appeal of Local 47,
Cecil Read consulted an attorney for advice as to the best way to pursue
the interests of the local given the indifference of the Federation leadership
and the local's president. Read's attorney advised him that a lawsuit
would involve a protracted battle; he also mentioned the unlikelihood of
success of a challenge through the National Labor Relations Board by any
newly formed independent union seeking to represent the Los Angeles
musicians in separate collective bargaining negotiations.
In anticipation of the regular membership meeting of Local 47 on February 27, 1956, Read and several of his supporters precipitated a "secret"
meeting that morning at Larchmont Hall in Los Angeles, at which some
100 invitees were present. Read and his associates, informally known as
the steering committee, devised a plan for the conduct of the afternoon
general membership meeting, the principal elements of which were the
creation of a Musicians' Defense Fund, which would take any legal action
necessary to assert the positions articulated in the earlier Appeal to the
IEB and be financed by voluntary contributions from the membership, and
the taking of appropriate action, including ouster, of any officers of Local
47 who remained loyal to the position of Petrillo and the IEB. Unknown
to the participants in the "caucus" meeting on the morning of February 27
in Larchmont Hall, their words were recorded; the owner of the hall had
called a business representative of Local 47 and had gotten his approval
for the secret tape-recording of the meeting.
The regular membership meeting of Local 47 was held that afternoon,
with at least 2,000 members (out of a total membership in the local of some
16,000) in attendance. The meeting was chaired by President te Groen.
The principal item on the agenda was Cecil Read's report on the fate of
the local's Appeal to the International Executive Board. After so reporting, Read announced that any further attempt by the local to redress its
felt wrongs within the Federation would be futile, and he introduced two
resolutions, one authorizing further action including litigation to protect
the rights of the members, and another authorizing the creation of a music
defense fund. It became quite clear that the litigation contemplated by
Read and his supporters was not merely an attack on the Trust Funds but
also an attack upon the Federation as representative of the recording musicians, through a National Labor Relations Board election. President te
Groen spoke against the resolutions, warning that their adoption could
lead to the revocation of the local's charter from the Federation, and ruled
consideration of the resolutions out of order, on the ground that proper
notice of their introduction had not been given to members of the local in
132. Trust Fund Hearings,supra note 100, at 129.
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the formal call for the meeting. One of Read's associates appealed the
ruling to the membership, which overruled it and adopted the resolutions.
This tactic had been planned by the Read faction during the morning
meeting at Larchmont Hall, as had the next step-the introduction of a
demand for the resignation of President te Groen, along with Financial
Secretary Hennon and Recording Secretary Paul, and then the introduction by Cecil Read of a resolution that these three local officers be suspended from office. Further heated discussions resulted in a substitute
motion by Read calling for the temporary suspension of te Groen; te
Groen earlier that evening had privately stated to Read that he would
abide by the instructions of the Federation and of Petrillo even if those
instructions were to conflict with the policies of Local 47. Te Groen ruled
Read's motion out of order, but Read appealed the ruling of the chair.
The meeting fell into a state of turmoil; Read put to a voice vote the overruling and suspending of te Groen, and ruled that both votes had carried.
The meeting concluded with an appeal by the Read supporters for contributions to the Musicians' Defense Fund.
The next day, February 28, the local's board of directors held its regular
meeting, with Vice President Read-taking over the duties of the president-in the chair. The board adopted a motion to file formal charges
against te Groen and secretaries Paul and Hennon, and to call a special
meeting of the local membership to consider such charges.
On March 1, the Local 47 board of directors met again. Te Groen was
present and declared that he had not been legally removed from office.
Moreover, he adverted to a telegram sent that day by President Petrillo to
each member of the local's board of directors. The telegram stated that te
Groen had filed with the International Executive Board an appeal from
the action of the February 27 meeting of the local suspending him from
6ffice and that all actions taken at meetings not chaired by te Groen were
stayed pending disposition of the appeal. Read declared that Petrillo's order was invalid, but when te Groen and Hennon left the room the Board's
quorum was destroyed and the meeting was adjourned. Four days later,
Read and his supporters circulated among the local membership a call for
a special meeting at midnight on March 12 to consider charges against te
Groen and to request his removal from office. In the meantime, the International Executive Board had established a committee of five of its members to investigate the claim of te Groen that the February 27 meeting had
been improperly packed and organized and that his suspension was unauthorized. That investigating committee wrote to Local 47 directing that the
charges against te Groen looking toward his removal from office not be
pressed while the investigation was going on, and directing that the membership meeting called for March 12 be cancelled by order of the IEB. At a
meeting of the local's board of directors on March 9, the directors adopted
a motion introduced by Read, declaring that the IEB had no authority to
call off the March 12 meeting. The March 12 midnight meeting was in fact
held, and very well attended. Because te Groen was not present, Read felt
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it appropriate to say some words in his defense. Then, by secret ballot, the
membership voted, 1,535 to 51, to remove John te Groen from the presidency of the local. Promptly after the meeting, te Groen filed an appeal to
the IEB from the action of the meeting removing him from office, and
President Petrillo directed that pending the appeal the removal from office
would be stayed and te Groen was to remain as president of Local 47 and
chairman of its board of directors.
Another confrontation was assured when at a later meeting of the local
membership, some 1,800 members heard the reading of charges prepared
by Read against local secretaries Hennon and Paul. Some 1,500 voted by
secret ballot to remove them from office, but Petrillo promptly overrode
that action and ordered them reinstated.
Shortly after the March 12 meeting te Groen and Hennon filed charges
with the International Executive Board against Cecil Read and twelve
others. The formal charges stated that the "defendants" had obstructed
the operations of the local by conspiring to oust its regularly elected officers; that they had packed the meeting of February 27 and effected an
invalid suspension of the local president; that they met as the purported
board of directors of the local on March 1, contrary to the orders of President te Groen; that they improperly called the meeting of March 12 and
persisted in holding that meeting in defiance of the order of President Petrillo and the International Executive Board; that they invalidly attempted
to oust te Groen from office at a meeting invalidly called; and that they
openly invited the revocation of the local's charter. All of these allegations
were said to demonstrate conduct-such as advocating dual unionism, defying orders of the Federation, and placing obstacles in the way of the
successful maintenance of Local 47-that was properly the subject of discipline within the union. The charges against Read and his supporters
concluded:
The charged member and each of them participated in the attempt to
establish an organization which was intended and designed to wrest
from AFM its exclusive right to represent and bargain for musicians
employed in the motion picture, the recording and the broadcasting
industries. The charged members and each of them have by act, deed
and word of mouth, attempted to bring AFM into disrepute and to
substitute for it a dual, rival and antagonistic bargaining agent.
All of the parties charged filed answers denying many of the allegations,
denying the validity of certain of the Federation's bylaws and directives,
and demanding a hearing with the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses before an impartial tribunal to be selected by the membership of
Local 47. On March 28, the defendants were notified that a trial on the
charges had been scheduled. The hearing, with the plaintiffs and defendants represented by attorneys, was conducted in Hollywood from April 9
to April 13, on most of these days in the evening as well as in the morning
and afternoon. In addition to the testimony offered by witnesses, the tapes
of the "caucus" of February 27 at Larchmont Hall were introduced in evidence and played. The Referee appointed by President Petrillo at the di-
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rection of the International Executive Board to preside at the hearing was
Arthur J. Goldberg, then special counsel to the AFL-CIO. Referee
Goldberg rendered an exhaustive and detailed decision on May 4, 1956.133

Referee Goldberg stated at the outset that his task was not to consider
the merits of the position of Read and his supporters, but only to determine whether their actions were subject to discipline under the constitution and bylaws of the AFM or Local 47. He then proceeded to analyze
some of the larger issues raised by the charges, stating that "almost every
union at some stage must balance the interests of various groups among
the employees whom it represents in determining the allocation of benefits
that can be negotiated by the union," and that "[n]ecessarily, when such
decisions are made, there may be those who feel that they have not received their proper share of the benefits negotiated by the union." While it
would be a perversion of trade union principles to hold that complaints
and efforts to change union policy should be the subject of discipline,
[jiust as surely, every union, and indeed every organization, must insist upon compliance with the reasonable rules which govern its structure in the processing of these complaints, and in the pursuit of the
efforts to change its policy. If the organization provides procedures by
which the grievances of the individual group may be heard and considered, it is a fundamental obligation of the group to pursue those
procedures in presenting their point of view. .

.

. There was avail-

able to the local, as there is in almost every union, the right to appeal
[the action of the International Executive Board denying the local's
Appeal against Trust Fund policies] to the ultimate governing body of
the union-the Convention. This procedure the defendants did not
utilize . . . '34
The Referee concluded that the Federation could properly insist that the
defendants utilize the procedures in the union constitution and bylaws and
that they obey the union's rules and regulations.
Referee Goldberg then turned to the applicable rules of the AFM and
held that it was reasonable for the Federation to provide in article 13, section 1 of its bylaws for the fine or expulsion of a member who "in any way
places obstacles in the way of the successful maintenance of a local or
violates any law, order or direction, resolution or rule of the Federation."
Also appropriate, held Referee Goldberg, was the application of article 12,
section 36 of the bylaws, which provided that "advocacy of dual unionism
. . . shall constitute sufficient and proper grounds for expulsion."
The Referee then proceeded to consider each of the charges against each
of the defendants. He found that six of the defendants, including Cecil
Read, had participated in the ouster of te Groen on February 27, 1956, and
that they thereby had violated the bylaws of Local 47, since the suspension
from office was, pursuant to a plan made at a secret caucus, without prior
notice, without charges, without a hearing, and without a secret ballot.
133. The full text of the Referee's decision is set forth in INT'L MUSICIAN, May 1956, ai

9.
134. Id. at 39.
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Goldberg also found that these defendants had violated the bylaws of the
Federation, because the illegal ouster of elected officers surely "places obstacles in the way of the successful maintenance of a local." These six had
engaged in a "deliberate and wilful conspiracy to suspend te Groen, not
for any neglect of duty or other proper charge, but because he would not
agree in advance 35
to lead the local in defiance of the lawful regulations of
the Federation." 1
Goldberg did not sustain the charge that certain of the parties violated
Petrillo's telegrammed order setting aside te Groen's suspension from office, since the meeting of the local's board of directors at which these members were in attendance was adjourned for lack of a quorum. The Referee
did sustain the charge, however, against eight persons, including Cecil
Read, regarding the ignoring of the IEB's order to cancel the meeting of
March 12 at which te Groen was purportedly voted out of office; these
members of the local's board of directors had contravened the section of
the Federation's bylaws making local bylaws subordinate to those of the
Federation and another section outlawing the violation of a Federation
order or directive. The defendants' refusal to cancel the March 12 meeting
could not be justified simply by claiming that the IEB order was contrary
to the "will of the membership" of the local; the order was within the
power of the IEB, since it was confronted with a serious claim by President
te Groen that the "will of the membership" was in this case in violation of
the rights of individual members and of the union's orderly processes.
Referee Goldberg also sustained the charge against Read and one other
person alleging that they openly invited the revocation of the charter of
Local 47 by participating in all of the pertinent events, particularly the
ouster of te Groen and the open defiance of the order of the IEB. These
actions also constituted an obstruction of the successful maintenance of
Local 47, in violation of the Federation's bylaws. As for several other defendants who participated in some but not all of the pertinent events,
"while I am convinced that perhaps all of them also understood what they
were dong, nevertheless, in keeping with my desire to grant to the defendants the benefit of any doubt, I am finding [them] not guilty of this charge
' 36
[of inviting the loss of the local's charter]."'
Cecil Read alone was held guilty of the charge of advocacy of dual
unionism, "one of the most serious charges that can be leveled against a
trade unionist." According to Goldberg, Read
left no doubt, in his remarks, that the course of action which he
planned and advocated involved the creation of a separate bargaining
unit for Local 47 outside of the Federation and in opposition to it, and
an election campaign to certify the local instead of the Federation
137
under the National Labor Relations Act.
The other defendants were held not guilty, in view of the serious nature of
135. Id. at 41.
136. Id. at 43.
137. Id.
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the charge, the doubt whether these defendants fully understood the implications of Read's plans and actions, and the Referee's desire to accord the
defendants the benefit of any doubts.
Finally, Read and five other defendants were held guilty-by virtue of
their conspiring at the Larchmont Hall caucus to precipitate the summary
and illegal ouster of unprepared and unwarned officers of the local-of
placing obstacles in the way of the successful maintenance of the union.
Several other charges were dismissed as overbroad, unsupported or
duplicative.
Referee Goldberg was as discriminating and lenient in recommending
sanctions as he had been in ruling upon the substance of the charges.
Goldberg recommended that a party technically guilty of one charge not
incur any penalty at all, and that ten other persons, not including Cecil
Read, be expelled from membership in the AFM and in Local 47 but that
they be reinstated after one day on the condition that they refrain thereafter from advocating dual unionism, placing obstacles in the way of Local
47, and violating any order, direction, or rule of the Federation. If these
persons abided by that condition for one year they were to be deemed to
have fully satisfied their penalty, except that they could not hold office in
Local 47 for a period of two years after their reinstatement. The recommended sanction for Cecil Read was the most severe: expulsion from
membership in the Federation and Local 47 for one year, with readmission
to be granted on application thereafter, provided that during the period of
expulsion he engaged in no advocacy of dual unionism against the Federation, placed no further obstacles in the way of the successful maintenance
of Local 47, and violated no order, direction or rule of the Federation.
Read too was to be debarred from holding office in Local 47 for two years
following reinstatement.
Within three weeks of the issuance of the Goldberg recommendations,
the International Executive Board met and, on May 23, 1956, adopted his
findings and recommendations with immaterial variations. At the same
meeting the International Executive Board sustained the appeals of John
te Groen and Maury Paul from their ouster as president and secretary,
respectively, of Local 47.
The matter did not end there, however, for all of the defendants were
granted an opportunity to present their case to the full membership of the
Federation at the June 1956 Annual Convention in Atlantic City, New
Jersey. At the Convention President Petrillo turned over the chair to one
of the delegates, who urged that the appellants be given every considera38
tion. Read and seven other persons individually stated their arguments,'
and Petrillo then spoke in reply, reviewing the Trust Fund policies of the
Federation and giving the reasons behind the action of the International
Executive Board in expelling the appellants. Among other things, his
speech referred to the well-paid Hollywood musicians who were attempt138. Id., Aug. 1956, at 28.
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ing to take the bread from the tables of the delegates. After a standing
ovation, several members of the Executive Board made brief statements in
139
support of their decision to expel.
A motion was made and seconded to sustain in full the action of the
International Executive Board. Ironically, Maury Paul, the secretary of
Local 47, then rose according to the instructions of the local and read a
resolution urging that the expulsion of the appellants be reversed. The
resolution asserted that all of the appellants had been expelled for actions
taken on behalf of Local 47 pursuant to membership resolutions and petitions; and that their expulsion from union membership was "unjust and
inequitable." The resolution required the Local 47 delegates to vote for a
reversal of the expulsions. A vote was then taken to sustain the expulsions;
the motion passed unanimously. Petrillo publicly criticized te Groen and
Paul for seeking to overturn the expulsions, but they gave public assurance
that they personally supported the action of the International Executive
Board but were forced to cast their votes against it by virtue of the instructions imposed by the membership of Local 47.
In spite of the fact that Read and his closest supporters had been ousted
from membership in the Federation and Local 47, the members of that
local still actively supported the principles for which Read had fought.
This was evidenced on the following day at the Convention, which opened
with a long series of resolutions on behalf of Local 47, proffered in each
instance by President te Groen on instructions of the local membership.
The resolutions included proposals giving greater authority to the local
membership, deleting certain powers of the President and the Executive
Board, reinstating certain re-scoring and re-use payments and rights, and
providing for wage increases.14°
Upon the recommendation of the Federation committee initially
charged with considering these resolutions, the Convention voted them
down. It did, however, support a lengthy resolution, introduced on the
following day, that affirmed the policy of the Federation leadership with
regard to the Music Performance Trust Funds and the "fight against un139. The tape recording of the Larchmont Hall meeting was also played.
140. Specifically, the resolutions called for ratification by the membership of all collective bargaining agreements; the deletion from the Federation bylaws of article 1,section 1,
giving the President the power to annul provisions of the constitution and bylaws; abandonment of the policy of requiring payments to the Music Performance Trust Funds in the
motion picture, television, phonograph recording and transcription industries; the reinstatement of the policy of requiring re-scoring payments to film musicians when theatrical motion pictures are released to television; the endorsement by the Federation in contract,
legislation and treaties of residual and re-use performance rights; the negotiation for wage
increases in the phonograph record industry commensurate with the increase in the cost of
living since 1946; the deletion of the powers of the Executive Board to annul actions of the
Convention and to expel any local from the Federation; the granting to larger locals of votes
at the Convention commensurate with the size of their membership, not subject to the present maximum of 10 votes; the deletion of the President's power to remove a local officer
without due process; amendment of the Federation bylaws to provide for appeals to the
Convention on decisions other than fines and expulsions; and payment to musicians for reuse of certain radio transcriptions rather than payment to the Trust Fund.
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employment," applauded the effort and "persuasive talent" of President
Petrillo on this matter, and criticized the "uninformed, misled, and dissident group of musicians" responsible for unwarranted attacks upon the
Trust Fund policies of the Federation.' 4 1 During the period of the Convention, the International Executive Board also approved a resolution empowering the Board to place a local union under the control of a trustee
appointed by the President of the Federation in the event the Board had
reason to believe that the union, its officers or members were violating the
Federation constitution or bylaws, or were acting in a manner detrimental
to the welfare or interests of the Federation or of the local, thus warranting
142
emergency action.

By the close of the 1956 Convention, the Read faction and the membership of Local 47 had been rebuffed by the full membership of the Federation. The leaders of the rebel faction had been expelled, the challenges of
Local 47 to the Trust Fund policies had been rejected, and the International Executive Board had been given express power to place a renegade
local under trusteeship. There were no further intra-union forums to
which the recording and film musicians could take their case. This outcome did not, however, take Read by surprise. He had already appeared
before a legislative subcommittee in the House of Representatives of the
United States Congress, and he was about to spearhead four massive lawsuits, one directed against each of the Music Performance Trust Funds, in
the courts of California.
VIII.

THE TRUST FUND HEARINGS OF

1956

On May 10, 1956-less than one week after the filing of the recommendations of Referee Goldberg-the Chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor of the United States House of Representatives appointed a
special subcommittee to investigate the operations of the Music Performance Trust Funds. The chairman of the subcommittee was Phil M. Landrum of Georgia, and the other two members were James Roosevelt and
Joe Holt, Representatives from Los Angeles. The subcommittee traveled
to Los Angeles to take testimony on May 21 and 22 from the Hollywood
musicians who were most adversely affected by the Federation's Trust
Fund policies, as well as those who were the principal characters in the
struggle for power within Local 47. 143 Extended testimony was given by
Cecil Read, who also introduced into evidence the entire text of the Appeal of Local 47 that he had presented to the International Executive
Board of the Federation in January 1956. Testimony was also given by
John te Groen, and other persons in the Hollywood music industry, including bandleader Bob Crosby and television producer and actor Ozzie
Nelson.
In general, the witnesses' testimony emphasized two perceived abuses:
141.

INT'L

MUSICIAN,

Sept. 1956, at 18-19.

142. Id., July 1956, at 6 (emergency action therefore warranted).
143. See Trust Fund Hearings, supra note 100.
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the diversion of compensation from recording musicians to the Trust
Funds, and the undemocratic structure and procedures of the American
Federation of Musicians. Ironically, both Read and te Groen articulated
their shared view that the diversion of the $25 re-scoring fees, upon the
release to television of theatrical motion pictures, from the original recording musicians to the Musicians Performance Trust Fund, was grievously
unfair and objectionable to the Hollywood musicians. Te Groen observed
that, as president of Local 47, he had promptly challenged this June 1955
action of the International Executive Board by a letter to the Board, and
that he intended to raise the challenge again at the forthcoming 1956 Annual Convention. Read also presented detailed information regarding the
diversion to the Trust Funds of imminent wage increases in the phonograph recording industry and of re-use payments for transcribed radio programs; and regarding the severe impact of substantial Trust Fund
payments upon the employment of live musicians in television film. Read
made it clear that he had no objection to the Trust Funds in principal, or
even to an exaction from the earnings of all musicians for the purpose of
alleviating unemployment. His objection was rather to the diversion of
wage increases to the Trust Funds; the massive disproportion between the
moneys contributed to the Trust Funds through the services of Local 47
and the moneys that Local 47 musicians received from the Funds; the use
of Trust Fund moneys to subsidize nonmembers and persons relying on
music merely as a part-time supplement to some other principal employment; and the dissemination of Trust Fund moneys by local union leaders
as a form of patronage and favoritism.
The second principal theme of the hearings-the undemocratic structure
and procedures of the Federation-was sounded by Read and other witnesses, particularly Bob Crosby. It was pointed out that the constitution,
bylaws and usages of the AFM gave extraordinary power to the President
and to the International Executive Board. Petrillo and the IEB could negotiate agreements without consultation with or ratification by the membership of any of the affected locals, and could enter into agreements to
further the interests of the bulk of the union's membership, in order to
preserve positions of power within the national union and in disregard of
the interests of adversely affected local members. The AFM constitution
also empowered Petrillo to annul and set aside not only any actions taken
by local unions but also any provisions of the constitution and bylaws
themselves. The testimony by Read and Crosby also underlined the fact
that Local 47 was powerless to secure any redress within the available intra-union machinery. Its attempt to oust its unsympathetic officers was
overruled by Petrillo; and it lacked voting power within the annual convention commensurate with its membership, because the voting rules were
weighted against the largest locals and because even a reversal by the full
convention of the Trust Fund policies of Petrillo and the IEB could be
summarily reversed by Petrillo himself.
Read claimed that these and other grievances warranted the following
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legislative remedies directed generally at all labor organizations: (1) prohibition of the absolute power of any union president or officers to annul
any portion of the constitution or bylaws without the express approval of a
majority of the members; (2) prohibition of the misuse of assessments collected for specific purposes such as welfare, pension, unemployment and
strike benefits; (3) required submission of all collective bargaining agreements for approval by the members in the bargaining unit covered by that
agreement; (4) prohibition of any evasion of the Taft-Hartley provisions
dealing with voluntary employer payments into welfare funds; (5) required
uniformity and nondiscrimination in assessments levied against union
members; and (6) creation and enforcement of residual property rights in
musical performances, so-called performing rights, under the copyright
law and similar laws regulating the exploitation of artistic property.
The testimony offered in the two days of hearings in Los Angeles was
often spirited and sometimes poignant. The Congressmen through their
questions attempted to get a clear understanding of the sometimes complex
operations of the various entertainment industries and the various Trust
Funds. On several occasions, their questions became near rhetorical, expressing their indignation at the unilateral powers reposed in and sometimes exercised by the President of the AFM. In the hearing room were a
significant number of Hollywood musicians, who on occasion punctuated
favorable testimony with applause and unfavorable testimony with derisive laughter or with critical comments.
The subcommittee filed its slender report, only four pages in length, on
October 10, 1956. The committee found that Local 47 had no voice in
collective bargaining negotiations carried on at the national level and lacked effective control over its own affairs,1'" and stated that "it is unlikely
that'members of that local can ever obtain proper or adequate participation in the management of the affairs of the union."' 45 The subcommittee's conclusions and recommendations, however, fell far short of the
recommendations of Read and his supporters. The subcommittee concluded, first, that the federal government ought not interfere with the dayto-day relationships between union officials and union members. "[Sluch
intraunion matters can and should be worked out within the structure of
the labor organization itself, sooner or later in most cases the will of the
members themselves will govern the conduct of the union."
The subcommittee's second recommendation went a bit further in the
direction sought by Read. Using as a model section 302(c)(4) of the TaftHartley Act, which forbids an employer to deduct dues from the members'
paychecks for purposes of paying them directly to the union unless the
member has so authorized in writing, 146 the subcommittee suggested that it
might be wise to require a similar employee authorization before the union
144. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 84TH CONG., 2D
SESS., REPORT OF MUSICIANS PERFORMANCE TRUST FUNDS 3 (Comm. Print 1956).

145. Id.
146. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
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and employer could agree to have any other part of the employee's wages
paid to the union or to a third party, such as the Trustee of the Music
Performance Trust Funds. This approach would require the union to poll
the employees in advance of collective bargaining to determine whether
they preferred to receive part of their wage increase in the form of some
other benefit, through the creation or continuance of a specific employee
benefit plan. Although such a poll might delay the collective bargaining
process, the subcommittee thought this disadvantage might be outweighed
by the values of employee participation in the setting of collective bargaining policy and an administration of employee benefit plans that was satisfactory to the employees whose wages were being contributed. Since these
issues went far beyond the particular problems of Local 47 and the AFM,
the subcommittee recommended no more than that additional hearings be
held to determine the feasibility of amending the Taft-Hartley Act to
achieve such a result. The subcommittee also concluded "that further
hearings regarding the operations of the musicians performance trust
funds are not necessary when considered from the standpoint of possible
Federal legislation. Hence, with this recommendation and report the subcommittee believes its assignment has been completed."
The report of the subcommittee, while generally sympathetic to the
cause of the Hollywood musicians, must have provided only cold comfort.
Its rejection of the suggestion that the federal government had a role in
regulating intra-union affairs between officers and members frontally rejected one of the major objectives of Read and his supporters. 47
The subcommittee's second recommendation was not soundly based,
either in precedent or in policy. Reliance on the Taft-Hartley rules regarding employee authorization for dues deduction did not prove the case for
employee authorization for payments into specific benefit plans. The decision to require payment of union dues is one that the union and employer
make in collective bargaining, without advance consent from individual
employees. The consent is necessary only to approve a particular method
for paying those dues (i.e., checkoff from periodic wages) in the absence of
which the employee would have to pay the dues directly. Democratic determination of employee compensation policy is normally pursued not
through advance direct vote of the membership, which the subcommittee
acknowledged would commonly be impracticable and time consuming,
but rather through the designation of negotiating committees and often
through post-negotiation ratification procedures. Whatever the strength or
147. Ironically, Congress in effect ignored the subcommittee's conclusion when, within
three years, it enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976 & Supp. V
198 1)), the principal feature of which was the so-called union members' bill of rights. That
Act gave union members the right to participate in discussions at union meetings, to vote on
union business, to run for union office, and to participate in the election of union officers.
This congressional rejection of the suggestion that it had no role to play in assuring democratic relationships between union officers and union members was manifested in a law that
bears the name of Congressman Landrum, the chairman of the subcommittee to investigate
the Music Performance Trust Funds.
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deficiencies of the subcommittee's suggestions for further hearings on the
matter of pre-negotiation membership approval of benefit plans, no such
hearings were convened and no such legislation introduced.
IX.

THE TRUST FUND LAWSUITS

In late 1956 and early 1957, four lawsuits were brought in California
state court by film and recording musicians who were members of Local
47. In each case, the defendants were the American Federation of Musicians, the Trustee of the Music Performance Trust Funds, and companies
in either the recording industry or the film industry. Each lawsuit attacked
the legality of one or another Music Performance Trust Fund, sought an
injunction against payments to the Trustee and the appointment of a receiver to collect Trust Fund moneys for the plaintiff musicians, and sought
damages against the Federation for payments already made to the Trust
Funds. 48 The theory of recovery in each case was that the Federation,
through its trust fund policies, had violated its fiduciary obligation as exclusive bargaining representative for the film and recording musicians.
The actions were brought in California state court to guard against the
possibility of the transfer of the case to a federal court in New York, where
both the Federation and the Trustee had their principal offices, which
would greatly inconvenience the plaintiffs and other principal witnesses.
The suit involving the phonograph record industry, Anderson v. American Federation of Musicians, proved to be the principal case. Anderson
was brought first because it was thought to be the strongest case for the
plaintiffs, and it was the only case of the four that went to trial. Anderson
ultimately resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs and precipitated the
settlement of the other three cases.
The style and theories of the Anderson complaint set the pattern for the
complaints that followed. The plaintiffs were recording musicians covered
by the 1954 Labor and Trust Fund Agreements with the phonograph record industry. All of the ninety-one named plaintiffs, with the exception of
Cecil Read, were members of the Federation and Local 47, and they purported to represent a group of 6,000 members. The complaint alleged that
in the negotiations for the 1954 agreements, the Federation secured the
oral agreement of the recording companies to a wage increase for the musicians, only to induce the companies to pay these "wage increase payments" to the Trustee, in addition to the "royalty payments" paid to the
Trustee since 1948 and calculated as a percentage of the price of records
sold. This diversion of wage increase payments and royalty payments to
148. The first lawsuit, Anderson v. American Fed'n of Musicians, was filed on Nov. 20,
1956; it attacked the Music Performance Trust Fund pertaining to the phonograph record
industry. The second lawsuit, Atkinson v. American Fed'n of Musicians, was filed on Nov.
29, 1956; it attacked the Music Performance Trust Fund pertaining to theatrical motion
pictures. Beilmann v. American Fed'n of Musicians, filed on Apr. 30, 1957, attacked the Trust

Fund pertaining to films made for television. Finally, Bain v. American Fed'n of Musicians,
filed June 6, 1957, attacked the Trust Fund pertaining to electrical transcriptions of radio
programs and to commercial announcements for radio and television.
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the Trust Fund allegedly violated the Federation's fiduciary duties to the
plaintiffs as their bargaining representative. 149 The complaint also alleged
that the Federation, acting out of hostility toward the plaintiffs, failed to
bargain in good faith, and negotiated away the wages and property interests of the plaintiffs through the device of the Trust Fund payments. The
complaint further asserted that President Petrillo and the International Executive Board, motivated by a desire to retain control over the affairs of
the Federation and perpetuate themselves in office, used the Trust Fund
payments to win the support of member musicians who received the payments at the plaintiffs' expense.
The complaint also articulated three other causes of action: one under
the California Labor Code, which barred an employer's withholding of
any part of an employee's wage "either wilfully or unlawfully or with intent to defraud an employee, a competitor, or any other person";' 50 one
against the Federation only, in the amount of $1,737,900 for wage increase
payments already paid to the Trust Fund under the 1954 agreement; and
another only against the Federation for royalty payments in the amount of
$6,750,000 already paid, in the preceding four years, as royalties to the
Trust Fund (the four-year period apparently having been dictated by the
applicable statute of limitations).' 5'
The relief requested on the principal cause of action was an order forbidding the defendant recording companies from making any wageincrease payments or royalty payments to the Trust Fund and requiring
them instead to make such payments to the recording musicians; requiring
the Trustee to hold the Trust Fund for the benefit of the musicians who
recorded the phonograph records, or their heirs; forbidding the Trustee to
disburse any past or future wage-increase payments or royalty payments to
anyone other than the recording musicians; and impounding all Trust
Fund payments presently or in the future in the custody of the Trustee,
and directing the recording companies and the Trustee to transmit such
moneys to either a receiver appointed by the court or to the court itself.
These funds would then be divided among the recording musicians according to shares determined by a referee appointed by the court.
The second case, Atkinson v. American Federation of Musicians, challenged the Federation's decision in June 1955 to divert to the Trust Fund
re-scoring fees formerly paid to recording musicians upon the release of
theatrical motion pictures to television. The twenty-two plaintiffs prior to
1948 were musicians performing in motion pictures produced prior to 1948
for theatrical exhibition and released to television under the Labor Agreements of 1952 and 1954, who claimed to represent some 2,400 members of
149. The complaint asserted that under the 1954 Labor Agreement diverting "wage increase payments" to the Trust Fund, more than $1,737,900 had been paid to the Trustee, and
that $2,250,000 more would be paid during the balance of the agreement unless the defendant recording companies were enjoined. (This was in addition to $5,750,000 in anticipated
"royalty" payments, based on record sales, for the balance of the 1954 agreement.)
150. CAL. LABOR CODE § 222 (West 1971).
151. See CAL. CIV. PRAC. CODE §§ 337, 343 (West 1982).
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the Federation. All of the named plaintiffs, with the exception of Cecil
Read, were members of the Federation and of Local 47.
The complaint set forth the terms of the 1952 and 1954 agreements,
which provided that the original recording musicians would receive $25
upon the release of the motion picture to television and also provided for
the payment by the motion picture companies to the Trustee of five percent of the gross revenues received for the television exhibition rights.
These provisions for re-scoring fees or re-use payments allegedly reflected
an established principle of wage negotiation in the motion picture industry
and a valuable property right of the performing musicians. In June 1955,
however, the International Executive Board-acting on the pretext that the
recording musicians or their heirs entitled to the re-use payments could not
be located, which the plaintiffs alleged the IEB knew to be untrue-authorized President Petrillo to demand unilaterally that the motion picture
companies make the re-use payments instead to the Trust Fund. Petrillo's
action was allegedly timed so52as to divert to Trust Fund recipients vast
amounts of re-use payments.
A second cause of action was stated, as in the Anderson case, founded on
the California Civil Code. Other causes of action were alleged regarding
the five percent royalty payments under the 1952 and 1954 contracts, on
the theory that these would have been used to augment the musicians' reuse payments had the Federation acted loyally, conscientiously and in
good faith, and in accord with its fiduciary obligations. 53 The relief
sought in the motion-picture case was comparable to that sought in the
phonograph-record case.
The third lawsuit, Beilmann v. American Federationof Musicians, named

as plaintiffs a class of some 1,200 musicians employed by companies in the
production of motion pictures made primarily or solely for television
under the Television Film Labor and Trust Agreements of 1951 and 1954.
The 1951 Trust Agreement required the defendant television film companies to pay to the Trustee five percent of the gross revenues received for the
exhibition of television films produced under the companion Labor Agreement, including revenues from all future exhibitions and re-runs of those
films. The same arrangement prevailed under the 1954 agreements.
152. Thq complaint also recited the agreements made by the major motion picture producers-RKO, Paramount, Columbia, Twentieth-Century Fox, Warner Brothers, MGM,
United Artists and Republic-for the release of thousands of old films to television. The
complaint alleged that approximately $1,495,000 in re-use payments had been diverted from
the plaintiffs to the Trust Fund since June 1955, and that, unless the defendant companies
were enjoined, some $5 million would be diverted to the Trust Fund from films already
licensed or sold to television, and another $5 million would be diverted under licenses or

sales to be made in the future.
153. Separate causes of action were alleged against the Federation, seeking $1,495,000
damages for re-use payments diverted to the Trust Fund since June 1955, and $2,973,950
damages for the royalty payments in that period. A specific claim was made against defendants that were serving as licensing or distributing companies for the motion picture produ-

cers and that were thereby required to become signatories to the Trust Fund Agreement; and
another specifically against the Trustee for money had and received for the benefit of the

plaintiffs in the preceding six months totalling $200,000.
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The complaint alleged that the Federation had violated its obligation of
loyalty and good faith by failing to protect the property interests of the
plaintiffs in their wages, including compensation that the television film
companies would have been willing to pay the musicians for re-runs of
films. As in the earlier cases, there were allegations of hostility; of the
unfair creation of a subsidy from the bargaining power of the plaintiffs for
the benefit of musicians not in the film-recording industry and not union
members; of the responsibility of Petrillo and the members of the International Executive Board, who were motivated by a desire to perpetuate
themselves in office; of constructive fraud; and of the exhaustion of plaintiffs' intra-union remedies through its Appeal to the IEB and to the 1956
Convention. The plaintiffs asserted that the total number of musicians engaged in the production of television films was 1,200, less than one-half of
one percent of the AFM membership; yet the members of Local 47 were
alleged to provide ninety-four percent of all of the live instrumental music
used for television films, and an equivalent proportion of the payments
made to the Trust Fund. The plaintiffs further claimed that some
$2,100,000, the property of the plaintiffs, had in the past been diverted in
the form of five percent royalty payments to the Trust Fund, and that
$600,000 would be so diverted in the future from the television films already produced that utilized the plaintiffs' services.- 54
Another cause of action, departing somewhat from the formulations of
the Anderson and Atkinson complaints, focused on the loss of musical employment in television film as a result of the substantial Trust Fund payments required by the 1951 and 1954 agreements. The obligation to make
the five percent royalty payments allegedly created such a cost differential
between live music and old soundtrack or canned music that ninety percent of all television films made by the defendant film companies utilized
foreign or canned music. Moreover, many shows formerly using live musicians had been discontinued, allegedly as a result of the Federation's Trust
Fund policies. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the 1954 Television
Film Trust Agreement was invalid, along with the condition in the Labor
Agreement that defendant companies hire no musicians until the companies had agreed to make payments to the Trust Fund. A related cause of
action for damages, solely against the Federation, rested on the harm to
the plaintiffs' employment caused by the royalty provisions, and emphasized the fact that the television film companies were ready, willing and
able to employ the plaintiff musicians without paying royalties and to negotiate reasonable re-run payments to the plaintiffs for the exhibition of
television films.
154. A second cause of action was asserted against the defendant companies that were in
the business of selling, distributing or syndicating television films and were thereby required
to become parties to the 1951 and 1954 Trust Agreements and to make royalty payments to
the Trust Fund. A third cause of action was stated against the Federation, for the diversion
of $2,100,000 made as Trust Fund royalty payments rather than as compensation for the
television film musicians. A fourth cause of action was asserted against the Trustee, for
money had and received in the preceding one year, in the amount of $800,000.
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The relief sought included: an order forbidding the defendant companies to pay royalties to the Trustee and requiring such moneys to be paid
to the plaintiffs; an order requiring the Trustee to hold the five percent
royalty payments for the benefit of the plaintiff musicians as their property, and to pay such moneys only to them; an order impounding the royalty payments now or in the future in the custody of the Trustee,
appointing a receiver, and appointing a referee to ascertain the plaintiffs'
equitable shares; an order authorizing the defendant companies to employ
plaintiffs without performing the conditions of the 1954 Trust Fund Agreement; and an order barring the Federation from disciplining plaintiffs
working for companies that were not making royalty payments to the
Trust Fund; and a judgment for damages of $2,900,000.
The fourth lawsuit filed, Bain v. American Federation of Musicians, was
something of a catchall, but its principal attack was upon the diversion to
the Trust Fund of royalties from the re-use of radio transcriptions. The
plaintiffs, a class of some 1,000 musicians all of whom were members of
the Federation and of Local 47, were employed in the making of electrical
transcriptions for radio and commerical announcements for radio and television. The 1948 Electrical Transcription Labor Agreement, which had
expired on December 31, 1953, provided that if a signatory company
wished to re-use or to dub a transcription or a commercial jingle or spot, it
would first have to secure the permission of the Federation and to pay the
recording musician the full scale payment that would be applicable to the
new use, as additional compensation for the original performance. The
same re-use restriction clause was also to bind persons to whom the signatory recording companies might sell the transcription. All signatory companies also had to sign the 1948 Electrical Transcription Trust Agreement,
which obligated them to pay to the Music Performance Trust Fund three
percent of the gross revenues received when electrical transcriptions, jingles or spots were used more than once on radio, such obligation lasting as
long as the transcription continued in use. The complaint alleged that
these Trust Fund payments were in substance wage increases for the plaintiffs and were improperly diverted by the Federation, in breach of its
fiduciary duties and its obligation to bargain honestly, conscientiously and
in good faith. The plaintiffs were alleged to constitute less than one-half of
one percent of the Federation's membership, and to have been the object
of a hostile attempt by President Petrillo and the International Executive
Board to perpetuate themselves in office through their trust fund policies. 15 5 The complaint requested a holding that re-use fees and royalties
155. Further causes of action allegedly arose from the Transcription Labor and Trust
Agreements of 1954, which increased the royalty payments to be made to the Trust Fund
upon the use of electrical transcriptions; the 1954 and 1956 Labor Agreements relating to
television jingles and spots, which provided for the payment of $100 to the Music Performance Trust Fund for each jingle or spot when first exhibited on television; and a 1954 agreement between the Federation and the radio networks, which authorized the re-use of
transcriptions by a different sponsor from the original one, provided re-use payments of $27
per musician were made to the Trust Fund (in contrast to the $54 scale rate which had
previously been paid for such re-use to the recording musicians). Claims were also asserted
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were the property of the plaintiffs, and that the union could not alter the
dubbing restriction clause and the re-use restriction clause in the Labor
Agreements except for the benefit of the plaintiffs who recorded the electrical transcriptions or the jingle or spot announcement.
In each of the four Trust Fund lawsuits the Federation, usually in combination with the other defendants, raised a number of defenses.' 56 The
Federation considered itself empowered, as the exclusive bargaining representative under the Taft-Hartley Act, 157 to enter into the Trust Fund
agreements to create employment opportunities for the benefit of the entire
Federation membership, a power that was also conferred by the bylaws of
the Federation. Even if the court determined that the plaintiffs did have
some grievance, however, the defendants contended that it was barred by
such affirmative defenses as the statute of limitations, laches, estoppel,
waiver and ratification, given the substantial period of time during which
the plaintiff had raised no protest regarding the Federation's negotiations
for the Trust Fund payments. Finally, the defendants claimed that the
power of any court to hear these actions was pre-empted by the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
In December 1956, shortly after the filing of the Anderson and Atkinson
lawsuits in California, Trustee Rosenbaum initiated an action in New
York state court designed to test the same issues addressed in the California cases. Rosenbaum wished to obtain a more favorable ruling on the
merits, more expeditiously, and in a more convenient forum. Rosenbaum
v. Melnikoff named as defendants the American Federation of Musicians,
the signatories of the labor and trust agreements in the phonograph record
industry and the theatrical motion picture industry, and some two dozen
musicians previously employed in the production of phonograph records
and in the scoring of motion pictures made primarily for theatrical use and
thereafter released to television. The New York action requested a declaratory judgment recognizing the validity of all of the pertinent labor and
trust agreements and determining that the defendant Federation had violated no duty to the recording and film musicians. If the New York court
were to determine that the musicians named as defendants there were representative of the same class of musicians as were the plaintiffs in the Anderson and Atkinson cases in California, this would significantly impair
against NBC and CBS for diverting to the Trust Fund re-use payments deriving from the re-

broadcast, with new sponsors, of transcriptions of such radio shows as "Gunsmoke," "Jack
Benny," and "Dragnet"; against the AFM, for $2,150,000 allegedly wrongly paid to the
Trust Fund pursuant to the union's Electrical Transcription Labor and Trust Agreements;

and against Trustee Rosenbaum for $200,000 for moneys had and received in the preceding
year.
156. The defendants argued a number of threshold issues. First, the defendants claimed
that Samuel Rosenbaum was an indispensable party under California law who had to be

personally served within California in order to confer jurisdiction on the court. Rosenbaum

had in fact been served in New York City. Second, if the California Code of Civil Proce-

dure were construed to permit such constructive service, Rosenbaum's constitutional rights
under the due process clause of the federal constitution would be violated.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)-(b) (1976).
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the effectiveness of the California lawsuits and presumably render any decision in New York preclusive of a decision on similar issues in California.
The plaintiffs in the Anderson case moved quickly, and on December 4,
1956, Judge Ford issued a temporary restraining order barring the making
of any wage-increase payments by the phonograph record companies to
the Trustee until the court could pass upon the motion of the plaintiffs for
a preliminary injunction against such payments and for the appointment
of a receiver to impound the moneys. After three days of hearings in midJanuary 1957 (in both the Anderson and Atkinson cases) Judge Ford denied the motion for preliminary relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
He concluded that the non-resident Trustee was an indispensable party
and that provisional relief could be granted by a California court only if
the Trustee were personally served there. The office of the Trustee was in
New York, all collections for the Trust Funds were made there, and disbursements originated there. Judge Ford stated that, had there been no
jurisdictional defect, sound discretion would probably have warranted the
issuance of a preliminary injunction against further payments to the Trust
Funds. Although technically, the ruling merely prevented the issuance of
injunctive relief, and left viable the plaintiffs' claims in the two cases for
some $13,000,000 in damages for the past diversion of plaintiffs' compensation, it appeared likely that the court would ultimately conclude that
Trustee Rosenbaum was as indispenable to the disposition of that claim as
he was to the disposition of the equitable claim for injunction and the
appointment of a receiver. The plaintiffs promptly prepared an appeal of
Judge Ford's order and moved for an injunction pending appellate review,
but Judge Ford denied the motion.
In Anderson v. Superior Court 58 the district court of appeals unanimously directed that a writ of mandate issue commanding the lower court
to assume jurisdiction over the appeal for preliminary relief.' 59 The
60
Supreme Court of California affirmed the intermediate appellate court.'
The supreme court concluded that any court of that state having jurisdiction over the defendant recording companies, which were subject to the
claims of the Trustee for payments to the Trust Fund, also had quasi in
rem jurisdiction, upon constructive service of the Trustee outside California, to adjudicate the ownership of the moneys, debts, funds and obligations impounded by the receiver or owed by such resident debtordefendants.' 6' The trial court in Anderson could therefore issue a preliminary injunction against recording companies doing business in California,
appoint a receiver for the collection of Trust Fund payments and exclude
the Trustee from any right, title or interest in moneys due from the companies or moneys held by the receiver. 162 Counsel for the Federation and the
major phonograph record companies unsuccessfully sought review in the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

310 P.2d 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
Id. at 161.
49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
316 P.2d at 963.
Id. at 966.
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United States Supreme Court. 163 Throughout this entire proceeding for
writ of mandate, Judge Ford had continued in effect the temporary restraining order barring the making of any wage-increase payments by the
defendant phonograph record companies to the Trust Fund; this effectively created a res upon which the jurisdiction of the California trial court
could operate.
On January 8, 1958, after the decision of the California Supreme Court
and before the denial of the writ of certiorari, the Anderson plaintiffs secured a favorable ruling from Judge Ford on their renewed request for
preliminary relief. The judge issued a preliminary injunction restraining
the defendant recording companies from making any wage increase payments to the Trustee, and granted plaintiffs' motion for the appointment of
a receiver pendente lite to collect and impound such funds.
Although the time had apparently arrived for all parties to the California lawsuits to develop their cases on the merits, the litigation tangle grew
more intense. When Rosenbaum, Petrillo and other Federation officials
failed to respond to the plaintiffs' requests for depositions, the plaintiffs
had to resort to the trial court in New York to issue a subpoena duces
tecum in aid of the California litigation. A subpoena was issued; the Federation and the Trustee moved to vacate; the denial of the motion was
appealed to the New York Appellate Division 64 and then to the New
York Court of Appeals, both of which sustained the issuance of the subpoena. 165 Other subpoenas were issued, avoided and attacked, in the
courts of both New York and California. Ultimately, the Federation entered into a stipulation providing for the taking of the depositions of Petrillo and other members of the International Executive Board in New
York City. The depositions were taken, and other pre-trial discovery
ensued.
X.

THE RISE OF THE MUSICIANS GUILD AND THE NEW REGIME IN

THE

AFM

By the end of 1957, Cecil Read and the other dissidents in Local 47 had
fought their battle against the international union and its officers at several
levels. They had pursued an appeal to the International Executive Board,
which shunned their attack upon the union's Trust Fund policies. They
had attempted to take over control of Local 47, but that led to their trial on
charges before the Executive Board and their expulsion from union membership. They had instigated congressional hearings and apprised a legislative subcommittee of their union's autocratic operations and of their
economic plight, but no legislative initiative developed. They had commenced four massive lawsuits in the courts of California, seeking millions
of dollars in damages and the effective dissolution of the Music Performance Trust Fund. The dismissal of their case had just been reversed by the
163. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
164. In re Atkinson, 4 A.D.2d 1020, 169 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1957).
165. In re Atkinson, 5 N.Y.2d 841, 181 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
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California Supreme Court, and a long road lay ahead before judgment
could be rendered. As 1958 began, the dissidents planned for a more direct attack upon the control and policies of the Federation. They formed a
rival union.
In January 1958, the labor agreement between the Federation and the
motion picture producers had expired and negotiations were proceeding
for a new agreement at the national level. The principal spokesman for
the union was, of course, President Petrillo, who was aided by union representatives from the major studios. In addition, representatives from Local
47 had prevailed upon Petrillo to allow them to participate in the negotiations; they were formed into a committee of some sixty persons representing the musicians at all of the studios, and they had formulated some fiftyfive proposals. Although Petrillo was somewhat wary of the bargaining
ability of the group from Local 47, he felt that the officers had supported
him in the conflict with Cecil Read, and he gave them some responsibility
in the negotiations.
The film producers were proving intransigent. The downturn in motion
picture attendance and production had reduced the need for fulltime staff
musicians in the studios. These musicians were paid an annual salary for
their services, but some were drawing a full year's pay by putting in only
150 to 350 hours of work. Moreover, the studios had already released to
television many of their theatrical motion pictures made before 1948; the
exhibitors had expressed concern about the release of later motion pictures, for fear that their availability on television would further reduce box
office proceeds. The studios, however, were anxious to win the contractual
right to release to television some of their post-1948 films to free those
films from royalty payments to the Music Performance Trust Fund. The
obligation to pay five percent of the gross revenues along with the twentyfive dollar re-scoring fees based on the number of musicians in the original
film had been converted into an obligation simply to pay six percent of the
gross revenues to the Trustee.
On the other side of the bargaining table, the Federation proffered the
demands of the Local 47 musicians, which could only be characterized as
extravagant, given the state of the motion picture industry. Demands were
made for more than a doubling of the wage scale, and for substantial increases in the size of studio staff orchestras. Petrillo urged his bargaining
team to be realistic and to limit their demands to those considered most
important. The committee from Local 47 responded by incorporating all
fifty-five proposals into five omnibus demands.
The producers walked out of the negotiations, and the Federation called
a strike among the motion picture musicians. The producers continued to
score their soundtracks, first by recording in Mexico and England and
then, after the AFM secured the cooperation of the unions there, by recording in Munich and Rome. The studios sent their editors, composers
and orchestra leaders to Europe, and scored soundtrack there for less than
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the cost would have been in the United States. A Federation-induced public boycott of these films had no serious impact.
Cecil Read feared that the widespread use of foreign musicians and
canned soundtrack, which had been so harmful to the Hollywood musicians in television films, would deal a similar blow to their employment in
theatrical films. Read saw that the studio strike was having little effect,
and there appeared to be little concern on the part of Petrillo, who was
about to have his deposition taken in the pending lawsuits brought by
many of the Hollywood musicians. In March 1958, Read rented a hall and
called a meeting of interested film musicians; some 125 of the 300 studio
staff musicians attended. Read encouraged those in attendance to petition
Petrillo to reopen negotiations with the producers and to eliminate or
modify the Trust Fund arrangements in order to save employment in the
motion picture industry. This petition proved unavailing. Read became
convinced of the need to form a rival union among the motion picture
musicians and to oust the AFM as their bargaining representative.
In April 1958, Read and three others formed an association, the Musicians Guild of America. Authorization cards were distributed among the
film musicians, who were assured that their signing would be held in confidence; the obvious sanction for such dual unionism would be explusion
from the AFM and the likely loss of job opportunities. The Guild held
meetings at Read's home and rented space for an office. Many of the
members of Local 47 sent donations to the Guild. During that same
month, the Musicians Guild of America filed a petition with the National
Labor Relations Board for a representation election. Under the applicable
law, the filing of the petition forced a cessation of bargaining between the
Federation and the studios. The strike was also effectively terminated, a
development that opened the officers and members of the Guild to the
charge of George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, that they had "com66
mitted the grievous sin of strike breaking against their union brothers."1
Hearings before the NLRB were scheduled for June 1958. The Federation was under substantial pressure; it was being sued for millions of dollars in the four California lawsuits, its strike effort was weak and its strike
fund depleted, and a representation campaign would have to be waged.
The Federation therefore stipulated that the appropriate bargaining unit in
which the election was to be held would include those musicians, numbering roughly 1,400, who had received two calls to work during the preceding eighteen months from the major movie studios in Los Angeles County.
The election was held on July 10, 1958, and the Guild won by a narrow
margin.
Negotiations promptly commenced between the Guild and the producers, covering both theatrical motion pictures and the films made by the
producers for direct use on television. Unencumbered by a nationwide
constituency, the Guild could focus its attention solely upon the economic
166. INT'L

MUSICIAN,

Aug. 1958, at 45.
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situation of the Hollywood musicians. A major problem to be addressed
was the extensive use of canned music, American and foreign, in the scoring of films. The Guild hoped to secure more employment for its members
in the Hollywood studios, particularly in television films, and to secure a
favorable contract with the Hollywood producers that it could use as a
springboard for successes in other segments of the entertainment industry.
The task turned out to be more onerous than the Guild had anticipated.
Ironically, the difficulty was attributable in some considerable measure to
the fact that they secured along the way a long-sought objective, the end of
the reign of James C. Petrillo. In late April 1958, Petrillo had been subjected to very intensive questioning during depositions in the Trust Fund
lawsuits. In May, one month before the Federation's Annual Convention,
The InternationalMusician, a union publication, carried a lengthy letter
from Petrillo to all of the officers and members of the Federation announcing his intention to refuse the nomination of the Convention as President
of the Federation. 6 Petrillo recounted his long service in the labor movement, with the Chicago local, the international union, and the American
Federation of Labor and AFL-CIO, and stated that his intention had been
to retire at the 1957 Convention but that he had reconsidered because of
the then recently initiated trust fund lawsuits in California. Now that he
had given his deposition and had been advised by his attorneys that the
suits might go on for years, he felt that at age sixty-six the time was right
for retirement.
In reflecting upon his accomplishments, Petrillo in his letter gave first
mention to the creation of the Music Performance Trust Funds in the record and motion picture industries, and the fact that the funds had both
encouraged the appreciation of live music by the public and generated employment for union members. He extolled the practice of democracy
within the union, and expressed his gratitude to those who had supported
him in times of adversity in the face of attacks both from within and without the union. "I am leaving you an honorable organization with a good,
clean record, which gives me great personal satisfaction. But after fortytwo years as a labor leader, I believe the time has come when I am entitled
to spend whatever years I have left in relaxing and doing the things I want
to do for my family, my friends and myself."
At the June 1958 Convention, hundreds of delegates-led naturally
enough by a band-marched to the stage urging Petrillo to reconsider his
decision to resign, but the urgings were to no avail. 168 The contestants for
the presidency were Herman D. Kenin, a member of the International Executive Board since 1943 and a former president of Local 99 in Portland
(and a former practicing lawyer), and Al Manuti of Local 802 in New
York City. Petrillo stated that when he became President of the Federation he was recommended by his predecessor, Joe Weber, and that he, too,
had his own successor in mind and would identify him should the Conven167. Id., May 1958, at 6.
168. Id., July 1958, at 29.
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tion so desire. On motion, the Convention expressed its desire, and Petrillo named Mr. Kenin. The election was held the next day, and Kenin
won by a vote of 1,195 to 608. A resolution was introduced to make Petrillo an advisor to the union and its officers and to pay him his former
presidential salary for the rest of his life, but Petrillo declined to accept any
payment so long as he continued to receive a salary as president of the
Chicago local.
The attention of the Convention delegates was not focused exclusively
on the presidency, for the next day a resolution was introduced seeking a
concerted effort within the union to deal with the problems created by the
Musicians Guild of America and with the intimations within the motion
picture and recording industries that the Trust Funds might be terminated.' 69 After discussion, the resolution was reworded so as to refer simply to the "difficulties in Los Angeles" and was endorsed by the
Executive Board,
Convention and later adopted by the International
70
which referred the resolution to President Kenin.'
In the summer and fall of 1958, as the Musicians Guild of America was
negotiating an agreement on behalf of the Hollywood film musicians,
Kenin began to articulate and implement a philosophy far more congruent
with that of the Guild than Petrillo's had been. In August, after negotiating with two large producers of television films, Revue Productions and
Desilu Productions, the Federation executed agreements that placed priority upon security of employment and dramatically curtailed the producers'
obligations to make Trust Fund payments. These five-year contracts provided for a ten percent pay increase after the third year, and also included
employment guarantees for American musicians, even for film shows formerly utilizing canned music. The Revue Productions contract provided
for a payment of only one percent of revenues to the Trust Fund, in contrast to the five percent payments formerly required. The Desilu Productions contract eliminated altogether the concept of a percentage payment
to the Trust Fund derived from the gross revenues on each production,
flat-fee payment for the second
and substituted a diminishing-scale
17 1
through fifth re-runs of the show.
The next major shift in emphasis in the Trust Fund policies of the Federation came with a speech by President Kenin in September 1958. Adverting to the dual-union movement in Los Angeles and the attacks upon
the Trust Funds, Kenin stated:
The Trust Funds are not major objectives of the Federation. Indeed,
accurately speaking, they are not objectives at all. They are rather a
means-an important one, but just one of several-to achieve the
Federation's basic objective. And that objective, of course, is live jobs
172
for living musicians or, put otherwise, the survival of live music.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

Aug. 1958, at 37.
Sept. 1958, at 43.
Aug. 1958, at 6-7.
Oct. 1958, at 8.
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He labeled "absurd" the suggestion that the Federation was more interested in the growth of the Trust Funds than in the welfare of the members.
"The fact is, of course, that the Federation has always stood willing, able
and even anxious to exchange Trust Funds payments for direct live employment. That is the whole point of the Funds and the consistent policy
of the Federation." He referred to the recent television film contracts, and
their "conversion" of Trust Fund payments into guaranteed employment,
as not an abandonment of the Trust Fund policies but a "complete fulfillment" of them.
Kenin then turned in his speech to the certification of the MGA as bargaining representative for the major motion picture producers. He expressed his fear that dual unionism in a time of diminishing work
opportunities would undermine the objectives of the union movement.
"Where jobs are relatively few and job seekers are relatively many, and
there is no single scale set by a single union, the result is obvious:-wages
and other conditions can only go in one direction-down-way down."
He pointed to the MGA negotiations just completed with the producers of
theatrical and television films, and outlined the extent to which the Federation's achievements in those industries had been undermined by the
MGA through its weakness and its lack of experience.
In the same month as the Kenin speech, the Musicians Guild of
America had consummated an agreement with the major motion picture
producers, some two months after their NLRB election victory. The objectives of the Guild were to reduce unnecessary costs in the scoring of television film, principally by eliminating payments to the Trust Fund, to
increase employment of the Hollywood musicians in substitution for
canned music, and to increase their wage scale. The agreements permitted
the television film producers to develop a "track library" for each series,
containing the show's theme music, opening and closing music and the
like; and to re-use that library on that series. Beyond that, every show had
to use some music recorded live by American musicians represented by
the Guild. At least one recording session of three hours was to be called
for each series, at which all of the music to be used in thirteen segments of
that series (one-third of a season) could be scored. The producers agreed
that they would not use the soundtrack of any television film recorded
during the agreement for any other television film or series during the life
of the contract and for ninety days thereafter. Similar restrictions were
made applicable to theatrical motion pictures: old track would not be used
in films made in Los Angeles during the term of the contract and for
ninety days thereafter, and during the same time period soundtrack recorded by Guild musicians would not be used in any other film released
for theatrical exhibition.
Although the Guild negotiators would have wanted to secure residual
payments for its members when television films were re-used in subsequent seasons, they felt that their association did not have the economic
power to extract such a concession from the film producers. Of course, the
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principle of the re-use or residual payment, tantamount to a "property
right" or a "performance right" in the musicians' creative performance,
was one that had been embraced by Cecil Read in the Trust Fund Appeal
in January 1956, the Trust Fund Hearings in April 1956, and the Trust
Fund lawsuits in late 1956 and early 1957. But it was one thing to embrace
that claim in principle, and another to implement it in collective bargaining. The MGA knew that were it to induce a work stoppage in support of
its claims for residual payments, the television film producers would simply revert to the use of canned music.
As the September 1958 speech by President Kenin demonstrated, the
leaders of the AFM were quick to subject the MGA film agreements to
detailed criticism. They pointed out that under those agreements theatrical motion pictures could be released to television without the Guild's consent; that soundtrack from one film could be dubbed into any other film if
the producers could hold out beyond ninety days in the next negotiation;
that soundtrack made for a television film could be dubbed into an entire
series; that the Guild contract contained a no-strike provision; that canned
music (the "library track" of theme songs) could be dubbed in with live
music. All of these concessions were condemned as significant retreats
from longstanding policies of the Federation. The MGA had also tolerated the substitution of a system of so-called casual or free-lance employment in place of studio staff orchestras with guaranteed salaries.
Moreover, the Guild had permitted the film producers to score the music
for an entire thirteen-week series in one three-hour session while, although
the AFM scale was somewhat lower, the Federation contracts had authorized the scoring of only one film per session. The failure of the Guild to
secure residual payments came under particularly heavy attack. Kenin
said that the longstanding AFM policy against the unregulated use of theatrical film on television was discarded by "a man who for two years was
ranting and raving about the fundamental rights of performing musicians
to residual payments. Under his contract, motion picture films can be used
payments either to the indion television repeatedly and endlessly without
17 3
vidual performers or to the trust funds."'
Undaunted by the AFM criticism of their agreements with the
Hollywood motion picture studios, the leaders of the Guild filed with the
National Labor Relations Board in October 1958 a petition for another
representation election, this time on behalf of musicians engaged in making phonograph records in Los Angeles County. As with the bargaining
unit for the Hollywood studio musicians, the Guild hoped that by limiting
itself to this narrower geographic constituency it could secure a majority of
the votes and free itself of the Federation's Trust Fund policies. Because
the Guild's petition was limited to the Los Angeles recording musicians, it
presented no legal obstacle to the commencement of negotiations for a new
agreement between the AFM and representatives of the phonograph companies covering recording elsewhere.
173. Id. at 13.
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The Federation negotiated a new five-year agreement in January 1959.
Once again, the agreement reflected a retreat by President Kenin from his
predecessor's single-minded attention to the growth of the Music Performance Trust Funds. The improvement in the wage scale for the recording
musicians was dramatic. In December 1958, scale pay for these musicians
was $41.25 for a three-hour recording session, the same as it had been for
thirteen years. The former contract had also required that twenty-one percent of scale, or $8.66, multiplied by the number of recording musicians
was to be paid to the Music Performance Trust Funds. In the contract of
January 1959, scale was increased to $48.50, still less than the two payments under the previous agreement. But the new agreement created for
the first time in the industry a pension plan, into which the recording companies were to pay five and one-half percent of scale per musician. The
agreement also provided for increases in scale for each successive year, so
that beginning in October 1962 a musician would receive $56.00 for a
three-hour session; in addition, the payments due to the Pension Fund
would increase to eight percent of scale earnings, generating total compensation of $60.48.
Consistent with the new approach that had been reflected in the television film contracts negotiated by Kenin soon after becoming President of
the Federation, the 1959 agreement provided for a cutback in the contributions of the phonograph record manufacturers to the Music Performance
Trust Fund. From January 1956 through December 1958, the wageincrease payments of twenty-one percent of scale, which had been so controversial when negotiated by President Petrillo in January 1954, had been
paid to the Trust Fund. The agreement of January 1959 eliminated those
payments. The Trust Fund obligation of the recording companies reverted
to the previous level of roughly one percent of the retail price of records
sold. 174
The new phonograph record industry agreement adverted to the petition
currently pending with the NLRB seeking a representation election in Los
Angeles and stated:
The parties hereto believe that the unit sought therein is clearly inappropriate. Out of deference to the processes of the Board, however,
the parties agree that, in the case of any company which is named as a
party in any such petition, the increase in minimum scale provided for
in this agreement shall not be paid for services performed in Los Angeles County unless and until said petition is dismissed or otherwise
ally disposed of in favor of the Federation.
It provided that such companies were, in the interim, to open an escrow
account and to deposit currently, at the same time they were paying wages
to the musicians, the difference between the 1954 scale and the scale provided for in the new agreement.
174. In a pamphlet distributed by President Kenin, in which he described the new agreement and pointed out the new benefits secured therein, he stated: "Many of our recent gains

were made possible by exchanging Music Performance Trust Fund contributions for jobs,
pensions, residuals, and pay increases."
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Other industry agreements negotiated by the American Federation of
Musicians in 1959 continued to pay greater attention to the compensation
of the film or recording musician and somewhat less attention to the Music
Performance Trust Funds. In February 1959, agreements covering live radio and television programs on the networks sought to maintain staff
orchestras in some of the larger cities at a time when the need for them,
particularly in radio, was sharply dwindling. These agreements also estabfished pension funds in these industries for the first time. In May 1959,
new agreements between the Federation and the television networks, covering television film, continued the pattern of the Revue and Desilu agreements by reducing Trust Fund payments in exchange for increased live
employment of musicians. In November 1959, a new agreement relating
to jingles and spot announcements in radio and television traded Trust
Fund payments for wage increases, residuals and pensions for the recording musicians.
XI. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRUST FUND LAWSUITS
The period beginning in June 1958 with the resignation of James Petrillo
from the Federation presidency witnessed a lessening of commitment by
the Federation to the Music Performance Trust Funds. The Trust Funds
remained an important element in the union's philosophy and in its bargaining activities, but the zealous attempt to expand the level of contributions to the Trust Fund, typically at the expense of the film and recording
musicians, was apparently a thing of the past. At the same time, the Trust
Funds were being attacked in courts of law on three different fronts. One
such front, of course, was in the state courts of California, where depositions had been taken in the spring of 1958 and the parties were preparing
for trial a year later.
The Trust Fund in the motion picture industry, pertaining to the release
to television of theatrical motion pictures, was also being challenged, in the
federal district court in New York. In 1957, Republic Productions, Inc.,
one of the major producers of theatrical motion pictures, had instituted an
action in federal court in California, seeking treble damages under the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The case was transferred the following year to the
federal district court in New York. The complaint charged that the defendants-the AFM, the International Executive Board, and Trustee Samuel R. Rosenbaum-had conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate
commerce in the distribution and licensing of motion pictures for exhibition on television. The case was not to be concluded until July of 1965,
when the court dismissed the action. 7 5 Although the assault by Republic
175. Republic Prods., Inc. v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 245 F. Supp. 475, 483
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). The New York district court traced the history of negotiations in the motion picture industry-the 1946 ban on the release of theatrical films to television, the 1951
agreement requiring that any films so released were to be fully re-scored, the 1952 agreement requiring instead the payment of re-scoring fees to the original film musicians, and the

Trust Agreements requiring payments to the Music Performance Trust Fund of five percent
of the producer's gross revenues from the television exhibition. The court considered the so-
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Productions upon the Trust Fund was ultimately rebuffed, the case was
very much alive in the period from 1958 to 1965.
The third legal attack upon the Music Performance Trust Funds was
directed at the fund in the phonograph record industry. It was in the form
of shareholders' derivative actions brought by shareholders of the Radio
Corporation of America (manufacturer of RCA Victor Records), the Columbia Broadcasting System (manufacturer of Columbia Records), Loew's
Corporation (manufacturer of MGM Records), and Decca Records, Inc.,
against those corporations and Trustee Samuel R. Rosenbaum. 76 Those
actions were instituted in New York federal district court in 1955---even
before Cecil Read had been sent by the members of Local 47 to argue their
case before the International Executive Board-and challenged the legality of the Phonograph Record Trust Fund under section 302 of the TaftHartley Act. 177 The plaintiffs claimed that the Trustee was a "representative of employees" under the Act' 78 and that therefore the payments to
him from the phonograph record manufacturers violated section 302. The
relief sought was an injunction against any payments to the Trustee from
the companies and any disbursements from the fund by the Trustee. The
court found that "[t]he legislative history of Section 302 shows that it was
directed against the establishment of funds exacted from employers and
administered by union officials at their unlimited discretion and without
any obligation whatever to account."' 79 The court held that neither the
provisions of the Trust Agreements nor the Trustee's administration of the
Trust Funds made him a "representative of employees" under the TaftHartley Act.180 This judgment was not, however, rendered until February
1959, after the Musicians Guild of America had petitioned for an election
among the Los Angeles recording musicians and the AFM had negotiated
an agreement in the phonograph record industry that redirected the wageincrease payments allegedly taken from the recording musicians in January 1954 and diverted to the Trust Fund.
The principal attack upon the Music Performance Trust Funds lay in
the four California lawsuits spearheaded by Cecil Read. The trial of Anderson v. American Federation of Musicians, which attacked the Trust
called labor exemption from the antitrust laws, found in the Clayton Act and the NorrisLaGuardia Act, and concluded that had the Federation engaged in a work stoppage to secure the above agreements, the stoppage would have been exempt from the Sherman Act;
the union was acting in its self-interest and was carrying out its legitimate objects in collective bargaining. id. at 482. If a strike to secure these objectives is lawful, so too, concluded
the court, must be a collective bargaining agreement effecting those objectives. Even the
1946 total ban on release of theatrical films to television was lawful: "Its purpose was to
protect professional musicians, members of the union as a whole, from the competition of
recorded music. In the final analysis, therefore, the clause related to the economic welfare of
union members, to their job opportunities and to the wages which they would eventually
receive." Id.
176. Shapiro v. Rosenbaum, 171 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
177. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
178. Id. § 186(a)-(b) (1976).
179. Shapiro v. Rosenbaum, 171 F. Supp. 875, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
180. Id. at 883-84.
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Fund in the phonograph record industry, opened on March 9, 1959, before
Judge Kincaid of the California Superior Court. The Federation prevailed
on its demurrer to the two causes of action against the AFM for damages
resulting from payments previously made to the Trustee. The court agreed
with the Federation's contention that the plaintiffs as members of a voluntary unincorporated association could not bring an action against themselves. This adverse ruling induced the plaintiffs to file for a postponement
of the trial on the principal cause of action for equitable relief against the
Trust Fund payments; they intended to seek review of the demurrer.' 8'
This strategy was abandoned, however, when counsel for the plaintiffs
learned that the Appellate Division in New York had denied the request of
the defendant musicians in Rosenbaum v. Melnikoff for a stay of that proceeding pending the outcome of the California lawsuits.' 8 2 Counsel appreciated the risk of the New York action's being tried first, with the attendant
need to transport the Anderson and Atkinson witnesses and documents to
New York, as well as the risk of any judgment in New York having res
judicata and estoppel effects in California. The Anderson plaintiffs thus
chose to resume the trial on their principal cause of action in California
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Federation, the Trustee
and the defendant recording companies.
After some twenty trial days, in March and April 1959, Judge Kincaid
upheld the plaintiffs' principal contentions on the facts and the law, and
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment. The judge concluded, at
the outset, that the plaintiffs had properly brought the action on behalf of a
valid class and that they had exhausted all of their internal remedies
within the Federation. He found that the phonograph record companies
had offered the Federation a wage increase for recording musicians in negotiations for the 1954 Labor Agreement, but that the Federation knowingly and in bad faith diverted this increase to the Music Performance
Trust Fund. Judge Kincaid rejected the defendants' affirmative defenses
of waiver, laches, estoppel, statute of limitations, and ratification. Acknowledging that his jurisdiction was limited to the wage increase payments in the hands of the court-appointed receiver or still retained by any
of the enjoined recording companies, the judge concluded that the plaintiffs had a property right in the proffered wage-increase payments in the
1953-54 negotiation, and that the Federation had violated its fiduciary
duty in diverting those payments to the Trust Fund. 83 The defendant
Trustee was deemed to have no right, title or interest in the wage-increase
payments forthcoming from the defendant record companies or already in
the hands of the receiver. The preliminary injunction against the defend181.

The claim for injunctive relief based on an alleged violation of the California Labor

Code had earlier been withdrawn.
182. Rosenbaum v. Melnikoff, 7 A.D.2d 975, 183 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1959) (no opinion), affig
15 Misc. 2d 601, 179 N.Y.S.2d 700 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
183. See Petition for Allowance of Attorneys' Fees, Harold A. Fendler and Daniel A.
Weber, at 72-73, Anderson v. American Fed'n of Musicians, Case No. 669,990 (Cal. Super.

Ct., L.A. County).
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ant recording companies was made permanent, requiring them to pay
wage-increase payments withheld by them not to the Trustee but to the
receiver. Not surprisingly, notices of appeal were filed by the Federation
and by certain of the recording company defendants. The plaintiffs filed a
cross-appeal challenging the dismissal of the two causes of action for damages against the Federation.
While the appeals were pending, meetings were held in December 1959,
among counsel for the plaintiffs in the Anderson case, the general counsel
for the AFM, and Samuel Rosenbaum. These meetings explored the possibility of settling all the Trust Fund lawsuits pending in California. The
settlement discussions were pursued in a spirit of cooperation and fairness,
and after several meetings the parties reached a proposed agreement.
Kenin, the President of the AFM, endorsed this proposed settlement in a
letter addressed to the president of the locals in San Francisco, Chicago,
Los Angeles, Nashville, and New York City, and it was unanimously approved in April 1960 at meetings of the Musicians Defense Fund in Los
Angeles and in New York.
In the Anderson case the settlement terms called for all moneys presently
in the hands of the receiver, totalling more than $1,900,000 plus interest, to
be distributed to the recording musicians after deducting the receiver's fees
and other litigation expenses. An additional $215,000 or more, representing wage-increase payments (calculated at twenty-one percent of scale
earnings) that were due and owing to the Trustee from record companies
that were not defendants in the California action, would be assigned by the
Trustee to the receiver for collection and distribution to the recording musicians. This total of more than $2,250,000 represented substantially all of
the twenty-one percent wage raise diverted from the recording musicians
since the filing of the Anderson action. The agreement did not, however,
include the wage-increase payments of ten percent of scale that had already been paid into the Trust Fund in 1954 and 1955, which Judge Kincaid had held could not be recovered as damages from the Federation.
In the Atkinson case, Trustee Rosenbaum was to pay $1 million to the
California receiver to be divided as ordered by the court among the musicians who worked on theatrical motion pictures that were released to television. The amount paid to each musician-including conductors,
arrangers, copyists and contractors-would be in proportion to the number
of such motion pictures in which he worked.
The Beilmann case, which involved the five percent royalties payable to
the Trust Fund on the exhibition of films made primarily for television,
was to be settled simply upon the payment by the Trustee to the receiver of
$50,000 to cover court costs and legal fees. The principal objective of that
lawsuit had already been achieved. The new AFM television film agreements had replaced the five percent Trust Fund payments with a smaller
flat payment on the second through the seventh re-runs; and additional
employment for musicians had been secured, at the expense of foreign
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canned music, through more favorable agreements negotiated by both the
AFM and the Musicians Guild of America.
In the Bain case, which involved re-use of transcribed radio shows, the
Trustee was to pay the receiver $50,000 to cover fees, as well as $89,000 to
be distributed to the musicians who had recorded certain radio shows;
those shows had been transcribed for one-time use but had been subsequently re-broadcast upon the payment of $89,000 to the Trust Fund. The
other principal target of the Bain lawsuit, the $100 Trust Fund payments
on radio and television jingles and spots, had already been eliminated
through changes in the Federation's contracts, which exchanged the $100
Trust Fund payments for a wage increase, pension fund contributions, and
a percentage re-use fee for the recording musician if the jingle or spot was
used for more than six months.
Under the proposed settlement, the plaintiff musicians in the four cases
would receive a total of roughly $3,500,000-consisting of $2,000,000 from
the receiver, and $1,500,000 from the Trustee of the Music Performance
Trust Funds. The settlement proposals also dealt with the New York proceeding in Rosenbaum v. Melnikoff, which was awaiting trial. The parties
wished to avoid an independent judgment in New York that might undermine the disposition of the California cases. Ultimately the parties agreed
that the New York case should be resolved in a manner "parallel" to the
California cases, and that the principal step to be taken was the formal
appearance of the Trustee in the California actions and his consent to the
judgments there. This proposal required approval by the New York court
and the New York attorney general under New York law governing the
operation of charitable trusts.
These proposed settlement terms were endorsed not only by Kenin, Rosenbaum and members of the locals principally affected, but also by Cecil
Read and his supporters. The Read group concluded that the settlement
terms embodied to a substantial degree the objectives they had been pursuing since the appeal to the International Executive Board, the revolt within
Local 47, and the formation of the Musicians Guild of America.
All of the parties to the proposed settlement understood that it would
have to be approved by the California court and by the plaintiff musicians
in all of the cases, and that the courts of New York would have to authorize the Trustee to appear in the California actions. A petition for judicial
approval of the settlement was filed in the California court in June 1960,
and within a month the terms of the proposed settlement were published in
the Federation's newspaper, The InternationalMusician; in Allegro, the
publication of Local 802; in Overture, the publication of Local 47; and in
the Los Angeles Daily Journal. In September 1960-almost four years after the Anderson case was commenced-Judge Wolfson signed an order
approving the settlement of all four cases. Protracted legal maneuvering,
however, delayed a formal approval in New York of the Trustee's participation in the California cases until November 8, 1963, when the New York
Supreme Court, after a lengthy hearing before a referee, determined that
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the settlement in California was fair and equitable and that the Trustee
should be authorized to appear in the California actions for the purpose of
consenting to the judgment there and consummating the settlement.
All that now remained was to reduce the settlement agreement to a final
order in California. Judge Kincaid had retired since hearing the Anderson
case, but he was appointed to sit pro tem at the hearing of April 15, 1964,
at which time the Anderson appeals were dismissed by stipulation, the 1959
findings of fact and conclusions of law were vacated, the written general
appearance of the Trustee was filed, and a modified judgment in the terms
of the proposed settlement was entered. The so-called Trust Fund lawsuits, begun in November 1956, thus finally ended in April 1964.
XII.

THE RECONCILIATION OF THE FEDERATION AND THE GUILD, AND
THE NEW AFM LABOR AGREEMENTS

By the middle of 1960, the Musicians Guild of America was receiving
mixed reviews, at least as measured by the votes of its constituents. Two
years after its election victory among the film musicians in the major
Hollywood studios, the Guild won an election among musicians employed
by the Alliance of Television Producers and prevailed in ten elections involving the musicians of ten small phonograph record companies. But it
was losing its support in the major studios producing theatrical motion
pictures and television films. Its contracts there had been loudly and effectively criticized by the AFM, while at the same time President Kenin was
negotiating contracts in the phonograph record industry and other sectors
of the television film industry that gave substantial economic benefits to
the recording and film musicians, typically through dilution of the Trust
Fund payments. In a proceeding before the National Labor Relations
Board, the Board held that although the collective bargaining agreement
between the Guild and the motion picture producers was to run for three
and one-half years, it would serve as a bar to a fresh representation election only for the first two years of its duration. Accordingly, upon petition
of the American Federation of Musicians a new election was held among
the Hollywood musicians in the summer of 1960, and they chose the AFM
over the incumbent Guild.
The AFM then commenced negotiations on three fronts. The negotiations with the motion picture producers covering television films led to the
so-called Television Film Labor Agreement-Motion Picture Producers
Association Pattern. Talks with the networks covering the filmed television programs that they produced resulted in the Television Film Labor
Agreement-Network Pattern. Finally, the AFM negotiated with the motion picture producers with regard to theatrical films. Agreements in all
three industries became effective on January 1, 1961. Those agreements
marked an increased concern on the part of the AFM for the economic
interests of the film musicians and a further retreat from the aggrandizement of the Music Performance Trust Funds. Indeed, the Trust Funds in
those industries were effectively extinguished.
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Of the three agreements, the television film agreement with the motion
picture producers (the MPPA Pattern) was the only one that made no provision for residual payments (or some equivalent) to the musicians for later
re-uses of their recorded performances. But other substantial economic
benefits, however, were secured. Scale for a three-hour recording session
was increased to $61.75; minimum scoring hours for each thirteen weeks of
a half-hour series were increased from twelve to eighteen hours; "library
track" could not be mixed on a television show with live music; the re-use
of theme music for a single series was allowed, but not beyond one year;
and for the first time in the industry, the producers were to make payments
to the AFM-Employers' Pension and Welfare Fund, calculated at three
percent of the employees' scale earnings. The Guild contracts negotiated
in 1958 left one major legacy: no payments were to be made to the Music
Performance Trust Funds for films produced during the term of the
contract.
Perhaps the most dramatic benefit secured by the Federation in its 1961
agreements was the introduction of residual payments for the re-use of
filmed television programs produced under the Network Pattern agreement. The formula was based upon that utilized in the 1959 television film
agreement with Desilu and also upon the collective bargaining agreements
negotiated in the television industry by the American Federation of Radio
and Television Artists. The AFM agreement provided that when a television film produced during the contract term was exhibited on television for
a second or subsequent time, the musicians who scored that film would
receive re-use payments, in declining amounts through the sixth showing. 8 4 The trade-off for this important benefit was the demise of the obligation to pay five percent of the gross revenues from re-runs to the Music
Performance Trust Funds. The networks and other signatory companies
also agreed to minimum scoring requirements and to a new obligation to
contribute five percent of the musicians' scale earnings to the Pension and
Welfare Fund. 185
184. For example, if the orchestra originally performing on the television film soundtrack had twenty-one or more musicians, each musician would not only be paid at scale for
the original recording session (the scale figure was $50.00), but he would also share in a
payment of $125 when the program was shown a second time; $62.50 for a third showing,
and the same amount again for the fourth showing; and $31.25 for each of the fifth and sixth
showings; there were to be no payments for the seventh and subsequent showings.
185. This somewhat anomalous dichotomy between filmed television programs produced
by the motion picture studios and filmed television programs produced by the networks has
continued to this day. The Federation now negotiates a Television Film Labor Agreement
and a Television Videotape Labor Agreement. The former governs, for the most part, television programs with a dramatic or comedy story line, while the latter-an outgrowth of live
television and then of kinescope television-principally governs variety shows, daytime serials and game shows. There is considerable flexibility as to which producers and distributors
execute which agreement, and almost all, in fact, execute both. The major difference between the two is that the Television Film Agreement to this day contains no provision for
residual payments to the film musicians, although that has for years been a principal demand of the Federation at the bargaining table and generally the last to be relinquished;
indeed, the union undertook a five-month strike against the film producers over this issue in
late 1980, with no success. The Videotape Labor Agreement does provide for re-use pay-
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With the 1961 Network Pattern television film agreement, the Federation and the networks thus expressly recognized that some of the commercial success of a television film was fairly to be shared with the musicians
who scored the film. Cecil Read and the leaders of the Local 47 revolt had
perhaps lost their battle with the AFM on behalf of the Musicians Guild of
America, but they had won the war for the endorsement of performers'
rights and for the effective demise of the Trust Fund in television films.
A similar war was won in the 1961 collective agreement negotiated by
the Federation with the motion picture studios covering theatrical motion
pictures. The parties negotiated new wage scales and provided that they
were to be increased by five percent on October 1, 1961, and further increased by seven percent on November 1, 1962. The producers would pay
three percent of scale earnings to the Pension and Welfare Fund for the
first time. Most dramatically, the film producers agreed that if they released to television any theatrical motion picture made on or after February 1, 1960 (which included the last nine months of the Guild agreement),
the producer would pay to the original film musicians a pro rata share of
one and two-thirds percent of the producer's receipts from the distribution
of the film to television.' 8 6 Each musician would receive a share of this
fund measured by his own earnings for the scoring of the particular
thea87
trical film in comparison to the earnings of all of the musicians.1
In exchange for the payments to the film musicians on the release of
theatrical films to television, the Federation made two major concessions.
ments. Today, the videotape musician receives 75% of current scale for the original scoring,
for the second run and the same for the third run; 50% of scale for each of the fourth, fifth,
and sixth runs of the show; 10% for the seventh run; and 5% for the eighth and all subsequent runs.
In recent years, with the opening of new geographic and technical markets for television
film and videotape, the Federation has expanded its interest in negotiating for the equivalent
of re-use payments for the film musicians. Thus, the videotape agreement contains a provision for the payment of 45% of scale to the videotape musician when the program is broadcast outside of the United States and Canada, subject to a reduced percentage payment if the
foreign area is relatively confined. Even the Television Film Labor Agreement now provides for payments to film musicians when their television program is exploited in supplemental markets such as video cassettes or pay television. For such uses, the producersignatory must pay one percent of its "accountable receipts" from the distribution of the film
in the supplemental markets. This is divided among all of the musicians who recorded on
that film, with each receiving a pro rata share measured by his individual earnings on the
film compared to the earnings of all musicians on that film. (A similar provision appears in
the Television Videotape Agreement.) These payments are made to a Television Film Special Payments Fund to be distributed as additional wages for the film musicians. The current Television Film Labor Agreement also provides that if a television motion picture is
exhibited in motion picture theatres, the producer has the choice of re-scoring (an option
that is never utilized) or paying all of the musicians who scored the film 50% of their scale
earnings when the film is first placed in theatre exhibition.
186. This was defined as the producer's gross revenues less an arbitrary 40% to cover
distribution fees and expenses.
187. Since 1972 those payments for the distribution of theatrical motion pictures to television have been paid into a fund known as the Theatrical and Television Motion Picture
Special Payments Fund, which is supervised by an independent administrator. Today's
agreements also provide for payment by the producers of one percent of their "accountable
receipts" from the marketing of their theatrical motion pictures in the supplemental markets
to the Special Payments Fund and pro rata distribution to the film musicians.
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Theatrical films produced during the term of the labor agreement and subsequently released to television would no longer generate payments to the
Music Performance Trust Funds. Moreover, the Federation acquiesced in
the claim of the motion picture producers that they no longer had an obligation to make payments, either to the Trust Funds or to the musicians, for
the release to and exhibition on television of theatrical motion pictures
made before 1960. Before the 1958 negotiations between the producers
and the Musicians Guild of America, the producers had been payingpursuant to the June 1955 declaration of the International Executive Board
of the AFM-five percent of their gross revenues to the Music Performance Trust Funds. The producers argued to the AFM, however, after the
Federation had regained its status as bargaining representative, that the
intervention of the Guild agreement had dissolved any obligation to make
Trust Fund payments under the prior Trust Agreements.
Although the Federation in the period from 1959 to January 1961 was
thus negotiating agreements in the recording and film industries that were
much more favorable than those of the past to the recording and film musicians, the Guild-although it had lost its bargaining status in the major
Hollywood studios-was still a force to be reckoned with. In 1960 the
Guild had won elections among the employees of a number of television
producers and small phonograph record companies.
The Guild contracts with the record companies were to run for four
years, during which time the companies would pay increases in wage rates
and terminate contributions to the Music Performance Trust Funds. The
Guild secured wage scales that were substantially higher than those negotiated by the Federation in its 1959 contracts with the bulk of the recording
companies.' 8 8 The Guild labor agreements also required the parties "to
use their best efforts to evolve an equitable plan for payments of royalties
and health and welfare benefits to musicians." This provision articulated
for the first time in the phonograph recording industry a commitment to
the principle that record sales should generate payments to the recording
musicians themselves, and not simply payments to the record manufacturers or to a trust fund.
Just as the AFM had widely advertised the perceived failings of the
Guild contracts in the motion picture industry, the Guild called its higher
negotiated wage scale to the attention of the recording musicians in Chicago, New York and Los Angeles. In May 1961, the Guild wrote to some
5,000 musicians, asking "Wouldn't you like to be paid Guild scales whenever you work for a record company?" and enclosing signature cards for
authorizing the Guild to serve as collective bargaining representative. The
Guild promised to petition for National Labor Relations Board elections,
which would oust the AFM in mid-contract. The response of the recording musicians to the Guild appeal revived the Guild's threat to the hegem188. Under the Federation agreements, the scale payment in 1960 was $51.50; in 1961,
$53.50; and in 1962, $56.00. During the same years under the Guild contracts with the

smaller record companies, the scale was to be $67.50, $70.00, and $72.50.
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ony of the AFM in the phonograph record industry. The leaders of both
the Guild and the AFM appreciated, however, that the Guild campaign
would probably not bring total victory for either association among the
employees of the major recording companies, and that divided representation would weaken the bargaining position of the musicians. The leaders
of the Guild and the Federation decided to meet and explore a settlement
of their differences. Negotiations took place in the summer of 1961 among
Herman Kenin, Cecil Read, representatives of the governing boards of the
AFM and the Guild, and the attorneys for both organizations. Contemporaneously, Kenin appeared before the 1961 AFM Annual Convention and
stated on behalf of himself and the International Executive Board that "we
stand ready to exchange any part of the Trust Fund payments for a better
deal for the working musician."'' 89 A number of delegates from some of
the smaller locals opposed this position, stating that the Trust Funds had
been a substantial aid to them in preserving live music. A resolution was
in fact introduced to bar Kenin's recommendation, but it was defeated by
a voice vote. 190 Kenin and the Board regarded this as an invitation to take
appropriate action to restore all film and record musicians to the AFM
fold.
By the end of the summer the Musicians Guild of America and the
American Federation of Musicians had reached agreement.' 9' The Guild
representatives promised to dissolve their organization as soon as possible.
The Federation agreed to take several major steps: (1) On the subject of
re-use and residual payments, the Federation would seek to induce the
phonograph record manufacturers to pay fifty percent of the moneys currently payable to the Music Performance Trust Fund to the musicians who
made the recordings. "Additionally the Federation reaffirms its policy to
seek residual or reuse payments for the recording musician in all other
recording fields." (2) Those former members of Local 47 and the Federation who had been expelled because of their support of the Guild would be
reinstated with full, uninterrupted rights. All fines imposed on musicians
for supporting the Guild would be nullified and, if already paid, those
fines would be refunded. (3) "The Federation reaffirms its policy to grant
to all musicians employed in the fields within the Federation's jurisdiction
the right to ratify all contracts it negotiates." (4) The Federation would
establish a committee, to be periodically and democratically elected by all
Los Angeles members working in the recording field-records, transcriptions, theatrical and television film, and jingles and spots. The committee,
whose members were to be actively working in the recording field and
189. VARIETY, June 14, 1961, at 45.
190. Id., June 21, 1961, at 51.
191. In a letter from Herman Kenin dated Sept. 5, 1961, to the Board of Directors of the
Musicians Guild of America, Kenin, after expressing "my personal and official thanks for
the unfailing courtesy displayed by your representatives throughout the course of these conversations," stated that all parties had acted on the fundamental premise "that the interest of
professional musicians could best be promoted by the consolidation of their total economic
and political power into a single union."
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which would represent copyists and arrangers as well as instrumental musicians, would have the right to communicate advice and opinions directly
to the Federation on all matters relating to recording musicians. This Recording Musicians Advisory Committee would also advise the Federation
on the formulation of bargaining demands and send a representative to
serve in an advisory capacity at all Federation labor negotiations.
Cecil Read and the other officers of the Guild called a meeting of their
membership, roughly 1,000-strong, and the members gave their consent to
the agreement with the AFM, and voted to dissolve the Guild and to permit their current agreements in the various entertainment industries to
lapse in favor of the Federation. Thus, by the fall of 1961, Cecil Read and
his colleagues at the Musicians Guild of America had substantially
achieved the objectives that they had articulated and fought for some six
years before. The AFM had permitted the Music Performance Trust
Funds effectively to terminate in their agreements covering theatrical motion pictures and television film and television commercials, and had made
a commitment to balance Trust Fund payments in the phonograph record
industry with comparable payments to the recording musicians. Relieved
of the burden of Trust Fund payments, all of the industries granted significant pay increases to the film and recording musicians, in the form of direct wages and contributions to pension, health and welfare funds. The
concept of the re-use or residual payment for the recording and film musicians was embraced by the AFM, which had already negotiated successfully for such payments in network television films and theatrical motion
pictures, and which was to bring them within three years to phonograph
records and transcriptions, television videotape programs and television
commercials. As members of Local 47 and the AFM, the former rebels
could participate in the shaping of collective bargaining policy and the
ratification of labor agreements. During the preceding year the California
court had approved the favorable settlement of the Trust Fund lawsuits.
The trial and judgment in the Anderson case had effectively established
that the Federation could not unfairly or discriminatorily ignore the economic interests of the film and recording musicians while bargaining for a
nationwide constituency. The settlement of all of those cases brought to
those musicians some $3.5 million; because of the delay in the disposition
of the Rosenbaum case in New York, and the enormous complexities of
calculating the appropriate shares of all of the musician plaintiffs in the
judgment, however, payments to the individual musicians were not begun
until 1967.
It was in the 1964 contract with the phonograph record manufacturers
that the Federation was first able to follow through on its promise to secure
residual payments for recording musicians based on record sales. For all
recordings made during the term of the 1964 agreement, the companies
promised to pay into a fund for a period of ten years from the date of first
release a percentage of income from record sales based on the suggested
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retail price of the record. On the average, the musicians' fund would receive one percent of the retail price of each record sold.
In the preceding Federation agreement in the phonograph record industry, negotiated in 1959, the royalty on record sales to be paid to the Music
Performance Trust Fund had increased to an average of two percent of the
retail price of each record sold. In effect, the 1964 agreement reduced the
Trust Fund contributions by half, with half going instead to the fund for
the recording musicians themselves.
This fund, known as the Phonograph Record Manufacturers' Special
Payments Fund, would be administered by the United States Trust Company, separate from the coffers of the union. Before distribution of the
fund to the musicians, the administrator would subtract its administrative
expenses and the "manufacturers' share" of the fund, which comprised social security taxes, unemployment insurance, disability and workmen's
compensation payments, and the like, that were owed by the recording
companies on the payments to the fund. The remaining proceeds would
be distributed to92those musicians who had performed on records in the
1
preceding year.

At the same time as the Federation was negotiating its 1964 Phonograph
Record Labor and Trust Agreements, it was also negotiating new agreements covering the musicians performing on electrical transcriptions for
radio. The predecessor agreement, negotiated in 1959, had provided for
payment to the Music Performance Trust Funds of three percent of the
revenues from the distribution or licensing of transcriptions. The 1964
agreement, following the pattern of that year's contract in the phonograph
record industry, provided both for an increase in. scale pay and for a divi192. Each musician would receive a proportion of the total distributable fund "as scale
wages payable to such musician in the immediately preceding calendar year by all [signatory
recording companies] shall bear to scale wages payable to all such musicians in said calendar year by all [signatory recording companies]."
This division of royalties from records sold, with one-half going to the recording musicians and one-half to the Music Performance Trust Funds for live musical performances free
to the public, continues to this day. There have, however, been slight modifications in the
formula for contributions to and disbursements from the two funds. The record companies
are now expected to pay .6% of the manufacturer's suggested retail price for all records sold
(if less than $3.79, and .58% if the price is higher), and .5%of such price for all tapes sold, to
the Trustee of the Music Performance Trust Funds, who is now Martin A. Paulson. These
payments to the Trust Funds are made only during the 10 years following a record's release
for sale. An equal amount is paid to the Special Payments Fund. The disbursements to the
recording musicians from the latter fund are no longer determined by their pro rata earnings
during the preceding year. Instead, a formula weights each musician's earnings from recordings in the previous year and then accords gradually less weight to earnings during the
preceding five years; this total is compared to the total earnings of all recording musicians
over the preceding five years similarly weighted. In sum, a record will generate contributions to the Special Payments Fund if it has been recorded in the preceding 10 years, and
will result in disbursements from the fund to musicians who have made any phonograph
records in the preceding five years. In 1982, the Phonograph Record Special Payments
Fund disbursed more than $11 million to roughly 44,000 eligible recording musicians, for an
average of approximately $250 per person for the year. During the same year, the Music
Performance Trust Funds disbursed nearly $19 million in more than 600,000 checks to individual musicians performing in live concerts throughout the United States and Canada.
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sion of the moneys that had formerly gone to the Trust Fund. Half of
those funds would be paid to93the Trustee and the other half would be paid
to the recording musicians. 1
A little more than a year after the reconciliation of the American Federation of Musicians and the Musicians Guild of America in 1961, an item
appeared in the New York Times, in small print almost lost within a clutter
of short articles on the entertainment page:
James C. Petrillo, president of Local 10 of the American Federation
of Musicians and former president of the federation, will face opposition for the first time since 1933 in next month's elections, it was disclosed today.
Chicago Musicians for Union Democracy, an anti-incumbent
group, put up the name of Barney Richards, a pianist and band
94
leader, at today's nominating meeting at the union's headquarters. 1
The results of that election some three weeks later made the front page:
James C. Petrillo was defeated today for re-election as president of the
Chicago Federation of Musicians, Local 10.
The defeat apparently marked the end of a career going back to
World War I for the 70-year-old Mr. Petrillo, a former head of the
American Federation of Musicians.
He had held union offices since 1919. This was his first challenge in
30 years.
The official count gave Mr. Richards 1,690 votes and Mr. Petrillo
1,595.1 95
The chairman of the opposition organization was quoted as saying, "This
union to
shows that professional musicians have taken control of their own
96
be run in a professional manner with professional dignity."'
XIII.

THE MUSIC PERFORMANCE TRUST FUNDS TODAY

With the settlement of the Trust Fund lawsuits in 1960, and the negotiation of new Federation contracts soon after, payments ceased coming to
the Trust Fund from newly produced television films, television and radio
jingles and spot announcements, and theatrical motion pictures released to
television. Since that time, the almost exclusive source of income for the
Music Performance Trust Funds has been the sale of phonograph records.
Allocations from the Trust Funds averaged approximately $5.7 million per
year in the 1960s, $8.8 million per year in the early 1970s and $11.5 million
per year in the second half of that decade, and nearly $19 million per year
193. That formula prevails today. The administrator of the Electrical Transcriptions
Special Payments Fund receives these payments from the contract signatories and allocates
the fund among musicians who have made such transcriptions within the preceding five
years, utilizing the same weighted formula that applies to the Special Payments Fund in the
phonograph record industry.
194. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1962, at 44, col. 2.
195. Id., Dec. 6, 1962, at 1, col. 8.
196. Id. at 50, col. 3.
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since 1980. Since 1950, the Trustee has disbursed a total of more than
$258 million, and sponsored well over one million performances.
The current Trust Agreement in the recording industry provides that its
object is the arranging and organizing of personal performances by instrumental musicians throughout the United States, its territories, possessions
and dependencies, and Canada. The Trust Agreement has some 4,000 recording companies as signatories, but many of those were small and shortlived concerns, and only some 300 companies are presently the major
source of contributions to the Trust Funds. Recording companies sign the
Trust Agreement because it is a condition to the union's signing a labor
agreement with those companies and supplying them with recording
musicians.
The Trustee invites and receives recommendations for musical performances from locals of the AFM, although recommendations can be initiated
from any number of sources, such as hospital administrators or park recreational directors. These requests for musical performances are referred to
a local person who is charged with administering the Trust Funds. The
Trust Fund designates the local administrator; that person need not belong
to the union or even be a musician, but is commonly an official of the local
union. The local administrator designates a leader for the musical event,
and the leader selects the musicians for the performance. The selection of
the musicians is thus not controlled by the Trust Fund or by the union,
and the musicians need not belong to the AFM. The leader requests an
allocation from the Trust Fund, which is subject to approval by the
Trustee. If approved, a contract is created between the Trust Fund and the
leader for the specific engagement. The performing musicians technically
become employees of the Trust Fund, to be paid at prevailing local wage
scales, and the Trustee remits a paycheck directly to the individual musicians after the local administrator states that the performance in fact took
97
place.
The union locals and the local administrators also assist the Trust Fund
by finding persons and institutions to co-sponsor the musical performances. Co-sponsors-which may be civic organizations, municipalities or
county or state bodies, banks or utilities, and the like-will normally provide a hall and seating for the performance, printed programs and publicity, and sound equipment. 9 8 Co-sponsorship is attractive to such groups
even though the performance must not be used to assist the co-sponsor in
any commercial venture, because every cent of the co-sponsor's contribution is used for the performance itself. The Trust Fund bears all administrative and overhead expenses. Moreover, all of the administrative
services rendered at the local level by local officials are cost-free to the
197. During the year ending April 30, 1983, the Trust Fund sponsored some 73,000 live
music performances in parks, concert halls, hospitals, colleges, playgrounds, schools, libraries, and museums, and disbursed some 625,000 checks to individual musicians.
198. In the year ending April 30, 1983, money contributions from co-sponsors totalled
some $5,986,000.
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Trust Fund. Administration of the Trust Fund consumes only fifteen percent of the Fund's total revenues.
Ninety percent of Trust Fund allocations are made to 700 localities in
the United States and Canada, corresponding to the geographic jurisdiction of the AFM locals, according to a formula based upon the number of
professional musicians in those localities as roughly represented by local
union membership rolls. The Trustee thus has little discretion in determining how funds are distributed geographically. The allocation of the
other ten percent of the fund is discretionary with the Trustee. This portion may be spent on projects that break through the geographic constraints of the union locals, such as the support of regional symphony
orchestras or of live-audience television performances. The Trust Funds
may not be permitted to accumulate, but must be spent currently. To assure that the signatory recording companies account properly for their
contributions to the Trust Fund, the staff of the Fund pursues a regular
auditing program that checks the sales and royalty records of each company once every two years. The staff also makes periodic unannounced
visits to performances that are subsidized by the Trust Fund, to assure that
Trust Fund conditions, such as free admission, as well as quality standards
are satisfied.
Although President Petrillo originated the trust fund concept as a way of
moderating the impact of unemployment resulting from the exploitation of
recorded music, the Trust Fund today cannot properly be regarded as a
welfare or unemployment fund. For one thing, the average check to the
musicians engaging in a Trust Fund performance is hardly more than $30.
Moreover, most of the payments froin the Fund are not received by unemployed workers. The great majority of the recipients hold full-time jobs
outside the field of music-as teachers, lawyers, clerks or machinists-and
play on occasion for enjoyment and as a small supplement to their income.
Indeed, this situation also prevailed in the early 1950s, and gave rise in
part to the grievances of the professional recording musicians in Los Angeles, whose services generated substantial contributions for the Trust Fund
but rather modest income for them as performers at Trust Fund musical
engagements.
The Trust Fund has always been operated with a scrupulous regard for
its independence from the AFM and its officers. The regulations that govern the Fund take pains to state that it is not a union fund. All programs,
publicity and announcements must state that the music is provided by a
grant from the Trust Fund and must identify the Trust Fund as "created
and financed by the Recording Industries under agreements with the
American Federation of Musicians." When a project approved by the
Trustee is one that a union local initially recommended, publicity and program material may give full credit to the local, but must not give the impression that the local provided the grant or the music.
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XIV.

CONCLUSION

The advent of recording technology in the entertainment industries created demands by the recording musicians to share in the profits that others
made from re-use or re-broadcast of musical performances and created
demands by other musicians to preserve their employment. Both of these
demands can be accommodated, as the co-existence of the Special Payments Fund and the Music Performance Trust Funds in the phonograph
record industry proves. But at root, these demands do clash, as each dollar
taken from the industry to provide employment for the technologically displaced is one dollar less to provide for re-use or residual payments to the
recording musicians. The more the industry is encouraged to use a recording many times over in the same form, or to transplant it into a different
medium, with liberal payments to the recording musician, the greater is
the risk of displacement for other musicians. Conversely, a ban on recording may preserve employment of live musicians, but it will also sharply
restrict the income opportunities for recording musicians. The two principle techniques that the Federation has utilized to accommodate these interests are public action through legislation and private action through
contract.
During his years as President of the AFM, James C. Petrillo was more
preoccupied with the lot of the unemployed musician than with that of the
recording musician. He was also more preoccupied with collective bargaining as a mode of advancing the interests of musicians than he was with
legislation. Neither of these strategies proved altogether satisfactory.
Petrillo's reliance on private power rather than governmental protection
is quite understandable. He believed, no doubt rightly, that the economic
pressures that the AFM could bring to bear upon manufacturers and
broadcasters would bring faster and more desirable results than would lobbying for protective legislation. At the beginning of his term as President,
a work stoppage in the phonograph record or motion picture industry
could exert severe economic pressure, as was true to a lesser degree of a
work stoppage in network radio. Moreover, Petrillo apparently distrusted
government, and he was to show disdain for governmental entreatiesincluding a presidential entreaty in time of war-throughout the 1940s.
When Congress enacted the Lea Act in 1946 and the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947, which were viewed by members of the labor movement as severely
repressive, it became obvious that the AFM could draw upon very little
congressional sympathy.
Petrillo's emphasis upon the plight of the unemployed musician is also
understandable. This choice was dictated by personal experience, personal
philosophy and union politics. On the verge of becoming the president of
Local 10 in Chicago when "talkies" were introduced, Petrillo saw tens of
thousands of theatre musicians displaced, almost overnight. The widespread commercial exploitation, within only fifteen years, of phonograph
records, motion picture soundtrack and television, was reasonably viewed
by Petrillo as a threat to the livelihood of the working musician. The
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twenty-seven month recording ban beginning in 1942 was a product of
Petrillo's desire to avoid a repetition in radio employment of the grave
employment loss in theatres hardly more than a decade earlier. Petrillo
also developed a philosophy about the technology of sound recording.
Unlike other forms of technological unemployment, the loss of employment caused by recorded music was brought about by fellow musicians,
who might fairly be expected to share that economic burden. Concern for
the displaced musician was also good politics. Only a small fraction of the
Federation's total membership was engaged in recording music for phonograph records or films. The bulk of the membership benefited from Petrillo's concern, and they determined who would sit in the president's
chair.
Thus, the Music Performance Trust Funds were a happy marriage for
Petrillo of compassion, philosophy and power. One should not forget,
however, that an insistent theme of the Federation's bargaining philosophy
had always been the protection of the recording musician, at least when his
"frozen performance" was translated into a different medium. The earliest
AFM agreements banned the use of motion picture soundtrack in any film
other than the one for which it was originally scored, and provided for
payments to motion picture musicians when the soundtrack was used, for
example, to make a phonograph record; the same was true when phonograph records were "dubbed" onto other records or onto soundtrack. The
provisions in the 1951 agreements for re-scoring of theatrical films released
to television, and in the 1952 and 1954 agreements for the payment of rescoring fees to the original musicians, were thus part of the fabric of standard Federation practice.
Petrillo's severe difficulties within the union began when he departed
from practice and single-mindedly exalted the interest of the so-called unemployed musicians-many of whom were in fact fully employed in other
trades--over that of the recording musicians. Petrillo obviously believed
that the recording musicians were being treated well enough and that the
Federation discharged its obligations by securing high wage scales and imposing restrictions on re-use. But those wages failed to keep pace with the
cost of living and with the wages of comparable crafts, and Petrillo's lack
of concern for the recording musician became evident when he allowed the
1946 scale for phonograph record musicians to prevail through 1958.
Petrillo's preference for the unemployed musician gave way under the
pressure of the efforts of men like Cecil Read. Petrillo's preference for
collective bargaining rather than law was also to be a victim of eventsevents that were in part legal, in part economic, and in part scientific. All
of these events conspired to sap the AFM of its strength at the bargaining
table. The Whiteman case prevented the union from using its bargaining
power in the recording industry as a means of removing phonograph
records from radio broadcasts. Attempts to impose direct pressure on the
broadcasters were totally undermined by the Lea Act of 1946, which outlawed strikes-and thus effective collective bargaining-designed to ex-
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pand or preserve live employment in radio, to eliminate or restrict the use
of records in broadcasting, or even to extract performance royalties for the
recording musicians for the radio use of their recordings. The failure to
pressure the broadcasters on the issue of "performers' rights" was attributable just as much to congressional mandate as to the preferences of Mr.
Petrillo. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 went yet further and declared the
secondary boycott illegal, thereby outlawing the use of economic pressure
on radio networks to induce local affiliated stations to retain small staff
orchestras.
Scientific and economic events deprived the union yet further of bargaining power. A union can lawfully exert economic pressure only where
it represents employees. Throughout Petrillo's presidency, the use of the
phonograph record on radio, and the use of "canned music" in motion
pictures and on television films, reduced employment in those industries
and thus reduced the capacity of the AFM to address this problem effectively through collective bargaining. The users of recorded music-the
radio and television stations, and the motion picture exhibitors--cannot be
pressured by the union because they do not employ live musicians and
because of legal restrictions. The AFM must therefore exert its bargaining
influence in dealings with the producers of recorded music, which are commonly in a position to withstand union pressure because of the availability
of foreign or canned music.
Since the resignation of President Petrillo and the election of President
Kenin, the Federation has given more attention to the problems of the
recording musician and to the political process in Congress. As has been
recounted above, the contracts negotiated by Kenin from 1958 until his
death in 1970 were successful in securing payments for recording musicians measured by the number of records sold, or the number of showings
of a television program, or the producer's revenues from the exploitation
of the recording. On the congressional front, the Federation has supported
legislation concerning restrictions upon the use of canned foreign music in
television, restrictions upon the entry into the United States of non-immigrant alien workers (such as film crews and musicians), and subsidies for
the arts and copyright protection for performers. Kenin and his successors
as Federation president have also emphasized public relations campaigns
and programs of cooperation with foreign unions.
The seeds of many of the Federation's current policies were thus sown in
the late 1950s. It is hoped that this Article has provided a greater appreciation of the events that shaped the Federation of today.

APPENDIX: THE LEA ACT OF

1946

§ 506. Coercive practices affecting broadcasting; enforcement of contracts; penalties; definition.
(a) It shall be unlawful, by the use or express or implied threat of the
use of force, violence, intimidation, or duress, or by the use or express or

SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL

[Vol. 37

implied threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel or constrain or
attempt to coerce, compel, or constrain a licensee(1) to employ or agree to employ, in connection with the conduct of
the broadcasting business of such licensee, any person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform
actual services; or
(2) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of
value in lieu of giving, or on account of failure to give, employment to
any person or persons, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, in excess of the number of employees
needed by such licensee to perform actual services; or
(3) to pay or agree to pay more than once for services performed in
connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee; or
(4) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money or other thing of
value for services, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting
business of such licensee, which are not to be performed; or
(5) to refrain, or agree to refrain, from broadcasting or from permitting the broadcasting of a noncommercial educational or cultural program in connection with which the participants receive no money or
other thing of value for their services, other than their actual expenses,
and such licensee neither pays nor gives any money or other thing of
value for the privilege of broadcasting such program nor receives any
money or other thing of value on account of the broadcasting of such
program; or
(6) to refrain, or agree to refrain, from broadcasting or permitting
the broadcasting of any radio communication originating outside the
United States.
(b) It shall be unlawful, by the use or express or implied threat of the
use of force, violence, intimidation or duress, or by the use or express or
implied threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel or constrain or
attempt to coerce, compel or constrain a licensee or any other person(1) to pay or agree to pay any exaction for the privilege of, or on
account of, producing, preparing, manufacturing, selling, buying, renting, operating, using, or maintaining recordings, transcriptions, or
mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproductions, or any other articles,
equipment, machines, or materials, used or intended to be used in
broadcasting or in the production, preparation, performance, or presentation of a program or programs for broadcasting; or
(2) to accede to or impose any restriction upon such production,
preparation, manufacture, sale, purchase, rental, operation, use, or
maintenance, if such restriction is for the purpose of preventing or limiting the use of such articles, equipment, machines, or materials in broadcasting or in the production, preparation, performance, or presentation
of a program or programs for broadcasting; or
(3) to pay or agree to pay any exaction on account of the broadcast-
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ing, by means of recordings or transcriptions, of a program previously
broadcast, payment having been made, or agreed to be made, for the
services actually rendered in the performance of such program.
(c) The provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall not be
held to make unlawful the enforcement or attempted enforcement, by
means lawfully employed, of any contract right heretofore or hereafter existing or of any legal obligation heretofore or hereafter existing or of any
legal obligation heretofore or hereafter incurred or assumed.
(d) Whoever willfully violates any provision of subsection (a) or (b) of
this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment
for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
(e) As used in this section the term "licensee" includes the owner or
owners, and the person or persons having control or management, of the
radio station in respect of which a station license was granted. (June 19,
1934, ch. 652, § 506, as added Apr. 16, 1946, ch. 138, 60 Stat. 89.)

